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Abstract
“Something On Women For the Crime Bill”:
The Construction and Passage of the Violence Against Women Act,
1990-1994
By Irene Meisel
Advisor: Professor Sandi E. Cooper
“Something on Women for the Crime Bill” examines the legislative and theoretical
history of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), signed into law in 1994. It explores the
deeply intertwined relationship between the tough-on-crime and feminist movements that shaped
both the bill itself and the political discussion surrounding it. The bill inherited a host of ideas
about crime, criminality, and race from the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
leading to a very particular representation of the rapist as a black criminal inhabiting the streets.
It merged the categories of rape and domestic violence into one classification of “violence
against women,” eliminating the need to address the particular characteristics of either and
resulting in even greater erosion of the feminist anti-rape message.
This dissertation also details the role of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
(NOW LDEF) in the bill’s crafting and passage. NOW LDEF’s participation in VAWA’s
creation represented a political coming of age for second-wave feminism, but the organization’s
eagerness to pass a civil rights remedy for addressing rape caused its staff to view the very
damaging effects of the bill’s other provisions as mere collateral.
Finally, “Something on Women for the Crime Bill” describes the hitherto undocumented
efforts of a number of the ACLU, the NAACP, and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,
all of which warned against VAWA’s destructive measures, to worked behind the scenes to halt
its passage, and or to ameliorate its effects.
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INTRODUCTION

“Something On Women for the Crime Bill” examines the legislative and
theoretical history of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) in an effort to
understand how the deeply intertwined relationship between the tough-on-crime and
feminist movements shaped both the content of the bill and the political discussion
surrounding it.1 VAWA’s close relationship to earlier anti-crime strategies ensured that
the bill focused not on empowering women but punishing their attackers; the language of
VAWA construed women as generic crime victims, eroding the empowering message of
feminism.
The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund (NOW LDEF) played a much
greater role in shaping the bill than has previously been appreciated. NOW LDEF’s
pivotal role in VAWA’s creation and passage represented a political coming of age for
second-wave feminist institutions and ideas, but was not uncontroversial. The
organization hadn’t worked extensively on either rape or domestic violence legislation
before, so was viewed with suspicion by many of those who had. Because NOW LDEF
was historically a majority white organization working on a crime bill with deep racial
undertones, both public and private conversations about VAWA stirred up old
animosities about who truly represents feminism.
Opposition to the bill from both civil rights and women’s legal advocacy groups
represented a larger and potentially more dangerous obstacle to its passage than
previously documented. While hesitant to publicly oppose VAWA because of the peril of
1

VAWA was Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, H.R. 3355 103rd Cong.
(1993) passed as Pub. L. 103-322 103rd Cong. (1994).
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appearing to be “pro violence against women,” they nonetheless worked assiduously
behind the scenes to prevent VAWA’s passage and, in lieu of that, to ameliorate what
they saw as the bill’s far-too-punitive measures.
The particularities of VAWA’s construction made understandings of rape
vulnerable to further revision to better conform to the law-and-order worldview in new
and alarming ways. For instance, VAWA merged the categories of rape and domestic
violence into one classification “violence against women,” a previously unheard of
legislative entity. The elision of the two removed the need to address the particular
characteristics of either and resulted in even greater erosion of the feminist anti-rape
message by the law-and-order impulse. In addition, the fact that several of the
legislation’s titles amended the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (the
1968 crime bill) guaranteed that VAWA inherited a host of ideas about crime,
criminality, and race from that bill.2
Not coincidentally, the driving ideas behind VAWA can be linked to two 1968
developments. The first is the emergence of rape as a feminist issue symbolized by
feminist Kate Millet’s essay “Sexual Politics,” which asserted that, “Like every system of
oppression, male supremacy rests finally on force, physical power, rape, assault and the
threat of assault.”3 Millett and others in the organization she belonged to, New York
Radical Women (NYRW) offered a radically new interpretation of rape as part of a
continuum of women’s oppression. Millett suggested that the solution to the scourge of
rape was nothing less than a social and cultural revolution. The revolution Millett called
2

Pub. L. 90-351 90th Cong. (1968).
Kate Millet, Sexual Politics, (Millet’s essay was circulated by hand before it was first published in book
form. New York: Doubleday, 1970), accessed April 9, 2014, https://www.marxists.org/subject/women/
authors /millett-kate/sexual-politics.htm.
3
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for would be marked by a “change of consciousness of which a new relationship between
the sexes and a new definition of humanity and human personality are an integral part.”4
The second was the passage of the 1968 crime bill, which marked the federal
government’s entrée into fighting state and local crime. Tough-on-crime proponents
conflated street the street protests of the 1960s with street crime and saw a more punitive
justice system as the solution to the social protests that had spread across American cities.
As noted sociologist Kenneth B. Clark pointed out, there was “a tendency to make crime
in the streets synonymous with racial threats or the need to control the urban Negro
problem.”5 Several scholars have documented the extent to which 1960s political
ideology linked blackness to criminality.”6
While “Sexual Politics” and the 1968 crime bill were poles apart in 1968, when
VAWA was introduced in 1990, its main rape provision would be called the Safe Streets
for Women Act—after the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act—and at its
center would be a title creating prosecution grants modeled on those in the 1968 bill.
Millett’s essay signaled the beginning of a robust anti-rape movement.7 Over the
next few years, addressing rape became a major feminist priority. Across the nation,
feminist activists held speak-outs and protests to demand change. They created volunteerrun rape crisis centers that addressed the needs of survivors and modeled the type of nonhierarchical society they hoped to create. By 1979, the number of rape crisis centers

4

Ibid.
Vesla Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American
Political Development, no. 21 (2007): 230–65.
6
Weaver, 230; Jonathan Simon, “Governing through Crime Metaphors,” Brooklyn Law Review 67 (2001):
1052.
7
Historian Liz Kelly describes one of the hallmarks of the rape crisis movement—stressing the agency of
those who have been raped by replacing the description of “victim” with “survivor.” I have chosen to
follow this practice. Liz Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1988).
5
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across the country had grown to over 400.8 In addition, state rape laws across the country
had been revised and subdivisions of police departments and state attorney general
offices were dedicated to investigating sex crimes.
While the second-wave feminists who first publicly addressed rape identified as
radical, rape quickly became an issue that not only crossed over boundaries between
multiple feminisms but also helped to erase those boundaries.9 The previously
mainstream National Organization for Women (NOW) started its own rape task force in
1973. In 1974, the New York Radical Feminists (NYRF), a successor group to NYRW,
and the National Black Feminist Organization (NBFO) held a joint speak-out.10
Nevertheless, how exactly to fight rape and even whether or not rape should be the target
of feminist anti-violence efforts were issues that caused great consternation between
feminists and feminisms.
To those who wanted to target rape law itself, collaboration with law enforcement
to get legislation passed—and the concurrent reframing of rape law as crime control—
seemed the most efficient route to meaningful legislative action.11 In this way, rape was
split off as a discrete target of legislative change, separate from the social justice goals of
the wider feminist movement. The decision to ally with law enforcement to reform rape
laws was controversial. While many feminists supported state-based solutions, such as

8

Maria Bevacqua, Rape on the Public Agenda: Feminism and the Politics of Sexual Assault (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 2000), 35.
9
In her study of black, Chicana, and white second-wave feminist movements, Benita Roth replaces the
standard narrative of a two-branch (radical and liberal) middle class white movement with one of a
movement comprised of multiple feminist mobilizations. Benita Roth, Separate Roads to Feminism: Black,
Chicana, and White Feminist Movements in America’s Second Wave (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
10
Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975),
XI.
11
Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 210.
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law reform, in the fight against rape, just as many fiercely contested this strategy,
preferring to remain faithful to the original movement politics that rejected state
mediation of any kind. Although they maintained their political commitment to ending
sexism, some women argued that reforming the criminal justice system was so far
removed from the root aims of the feminist movement as to invert the movement’s
original message.12
Scholars Marie Gottschalk, Kristin Bumiller, and Jonathan Simon have explored
the growth of the tough-on-crime movement and its intricate relationship to the anti-rape
and domestic violence movements at length. These scholars stand at the forefront of a
larger effort to document the history of what scholars term the “carceral” state—a phrase
referring to the explosive growth of the prison population and the retributive turn in
United States penal policy since the late 1960s.13
The work of these scholars elegantly explores the mechanisms through which the
feminist anti-rape movement was ultimately subsumed under the banner of a highly
racialized law-and-order movement. They posit that, in response to the social challenges
of the 1960s, conservative political leaders—both locally and at the national level—
began to highlight street crime in an attempt to steer state policy toward social control
and away from social welfare. Eventually rape was framed as just one of many street
crimes to be tackled by the state criminal justice apparatus.
Gottschalk, in particular, shows how Johnson’s 1968 crime bill, central to this

12

Catherine Olga Jacquet, “Responding to Rape: Contesting the Meanings of Sexual Violence in the United
States, 1950-1980” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2012), 17.
13
Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kristin Bumiller, In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism
Appropriated the Feminist Movement against Sexual Violence (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009);
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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drive, created policies and funding structures that would lead to a greatly expanded role
for government in rape crisis centers. Centers were gradually transformed from
expressions of a social movement to social service providers. This transformation
accelerated during the 1980s when the volunteer-run revolutionary ethos of rape crisis
centers was slowly drained of its potent transformative message.
By 1990, rape’s metamorphosis into a criminal justice issue would make it an
appropriate focus for the omnibus crime bill then-Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) had
recently introduced.14 There are several conflicting published accounts that detail Biden’s
decision to introduce VAWA to this crime bill, but Biden himself anchored his decision
to his career-long preoccupation with fighting crime.15 In May 1990 Biden, who was then
chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the self-proclaimed Democratic “point man
on crime,” decided he wanted to include a measure targeting crimes against women in his
sprawling crime bill.16 He turned for help to a new lawyer on the Judiciary Committee
staff, Victoria Nourse, who was asked to get him “something on women for the crime
bill.”17
Nourse crafted VAWA’s first two titles to fit into the already existing template of
the crime bill, so that the majority of VAWA’s provisions were refracted through that
bill’s tough-on-crime lens. VAWA’s first title, Safe Streets for Women, created grants for
law enforcement that ate up the majority of VAWA’s funding and introduced mandatory
minimum sentences. VAWA’s second title, Safe Homes for Women, implemented

14

S.1972 101st Cong. (1989).
Joseph R. Biden, Promises to Keep: On Life and Politics (New York: Random House, 2007), 224.
16
Ibid., 234.
17
Nourse described her work on VAWA in an essay titled “The Accidental Feminist.” Victoria Nourse,
“The Accidental Feminist,” in Transcending the Boundaries of Law: Generations of Feminism and Legal
Theory, ed. Martha Fineman (New York: Routledge, 2011), 339–351.
15
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mandatory arrest policies and made orders of protection for domestic violence valid
across state lines.
VAWA’s most controversial third title, Civil Rights For Women—a legal remedy
that made it possible for women who had been the victims of gender-based violence to
sue their attackers in civil court—did not fit this template.18 While crafting VAWA,
Nourse contacted NOW LDEF’s Senior Counsel Sally Goldfarb. Goldfarb, intrigued by
the civil rights remedy, threw herself wholeheartedly into VAWA’s passage. Ultimately
her investment in the civil rights remedy gave her and others at NOW LDEF a fierce
sense of loyalty to the bill. Their belief that the remedy would be landmark feminist
legislation caused them to view the possible damaging effects of the bill’s other
provisions as merely collateral. Hypnotized by the holy grail of a civil rights cause of
action, these feminists were deaf to warnings from the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), the NAACP, and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR)—an
umbrella organization that included both the ACLU and NAACP, among others—about
the overly-punitive nature of the bill.
Because NOW LDEF was focused on litigation, it did not have the lobbying or
grassroots organizing experience that had helped make its one-time parent organization,
the National Organization for Women (NOW), considered by many to be the standard
bearer for modern American feminism. Therefore NOW LDEF hired veteran lobbyist
Patricia Reuss. Together, Goldfarb and Reuss created and helped enlarge what would
become a national VAWA task force. Goldfarb operated behind the scenes, frequently
meeting with both lawmakers and other advocates and often serving as a bridge between
18

Several different people take credit for sparking the idea that shaped the civil rights remedy, including
Victoria Nourse herself; Ron Klain, her boss on the Judiciary Committee and Catharine MacKinnon, the
famed feminist scholar and activist known for her work on sexual harassment and pornography.
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the two. Reuss masterminded not only lobbying efforts on the Hill, but also the task
force’s broad-based nationwide outreach strategy.
The punitiveness of VAWA’s measures lead to a concerted effort by several at the
ACLU, NAACP LDF and the National Women’s Law Center (NWLC) to thwart
VAWA’s passage. While unwilling to speak out publicly, lawyers for these organizations
worked assiduously first to thwart the bill’s passage and, when passage seemed
inevitable, to temper the harsh provisions of the bill.
VAWA’s retributive content notwithstanding, during the bill’s sojourn in
Congress it frequently came under attack by politicians eager to add additional and more
stringent punishments. 19 Thus members of the VAWA task force created a working
alliance with the Congressional Caucus on Women’s issues to try to rebuff efforts to pull
VAWA to the right. President Clinton signed the bill into law as Title IV of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (the crime bill) on September 13, 1994.
Despite NOW LDEF’s best intentions, VAWA was ultimately an anti-crime bill,
rather than pro-woman legislation. Early anti-rape activists’ worst fears of criminal
justice co-optation had come true.

CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter One begins with an examination of American stereotypes about rape and
the rapist. It pays particular attention to the centrality of race to the political history of
rape in the United States, exploring the rhetorical construction of black men as constantly

19

Particularly Robert Dole (R-KS) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
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threatening sexual attacks, black women as always consenting to sex, and white women
as consistently duplicitous.20
Catherine Jacquet was one of the first scholars to consider both the civil rights and
feminist responses to rape, contextualizing the second wave in a larger history of social
movement response to sexual violence. While the history of anti-rape activism has often
been described as propelled entirely by white women in the radical arm of the feminist
movement, in fact anti-rape crusading had been one of the goals of the civil rights
movement. Despite this, the anti-rape efforts of the two movements frequently focused on
different aspects of the crime. Civil rights groups’ race-based framework thoroughly
informed their understandings and strategies in response to sexual violence to such an
extent that they often viewed rape as a tool of racial oppression, and focused their efforts
on the discrepancy in punishment between white and black convicted rapists. In contrast,
radical feminist activists like conceptualized it as the most exaggerated form of
patriarchal control, and often ignored the racial undertones in public discussions of rape.
At times the two approaches could and did intersect, but the difference in emphasis was
almost always a stumbling block to joint activism.
Kimberlé Crenshaw popularized the term “intersectionality” to describe a theory
that takes into account the cumulative influence of racism, sexism, and classism. At a
1993 meeting of the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault (NCASA), a national
coalition of rape crisis centers, Crenshaw gave a keynote that addressed the disastrous
effects of a theory of gender that excludes race and vice versa.21 She pointed out that the
lack of an intersectional analysis leaves the needs of black women ignored and insures
20

Ibid., 2.
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “The Marginalization of Sexual Violence Against Black Women.”
NCASA Journal 2, no. 1 (1994): 1, 2, 15.
21
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that black men are overly penalized. She warned that a penal solution to rape was overly
simplistic, as the violence suffered by women comes from several different sources, and
thus needs to be addressed with a complex set of solutions.22
Early in the life of the feminist movement, activists held an antagonistic view of
the legal system and law enforcement. Many radicals argued stridently against any kind
of collaboration with the government, including working with law enforcement and
accepting money from the state. Leery of such alliances, these feminists argued that their
independence was both implicitly and explicitly empowering. Still, many activists
conceded that working to reform the government’s approach to rape was a necessary evil.
The chapter then looks at the anti-rape movement’s incorporation into the toughon-crime movement, which was in part a byproduct of the anti-rape movement’s
mainstream success. Maria Bevacqua’s Rape on the Public Agenda: Feminism and the
Politics of Sexual Assault examines what happens to feminist aspirations when they are
reconfigured as legislative goals. 23 Bevacqua points out that moving anti-rape efforts
from the feminist agenda to the public agenda changes the understanding of rape in many
ways. For instance, gone is the impetus to revamp gender structures; in its place is the
drive to punish and stigmatize the individual rapist. In Bevacqua’s words, rape is
converted “from an expression of patriarchy to a heinous crime, and from a tool for the
control of women’s bodies to the province of a few criminally minded individuals.”24
Efforts to police blackness that began with the introduction of the 1968 crime bill

22

Ibid.
Bevacqua, Rape On the Public Agenda, 134.
24
Ibid.
23
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continued into the 1970s, when President Nixon declared a “war on drugs.”25 Michelle
Alexander’s The New Jim Crow makes the bold claim that the United States criminal
justice system has used the war on drugs as a tool for discrimination and repression to
such an extent that mass incarceration has become “a stunningly comprehensive and
well-disguised system of racialized social control.”26
Because women could be narratively framed as perfect victims, the anti-rape
movement was in many ways a perfect vehicle for furthering the victims’ rights
movement and vice versa.27 While it initially started as a parallel but deeply related
spinoff of the tough-on-crime movement, victims; rights soon developed its own separate
agenda. The first hallmark accomplishment of the movement was the passage of the 1984
Victims Of Crime Act (VOCA). Rape crisis centers, in desperate need of money,
represented their activities in such a way as to make themselves ideal candidates for
VOCA funding. Nancy Matthews’ history of the anti-rape movement’s relationship with
the state, Confronting Rape: the Feminist Anti-Rape Movement and the State contends
that feminist demands and concurrent state responses ultimately “converged at the point
of what happens after the fact of violence, a convergence Matthews terms “managing
rape.”28 Managing rape is, of course, in stark contrast to stopping violence. Matthews’
work uses a study of rape crisis centers in California to demonstrate the extent to which
the state—under the aegis of the Office of Criminal Justice Programs (OCJP) in this
case—influenced the direction of rape crisis work by supporting the therapeutic aspects
25

Andrew B. Whitford and Jeff Yates, Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda: Constructing the War
on Drugs (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
26
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York:
New Press, 2010).
27
Gottschalk, 215.
28
Nancy A. Matthews, Confronting Rape: The Feminist Anti-rape Movement and the State, (New York:
Routledge, 1994), 149–165.
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of the anti-rape movement’s agenda while simultaneously pushing rape crisis centers’
more political messages to the side. As a consequence, rape crisis centers were
transformed from sites of feminist activism to social service providers. Organizations that
did not go along with the wishes of the OCJP or were too interested in maintaining a
collectivist, rather than hierarchical structure, did not receive funding and had a severely
shortened lifespan.29
While radical feminists originally brought the issue of rape to the fore, Maria
Bevacqua shows that anti-rape activism sometimes allowed feminists to collaborate
across ideological lines.30 Despite this, throughout the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
NOW had an ongoing if slightly complicated relationship with anti-rape activists.
Maryann Barakso’s Governing NOW explores the fluidity of NOW’s politics. The
organization mutated from the 1960s, when it was relatively mainstream, to radicalism
and heavy involvement in anti-rape activism in the 1970s, and once more in the 1980s
when it again became more mainstream, focusing on electoral politics. This fluidity
affected the extent and quality of NOW and NOW LDEF’s alliance with groups focused
entirely on sexual violence.

Rape and the Law
The relationship between violence against women and the law was famously
addressed by a number of pioneering feminist theorists. Estelle Freedman’s Redefining
Rape points out the extent to which understandings of rape have been tied to ideas about
29

Barbara Levy Simon, “Social Movements and Institutionalization: Rape As A Case Study” (Ph.D. Diss.,
Bryn Mawr College, 1981).
30
Maria Bevacqua, “Coalition Politics in the Antirape Movement,” in Feminist Coalitions: Historical
Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United States (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008),
163–177.
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who is—and is not—a citizen. 31 The exclusion of women from voting and lawmaking
contributed to the sense that sexual crimes against them (by men enjoying these
privileges) were immune to prosecution. Indeed Catharine MacKinnon’s Feminism
Unmodified contends that because the American legal system uses maleness as the
standard, women are always judged by the extent to which they are different from men.32
These differences, MacKinnon argues, ultimately create a system of inherent inequality
when they are used to disadvantage women. Carol Smart’s Law, Crime and Sexuality:
Essays in Feminism examines the reciprocal constitutive relationship between the public
and legal understandings of rape.33 Smart explores the means by which the legal
construction of rape shapes the wider understanding of the crime just as the layman’s
understanding of the crime necessarily helps construct the law. Smart agrees with
MacKinnon that the hidden gendering of concepts is widespread and applies this concept
to the rape trial itself, which she understands as a mode of sexualization of women’s
bodies.34 Women’s overly sexualized bodies, Smart argues, are presented as open or
vulnerable to the desires of men. Indeed, Smart argues that women’s bodies are what she
terms “sexed,” meaning that sexualized meanings are attributed to the corporeality of
women.
Chapter Two begins by asking several questions about the introduction of
VAWA. Why did Biden decide to introduce VAWA at all? Why did he decide to
introduce VAWA when and in the form that he did? Who wrote the bill’s different

31

Estelle B. Freedman, Redefining Rape: Sexual Violence in the Era of Suffrage and Segregation
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 8.
32
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1987).
33
Carol Smart, Law, Crime and Sexuality: Essays in Feminism (London: Sage Publications, 1995).
34
Ibid, 84.
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sections and what was the relationship between authorship and content? How were those
who worked at NOW LDEF, an organization that had not been actively involved in the
anti-rape movement, galvanized to work for VAWA’s passage? And why was Nourse so
eager to enlist NOW LDEF’s services and support? A close look at competing and
contradictory claims about VAWA’s introduction and authorship reveals a great deal
about the complex juggling act used by those who supported the legislation to prove their
feminist credentials.
Next, the chapter examines VAWA’s individual titles. In addition to Safe Streets
for Women, Safe Homes for Women, and Civil Rights for Women, VAWA included
Equal Justice for Women in the Courts, which included measures for judicial education;
National Stalker and Domestic Violence Reduction, which authorized the federal
government to access criminal justice databases; and Protections for Battered Immigrant
Women and Children, which allowed beaten immigrant women to sue for United States
citizenship.
Chapter Three explores the strategy Goldfarb and Reuss employed to help the task
force garner support for VAWA both from members of Congress and from the public at
large. Because VAWA could be packaged as two bills in one—one part law enforcement
measures and one part civil rights remedy—task force members could present the bill as a
civil rights coup or a blow against crime, tailoring their message to their audience or
audiences. Because the task force was in the unusual position of having to gather support
for a bill supposedly promoting civil and women’s rights that many civil rights and
women’s groups shied away from, Reuss worked to gather the support of unions,

14

religious groups, and others less concerned with the legal construction of civil rights law
and more prone to endorse law enforcement measures.
Indeed, some of the fiercest opposition that VAWA faced was from the ACLU’s
Women’s Rights Project (WRP) and the NWLC, both of which saw a host of dangers
inherent in VAWA. Among the things they feared were the hyper-punitive nature of
VAWA’s law enforcement and mandatory arrest measures and what they saw as the
troublesome construction of the civil rights remedy. Isabelle Katz Pinzler of the WRP and
Brenda Smith of the NWLC worried that a remedy covering only gender could
potentially erode the civil rights of blacks and other minorities. Evidence of feminists
vying for legitimacy can be found in the fraught relationship between NOW LDEF and
anti-rape and anti-domestic violence groups outside Washington D.C. When writing her
dissertation, “Legal Momentum: NOW-LDEF’s Role in Shaping Policy on Domestic
Violence and Welfare Reform,” sociologist Margaret Holmes conducted extensive
interviews with politicians, advocates, and activists.35 Many anti-rape activists were, at
best, perplexed and, at worst, chagrined by NOW LDEF’s outsized role in VAWA.36
Because NOW LDEF itself had no history of working on either rape or domestic violence
legislation, smaller rape crisis groups and some domestic violence groups questioned the
authenticity of NOW LDEF’s effort to pass rape-related legislation.
Chapter Four expands upon other analyses of VAWA’s discursive structure to
shine a light on the entrenched representation of women’s victimization, the rapist’s

35

Margaret Ann Holmes, “Legal Momentum: NOW-LDEF’s Role in Shaping Policy on Domestic Violence
and Welfare Reform” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Minnesota, 2005).
36
Ibid., 25.

15

criminality, and the politician’s redemptive qualities.37 It provide a close textual reading
of VAWA itself as well as of the reports and hearings from the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd
Congresses that make up VAWA’s official historical record.
Caroline Picart’s work highlights the difficulty of presenting women who have
been raped or experienced domestic violence as anything besides victims, and those who
have not as maintaining agency.38 She suggests that in presenting a strict dichotomy
between women who are victims and women who are not, VAWA oversimplifies the
complexity of women’s role(s) in society, ignoring a central message of feminism.39
Indeed VAWA’s vision of women as generic crime victims reified women’s
victimization to a degree that anti-rape activists—who purposefully tried to excise the
word “victim” from their vernacular, replacing it with the less evocative and more
empowering term “survivor”—had gone to great lengths to avoid. Furthermore, VAWA’s
merging of the two very different crimes of rape and domestic violence into the single
category “violence against women” put added emphasis on women’s supposed
victimization, something these terms shared. Nor have scholars addressed the extent to
which women were encouraged to perform their victimization during hearings, and the
multiple ways in which the writers of Congressional reports capitalized on the image of
the woman as victim to bolster their case for VAWA’s necessity.
In a similar manner, VAWA included intrinsic assumptions about the nature of
the rapist. Several scholars have already examined how VAWA itself rhetorically
37
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constructs the rapist. For instance, “Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A
Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation” by law professor Christina E. Wells and
lawyer Erin Elliott Motley posits that VAWA, while presented as feminist, in reality
substantially undermined feminist efforts by reinforcing the notion that men who rape are
“brutish male aggressors and sex-crazed deviant sociopaths.”40 Aya Gruber’s “Rape,
Feminism and the War on Crime” is of a piece with “Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed
Rapist.”41 Gruber argues that the act of addressing sexualized violence solely through
criminal law supports the view that the prevalence of sexual abuse is a the result of
individual deviance and not the result of women’s impoverished socio-economic status
and men’s “normal” behavioral practices. In this way anti-rape legislation has privileged
a criminal, rather than a feminist, understanding of rape.
None of these scholars has examined the extent to which the actual architecture of
VAWA itself—moored to the historic framework of the 1968 crime bill and further
embedding anti-rape efforts in the structure of anti-criminality—reinforced the idea that
the rapist was a crazed black stranger stalking the streets. The imagery of women
victimized by criminals lurking in the streets set the stage perfectly for the idealized
politician/savior to step in and save the day; in one hearing and report after another
politicians indeed presented themselves as doing just that. The message of women’s
empowerment that had been woven into the fabric of early rape crisis centers had all but
disappeared in the rush to prosecute, supposedly on women’s behalf.
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DESCRIPTION OF SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
Claire Bond Potter begins her introduction to Doing Recent History with a quote
by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. exhorting historians of the recent past to be completely aware
of “the inadequacy of the present moment for any sort of lasting judgments.”42 Indeed,
writing about the recent past can put severe limits on one’s perspective, as well as limit
the number of books available to support and contextualize research. It also means facing
limits on archives that are closed or restricted to researchers for a specified period of time
that ends many years in the future.
As a plus, writing a history of the recent past makes it possible to interview live
sources. I gained invaluable information speaking to those involved in the day-to-day
machinations of VAWA’s passage. I spoke to NOW LDEF’s Sally Goldfarb and Patricia
Reuss. Brenda Smith, who played a central role in attempts to prevent VAWA’s passage
while working at the NWLC, helped me flesh out my understanding of those efforts. I
learned more about the relationship between NOW LDEF and domestic violence
advocates by speaking to Karen Artichoker of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and Joan Zorza
of the National Center on Women and Family Law, both of whom traveled to
Washington D.C. to work on the bill. Zorza redlined the first version of VAWA for
Nourse. Joanne Howes, who owned a public relations firm active in Washington D.C.43
told me about being hired by the Family Violence Prevention Fund (FVPF) to lobby for
VAWA. Members of Bass and Howes were involved in last-minute negotiations between
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Biden’s office, NOW LDEF, and the LCCR over the wording of the civil rights remedy.
Primary sources consulted included NOW’s and NOW LDEF’s records. The
minutes of the meetings of the VAWA task force made it possible to plot the
development and growth of task force membership to discern the relationship between
task force members and track the relationship between the task force and congressional
staff. Most of the minutes were typed for distribution, but in several instances
handwritten notes were particularly revealing. Margaret Holmes gave me copies of the
transcripts of her interviews with a range of subjects, including NOW LDEF staff,
congressional staff, and activists. These interviews helped me clarify my understanding
of grassroots activists’ attitudes toward NOW LDEF’s central role in VAWA’s passage.
In addition to investigating the above sources, I also examined VAWA’s various
drafts as well as the bill’s collateral materials—the reports and hearings that make up its
official historical record. I provide a close reading of these in an effort to uncover their
implicit and explicit assumptions about women’s vulnerability, the identity of the rapist,
and the role of politicians embedded in both the bill’s language and structure.
Ultimately VAWA’s passage narrowed the range of possible federal responses to
rape and domestic violence at the same time that it pushed the national conversation
about these crimes to the right. Because lawyers steeped in the tradition of civil rights,
such as Brenda Smith and Isabel Katz Pinzler, were more accustomed to focusing on
rape’s role as a tool of racial oppression, they were particularly attuned to the possibility
that efforts to craft anti-rape legislation could go devastatingly off course. Those who
came from a stricter—and whiter— tradition of feminist jurisprudence were focused
more narrowly on women’s rights and could perhaps too easily lay aside the worries of
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their peers. That VAWA was supported by the latter over the objections of the former
seems in hindsight to implicate legal feminists in the creation of the carceral state, but it
is nowhere evident that those working on VAWA twenty-five years ago could have
foreseen the extent to which it would push the movement they were so dedicated to one
step closer to co-optation by those bent on pursuing law and order. Instead, that some
feminists wholeheartedly supported VAWA is a reminder that even actions taken with the
best of intentions can have very ugly consequences.
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CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
THE RISE OF SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM
Between the mid-1950s and early 1960s, civil rights activists brought racial justice to the
center of the nation’s political consciousness through direct action protests, non-violent
resistance, and state and federal legal battles. The civil rights movement’s success in eliciting a
federal response to race-based discrimination raised expectations among feminist activists for a
comparable response, causing President Kennedy to create the Presidential Commission on the
Status of Women (PCSW) by executive order in December 1961.44 With the commission’s
creation, feminists felt ready to tackle the impasse between those who favored and those who
opposed passage of an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Organized labor’s support for
protective legislation made union members particularly outspoken opponents of the ERA.
Pauli Murray, a civil rights lawyer whose career trajectory would be shaped by the
tensions between the feminist and civil rights movements, was on the commission’s Committee
on Civil Rights. Murray recommended the creation of a litigation campaign for equal rights for
women’s similar to that used by the NAACP to fight for equal rights for blacks.45 Murray called
for stronger ties between advocates for women’s and civil rights. The PCSW’s final report
incorporating Murray’s ideas was published in 1963, the same year as Betty Friedan’s The
Feminine Mystique. While the runaway success of Friedan’s book is widely known, the PCSW’s
report, too, was something of a hit. Over 200,000 copies were ordered from the Government
Printing Office in the first year of publication, bringing a wide number of previously-ignored
44

Kathleen A. Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy: A History of the Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of
Labor, 1945-1970. (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000), 80.
45
Ibid., 351-352.

21

into the realm of public debate.46 The PCSW’s final report, “American Women,” declared that
equality should be achieved through a Supreme Court decision supporting women’s protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. It was noncommittal on the ERA,
stating that as women were already entitled to constitutional protection against discrimination, it
could not immediately endorse a constitutional amendment. By not explicitly objecting to the
ERA, the committee pointedly left it on the table as an option. At issue was the extent to which
race and gender should receive similar treatment and the benefits of equal protection promised
by the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to the prohibition on classification by gender
proposed by the ERA.
Legally-minded feminists were much more successful at creating legal precepts based on
a specific class of injury to particular women than at establishing more universal protections
based on gender. One of their few unequivocal successes was the addition of the category of
sex—joining race, color, religion and national origin—in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill,
which prohibited employment discrimination. Inclusion of sex undermined the necessity for
further protective legislation and formalized a connection between the fights for black and
women’s rights. In response to Title VII’s passage, Murray penned a piece called “Jane Crow
and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII,” which drew comparisons between Jim Crow
laws and discriminatory laws against women.47
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Murray and several other women who had been on the PCSW created a loose network,
known in feminist circles as the “Washington Underground,” to continue the PCSW’s
momentum.48 In 1966 a number Murray and a number of fellow Washington Undergrounders
attended the Third National Conference of State Commissions on the Status of Women, a
successor to the PCSW. Frustrated at the slow pace with which the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was responding to Title VII cases, several of these women
met hastily in the hotel room of another attendee, political activist Betty Friedan, where they
decided to form what one feminist called a “NAACP for women.” Murray contributed to NOW’s
statement of purpose, which proclaimed that the goal of the organization was to bring women
into full participation in the mainstream of American society. 49 The statement railed against the
EEOC’s unwillingness to enforce Title VII on behalf of women, many of who were “Negro
women, who are the victims of the double discrimination of race and sex.” It continued:
There is no civil rights movement to speak for women, as there has been for Negroes and
other victims of discrimination. The National Organization for Women must therefore
begin to speak. We believe that the power of American law, and the protection
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution to the civil rights of all individuals, must be
effectively applied and enforced to isolate and remove patterns of sex discrimination, to
ensure equality of opportunity in employment and education, and equality of civil and
political rights and responsibilities on behalf of women, as well as for Negroes and other
deprived groups.50
From the beginning, legal change was central to NOW’s goals and identity. Also from the
beginning, NOW had an intricate and confused relationship with the civil rights movement.
Although its statement of purpose pointed out the double bind of black women, it also distanced
itself from them by referencing the separate categories of “women” and “Negroes.” It also

48

Betty Friedan, "It Changed My Life," 76-83. Quoted in Georgia Duerst-Lahti, 250.
Serena Mayeri, “Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change.” California
Law Review 92, no. 3 (2004): 755–839.
50
Richard C. Sinopoli, From Many, One: Readings in American Political and Social Thought (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1996), 150.
49

23

actively linked the struggle for women’s rights to that of civil rights, in this instance positing a
direct parallel between the two.
During its first years, NOW focused on petitioning the EEOC to hold hearings to enforce
Title VII. By 1967, the EEOC agreed to hold hearings, and NOW had set up picket lines at five
national EEOC offices to protest newspapers’ routine publication of sex-specific “Help Wanted”
ads. The following February, a member of NOW’s legal committee filed a suit against the
commission. In August 1968 the EEOC bowed to pressure and barred segregated ads.
At NOW’s second national conference, in 1967, members voted to endorse passage of the
ERA. Several women who had been working for ERA passage for decades thwarted attempts
made by younger activists to create more expansive wording for the amendment. Working
toward ERA passage ultimately monopolized the collective attention and energy of NOW
members, and drained their attention and resources from other battles. Historian Serena Mayeri
argues that decisions such as these help to explain the emergence of a formalistic, exclusive, and
impoverished notion of equality that severed NOW’s activities from those of other social justice
causes and ensured that NOW’s victories benefited the privileged classes at the expense of the
poor and women of color.51 Disappointed with what she saw as NOW’s shortsighted decision,
Murray resigned from the NOW board.52
NOW’s legal committee began its life by working for the Title VII litigation for the
employment equality that had been at the root of its founding.53 To focus more sharply on
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legislation, the committee formally split off in 1970 to become the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund.54 Over time it expanded its legislative focus to include abortion rights and Title
IX, and worked with NOW to promote passage of the ERA. 55
Because of the fractious and volatile nature of early second-wave feminist politics, NOW
LDEF was just one of no fewer than nine organizations that broke away from NOW in its early
years. Of these, four—including NOW LDEF—were created as friendly spin-offs and five were
created as the result of angry schisms. In the schism category, Women’s Equity Action League
(WEAL) —the organization that would give Reuss her entrée into Washington politics—split off
from the National Organization for Women in 1968 because of its objection to NOW’s stance on
abortion and frequent use of picketing as a political tactic.56

PRE-FEMINIST IDEAS ABOUT RAPE
From the nation’s early years, rape had been represented as a crime of lust, and men
depicted as unable to control themselves. Beginning in the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud and
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his peers, as well a coterie of newly minted sexologists, began to explore the motivations behind
rapists’ behavior. As Estelle Freedman has documented, while theories abounded, most included
the belief that rape was a perversion and that rapists—termed sexual psychopaths—were
mentally ill.57 All of these theories negated the rapist’s responsibility for his actions since he was
considered unable to control his impulses. During the immediate post war years, twenty-one
states passed laws calling for rapists to be confined indefinitely to mental institutions rather than
locked up. The idea that those who raped were mentally ill helped to police boundaries between
supposedly normal and abnormal sexual behavior.58
Representations of rape were often inextricably bound to ideas about race. In the South,
the fusion of sexual and racial violence served as a tool of social coercion by which whites
intimidated blacks into submission.59 Black male sexuality was considered dangerous and
threatening, and rapists were often assumed to be black men. While black women were seen as
“loose” and “rapeable,” white females were portrayed as pure and virtuous.60 The many public
depictions and discussions of rape, of men who raped, and of women who were raped all shared
an emphasis on the individuals involved in the crime. Little or no attention was paid to the social
factors contributing to the crime and its frequency. At its core, much of the conflict about rape’s
definition was a struggle over gender roles, ownership of women’s bodies, and contested access
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to female sexuality.
Because of the forbidding thicket of rape laws and the taboo nature of the subject, NOW
did not immediately a see rape as a target for legislative change. In the late 1960s, judicial
understandings of rape had remained virtually unchanged from their origins in eighteenthcentury British common law.61 Rape laws in most states covered only those instances in which a
man forced a woman who was not his wife to have sexual intercourse under the threat of bodily
injury, she resisted strenuously, and there was outside corroboration.62 Before rape became the
subject of feminist anger and inquiry, there had been no legal check on the assumption that
women were complicit in the act. The idea that women were “asking for it” underwrote common
and even legal understandings of the law. Almost always, the burden of proof for convincing a
jury that a rape had occurred lay entirely on the survivor. Widespread corroboration requirements
were hard to meet in a crime that, more often than not, is committed in isolation. Because of the
skepticism they met in court, and the low rate of conviction for rape, survivors often hesitated to
report the crime.63

Radical Feminism and The Emergence of Rape as a Feminist Issue
The impulse to examine rape grew among radical feminists who were part of a subset of
the feminist movement as a whole. These activists had their start in the political movement
known as the New Left, a largely white youth movement that coalesced around the fight for
racial justice and against the Vietnam War. They chose the name New Left to emphasize their
61
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relationship to the socialists and communists of the 1930s and 1940s and found connections
between personal oppression and politics at large.64 Women in the movement were sorely
disappointed when they began pushing for a New Left analysis of liberation to incorporate
gender oppression and were heartily rebuffed.65 They were particularly disturbed by their
treatment as they began challenging male supremacy inside the movement. Arguing that they
were exploited as sexual objects, denied access to leadership roles, and consigned to menial
tasks, many of these women became disaffected with the New Left and left to form radical
feminist groups, which maintained a focus on the political nature of the personal.66
Unhappy with the measured legal reform of those who had started the feminist
movement, these groups called for a complete restructuring of society. In her 1970 book The
Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution, Shulamith Firestone argued that the feminist
revolution is based on—and surpasses—the socialist revolution.67 While existing socialist
societies had tried to expand women’s roles without fundamentally altering them, the goal of the
feminist revolution as defined by Firestone and others was to end the performance of
manufactured gender roles.68
In the words of historian Maria Bevacqua, radical feminists loved “to analyze, politicize,
and publicize the most personal and potentially offensive issues in women’s lives.”69 They
quickly began hosting private consciousness-raising groups as well as larger public speak-outs.
At these events, women openly discussed their own experiences, including the enormous
problem of rape, which they saw as symptomatic of fundamental economic and power
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imbalances between men and women. Unlike larger national feminist organizations—
understandably constrained by pre-existing commitments to a particular brand of legal change
and by a fear of appearing too outlandish or militant to their legislative and administrative
partners—these radical feminists spoke bluntly about the problem of rape. In addition, radical
feminism’s belief that “the personal is political” made those inspired by it eager to talk about the
particulars of their own experiences.70
Susan Brownmiller, who wrote the groundbreaking book Against Our Will and helped
make rape a national topic, attributed her sensitization to the issue of rape to her involvement in
such a consciousness-raising group. 71 Her totalizing description of rape in Against Our Will
exemplifies radical feminist thought on the topic, “From prehistoric times to the present…rape
has played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation
by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.”72 The radical feminist movement gave birth
to a body of feminist scholarship that articulated a new theoretical understanding of rape. Against
Our Will set the stage for much of the scholarship that emerged from the movement, many of
which recognized rape as an act of violence, not a crime of passion.73 Scholars and activists
redefined rape as a power-motivated act of violence rather than one of unbridled sexuality, one
of many mechanisms for men to control women in a society where anyone can rape and anyone
can be raped.74
In 1972, activists in Washington, D.C. and Berkeley created the first two rape crisis
centers. They sought to address the issue of rape as radical feminists understood it, and as such
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both provided advocacy for survivors and tried to restore the sense of control that sexual assault
had destroyed. 75 Employing principles of participatory democracy borrowed from the New Left,
rape crisis center volunteers tried not only to make day-to-day life easier for rape survivors, but
also to embody on a micro level the kind of society they hoped feminism could create. To this
end, they were run as collectives with all members taking part in decision-making.76 Women
survivors were seen as new recruits to the movement as a whole. The first centers prompted the
founding of other centers around the country; by 1976 more than 400 had been created. 77

Black Feminism and Rape
Despite the fact that several of the founders and early members of NOW saw the
correlation between feminism and civil rights and considered themselves both feminists and civil
rights activists, there was always a complicated relationship between the mainstream feminist
and civil rights movements. At times black women active in the civil rights movement did not
believe that NOW and other majority white feminist organizations represented them, fearing that
white women did not see the interconnection between sexism and racism. As one early black
anti-rape activist remembered, “I certainly saw the urge to try to make people split and choose; if
you’re black, you can’t be a feminist and if you’re a feminist, you’re not black.”78
For this reason, in the early 1970s black feminists created their own predominantly
feminist groups, such as the National Black Feminist Organization (NBFO), to address issues
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that were unique to black women.79 NBFO members were not only frequently alienated from
white feminists, but like white women who had departed the New Left, also frustrated with the
misogyny they found in the black power movement. NBFO’s statement of purpose declared:
We will continue to remind the Black Liberation Movement that there can’t be liberation
for half the race. We must, together, as a people, work to eliminate racism, from without
the black community, which is trying to destroy us as an entire people; but we must
remember that sexism is destroying and crippling us from within.80
Many black feminist activists recognized that race was essential to discourse about rape
and had to be considered when constructing a history of rape in this country.81 For instance,
Angela Davis’s 1975 piece in Ms. magazine, “Joan Little—The Dialectics of Rape,” was a case
study of the many ways that racism and sexism fed off of one another.82 Joan Little was a black
prisoner who had, in self-defense, killed the white jailer who tried to rape her. When discussing
the Little case, Davis argued that the one feature that remained constant in different rape cases
was “the overt and flagrant treatment of women, through rape, as property.”83 If particular rape
cases expressed the different modes in which women were handled as property, Davis reasoned,
…when a white man rapes a black woman, the underlying meaning of this crime remains
inaccessible if one is blind to the historical dimensions of the act…Whenever a campaign
is erected around a black woman who has been raped by a white man, therefore, the
content of the campaign must be explicitly antiracist. And, as incorrect as it would be to
fail to attack racism, it would be equally incorrect to make light of the antisexist content
of the movement.
Because white women ran the majority of rape crisis centers, the complicated relationship
between black and white feminists extended to the movement’s on-the-ground presence.
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For instance, the founders of Philadelphia’s first rape crisis center, Women Organized Against
Rape, who were themselves predominantly white, told a researcher that expanding their
membership base to include black and working class women was difficult largely because local
blacks were wary of the anti-rape movement and saw it as involved in a political fight that
ultimately served whites and imprisoned blacks.84 They also had trouble recruiting black women
leery of the fraught tradition of blacks lynched for the imagined rape of whites.85
This tension ebbed and flowed throughout the history of the second wave and had not
disappeared by the time VAWA was introduced in 1990. Even some points of contention
remained consistent; black women consistently had a more holistic view of women’s oppression
and—as both a cause and effect of this fact—placed more emphasis on civil rights.

Rape and Law Enforcement
From the start of the anti-rape movement, activists worried about whether and to what
extent they should ally themselves with law enforcement efforts to address rape and domestic
violence. Although aware of the compromises inherent in working with public officials

whose

apathy and disregard many believed had contributed to and helped perpetuate a culture that
condoned rape many feminists believed compromise was necessary to smooth the path for
women who wished to prosecute their attackers. Likewise, police and prosecutors saw the utility
of a working relationship with members of a radical feminist movement whose politics they did
not always support. Mary Ann Largen, an activist involved in NOW s first forays into anti-rape
activism, pointed out the bind radical feminists faced when they worked with those whom they
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had implicated in rape s existence to try to address the problem of rape itself:
…while the women’s movement continues to focus upon the societal sexism
inherent in rape, society itself is taking up the rape issue under the “law and
order” banner. This banner provokes emotion but fails to deal with the source of
the problem; it is a Band-Aid solution to a problem which requires major
surgery.86
Over time, advocates and members of law enforcement began collaborating on numerous
projects., and rape was added to the agenda of police precincts and district attorney s offices
throughout the country. New York was at the forefront of many such endeavors. In 1972 the
New York City Police Department formed one of the first rape analysis units in the country.87
Then, in 1974, the Manhattan District Attorney founded the country s first sex crimes
prosecution unit, dedicating an entire bureau to prosecuting rape something previously not
heard of.

Rape As A Mainstream Feminist Issue
While it is not untrue that the feminist movement consisted of a more conservative liberal
branch represented by NOW and a radical fringe, at times the movement could be much more
fluid. NOW, NOW LDEF, and other feminist organizations could and did change strategies to
suit the issue they were working on or the political climate they faced.88 By 1973, amidst all the
publicity that anti-rape activists had garnered, the New York City chapter of NOW began
working with the local group New York Women Against Rape to develop a legislative campaign
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to lobby for rape law reform.89 In addition, the national conference of NOW formed the NOW
Task Force on Rape to propose revisions to state laws.90 In many cities throughout the country
local NOW groups had their own local rape task forces that coordinated with the national NOW
Task Force on Rape.
The first reformed state law in the country, Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Conduct Act,
was passed in 1974 as the result of the efforts of the members of the Michigan Women’s Task
Force on Rape. They reached out to the Ann Arbor City Council, which approved the creation of
a community-wide anti-rape alliance.91 Two years later, the Ann Arbor group joined others from
southeastern Michigan to create a statewide women’s task force on rape. The task force met with
the Judiciary Committee of the state’s House of Representatives and local law enforcement
agencies, and together worked to pass the Criminal Sexual Conduct Act.92 The act bucked the
legislative trend of focusing on the consent or resistance of the survivor and instead focused on
the behavior of the rapist.93 It also served as a template for those working to reform state laws
throughout the country.
To those who collaborated with law enforcement to pass legislation, framing rape law
reform as crime control seemed to be the most efficient route to meaningful legislative action.94
Reform efforts had four main components. First activists tried to remove the “non-consent
requirement,” so that the prosecution no longer had to prove that the survivors of rape had
actively resisted their attackers. Next, instead of one umbrella category of rape, activists sought
89
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to create a hierarchy of sexual offenses, with a gradated system of penalties. Third, through socalled “rape shield laws,” activists tried to limit defense teams’ ability to bring to trial
information about a survivor’s supposedly lurid sexual history as evidence that she had somehow
prompted her attack, because such evidence was deemed relevant only when the past sexual
activity in question was the defendant. Finally, activists attempted to make sure that the law
would protect previously vulnerable groups.95
Following Michigan’s lead, activists across the country worked to change the architecture
of their own state legislation. By the end of the decade, thirty-eight states had removed
corroboration requirements from their rape laws.96 Because reform was enacted state by state,
there were huge variations in its depth and breadth. In many states, it was nearly impossible to
institute gender neutrality, and it remained legal for a man to rape his wife. Within 20 years,
every state had adapted legislation similar to Michigan’s groundbreaking rape shield law.97
However, state rape shield laws were far from complete.98
These cooperative efforts of feminist activists and theorists allied with the juridical and
law enforcement apparatus led to the first changes in rape laws. However, while a portion of the
movement saw the utility of partnering with law enforcement, many would ultimately choose not
to maintain the alliances they had created. Having brought rape to the attention of a broader
public, including that of the police, they chose to look elsewhere for support because of concerns
about having their movement subsumed. The same year the Michigan law was passed, members
of the pioneering Washington D.C. Rape Crisis Center founded the Feminist Alliance Against
95
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Rape (FAAR) to address the potential co-optation of the movement by government agencies.99
FAAR’s founding document stated:
We feel there is a need for communication nationally (and internationally) and for more
solidarity among our projects. This is particularly important at a time when government
agencies and politicians are beginning to take an interest in the issue of rape. Because we
see this interest as a potential threat to feminist control of the rape issue, we wish to form
a united front to ensure that the interest in rape works for us rather than against us.100
FAAR emphasized rape prevention—as opposed to the prosecution of the crime once it
had already occurred—and sought to maximize the impact of feminist institutional reform to
increase women’s control.101 Early FAAR members worried that:
Incarceration does not change the societal attitudes that promote rape. In a society that
deals with symptoms rather than causes of problems, prisons make perfect sense.
Confronting the causes of rape would threaten the basic structure of society. By actively
encouraging women to prosecute a rape we are helping to reinforce the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system…102
In 1973, Largen, who’d become the coordinator of NOW’s Task Force on Rape, worked
closely with liberal Republican Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) to craft a bill for the federal
funding of rape crisis centers and the establishment of a national center for rape prevention that
would run under the auspices of the National Institute of Mental Health.103 The bill was
introduced to the Senate Committee of Labor and Public Welfare’s Subcommittee on Health. It
called for the center to serve as a clearinghouse for studies on rape and offer training programs
for various professionals who came into contact with rape survivors, such as doctors and
policemen. In addition to funding rape crisis centers and creating a national center, the bill
authorized a national study of the efficacy of state rape laws and was incorporated into a bigger
99
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health services act.
As a piece of anti-rape legislation, the bill framed rape as a public health issue and thus
can be used as a point of comparison to underscore the implications of the varying approaches to
such legislation. It is easier to consider rape a systemic societal concern, rather than merely a
gendered crime problem, when one sees how it affects the public. As if to emphasize this, the
text of the bill called for an “examination of the relationship, if any, between traditional legal and
social attitudes toward sexual roles, the act of rape, and the formulation of laws dealing with
rape.”104 Thus, the bill suggested the possibility of a causal relationship between socially dictated
sex roles and the high incidence of rape.
In 1977, Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY) introduced a federal rape shield
law, the Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, which limited a defendant’s ability to crossexamine rape complainants about their past sexual behavior.105 Holtzman argued that the
amendment would “protect women from both injustice and indignity” by restricting “the
vulnerability of rape victims to such humiliating cross-examination of their past sexual
experiences and intimate personal histories.”106 With the Privacy Protection Act, federal
legislation followed a trend that had begun at the state level as an effort to counteract the
common defense tactic of implying that women who had been raped had somehow invited the
attack through their promiscuity. President Carter signed the bill into law, lauding its value for
ending “public degradation of rape victims” and for encouraging the reporting of rape.107
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Domestic Violence on the Federal Agenda
From the start, domestic violence activists were less radical than their anti-rape
counterparts.108 Gottschalk explains that the domestic violence movement was more vulnerable
to co-optation and compromise than the anti-rape movement for several reasons.109 The domestic
violence movement started several years after the rape movement, and was rooted in
organizations that were service-oriented rather than strictly feminist in scope.110 Early shelters
were established by churches, YWCAs, and Junior Chambers of Commerce and often did not
have a blatantly feminist culture.111 Because activists framed domestic violence as a “family
issue,” and delivered a deliberately subdued feminist message, law enforcement and legislators
were less squeamish about working with them than with their anti-rape counterparts. To a certain
extent, the issue of domestic violence was easier to broach in a public venue than rape. As one
rape crisis advocate explained, “Police don’t want to talk about anything related to sex.”112
The perception of domestic violence as a non-sexual gendered public crime issue would
translate into more consistent funding for domestic violence shelters than for rape crisis centers.
The funding, in turn, led domestic violence centers and shelters to align their activities more
closely with government priorities.113 Feminists succeeded in turning the federal government’s
attention to the issue of domestic violence when, in 1979, President Carter established the
national Office of Domestic Violence. The Family Violence Prevention Fund put lobbying for
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direct shelter funding at the top of its agenda. This funding became a reality in 1984 with the
passage of the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act.114
There was prolonged tension between anti-domestic violence and anti-rape activists.
Anti-domestic violence proponents worried that the stigma attached to the sometimes more
radical techniques of anti-rape groups, and the greater discomfort associated with speaking about
the explicitly sexual crime of rape would make anti-rape activists harmful allies. As one antirape activist remembered:
It got to a place around funding and access to systems and policy makers where the
domestic violence people actually told the sexual assault people, you can’t, we don't want
to go with you to talk to these people, and we don't want you there, and we don't want
you to align yourselves with us because that will give us domestic violence attention but
they won’t around sexual assault.115
Perhaps because of the distinct histories of rape crisis centers and domestic violence
shelters, rape and domestic violence were most frequently addressed in scholarship and practice
as completely separate entities. This was not always the case, however. Both activists and
scholars at times used the phrase “violence against women.” In 1977, hundreds of women
marched against violence against women in Washington D.C. That same year the Metropolitan
Detroit Chapter of NOW cosponsored a public policy conference on violence against women, as
did Metropolitan State Conference in Denver. However, this approach—combining rape and
domestic violence under one umbrella category—was the exception rather than the rule.
Post-War Law and Order Meets Feminism:
The Emergence of A Victims’ Rights Movement
The feminist attention to rape emerged at a time when local, state and federal authorities
were aggressively pursuing a “tough-on-crime” agenda. The next section of this chapter
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examines the birth of the tough-on-crime movement and subsequent creation of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in the 1968 crime bill. A discussion of the
LEAA is also central to any understanding of the trajectory of the anti-rape and anti-domestic
violence movements since it not only became a consistent source of funding for feminist centers,
it also helped birth the victims’ rights movement, which quickly claimed the violence against
women issue as its own. The tendency of feminist organizations—sometimes against their own
instincts—to ally with law enforcement initiated the reframing of anti-rape legislation as anticrime. The creation of the LEAA pushed the feminist movement further along this path and
would help to usher in an understanding of women who experienced rape or domestic violence
as quintessential victims. Historian Kristin Bumiller has demonstrated how the LEAA ultimately
helped secure what she calls “the neoliberal appropriation of the feminist movement against
sexual violence.”116
Beginning in the 1960s, conservative politicians such as Barry Goldwater, George
Wallace, and Richard Nixon made the issue of crime a national priority and pursued a rigorous
campaign against crime that continued unabated into the 1970s. In the face of powerful social
movements, grassroots protest, the decay of urban centers, and growing civil strife—particularly
the race riots which exploded out of urban ghettos—conservative politicians used a “law and
order” approach to exploit the public’s concerns over rising crime and civil unrest.8 The concept
of law and order was an amorphous one, blurring the line between unease over the rise of crime
with discomfort over changes wrought by the Civil Rights Movement, urban riots, and antiwar
protests.117
Because of the conflation of civil riots, protests, and crime, tough-on-crime language
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often included coded references to race. As historian Michael Flamm observes: “Law and
order…became the vehicle by which urban whites transmitted their antipathy to neighborhood
integration and racial violence from the municipal to the presidential arena.”118 Vesla Weaver
extends Flamm’s argument, noting that this strategy both imbued crime with race and
depoliticized racial struggle.119 Proponents of law and order pushed for punishment and control
as the primary response to crime. The main policies in the law-and-order playbook were
mandatory sentencing lengths, mandatory arrest, mandatory restitution, increased law
enforcement presence, and prison expansion.120
In 1964, Republican Barry Goldwater made law and order a central theme of his
presidential campaign, elevating the fight against crime to a national issue. In the fall of 1964,
President Johnson cast his war on poverty as a war on crime. This renewed focus on crime and
protection led the federal government to establish several national commissions to study the
problem of crime and criminals. President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration, convened from 1965-1967, carried out three significant pilot studies of victims
in 1965. These studies found that crime was going both unreported and unprosecuted and urged
increased efficiency for the criminal justice system.121
Johnson sent Congress the 1968 crime bill termed by one historian the “mother of all
contemporary crime legislation.”122. One of the bill’s stated goals was allowing Congress to
ensure the greater safety of the American people by better coordinating, intensifying, and
optimizing state and local law enforcement efforts. For the first time in American history, direct
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funding channels were created between the federal government and the criminal justice system.
To this end, one of its main objectives was encouraging the adoption of more comprehensive
anti-crime strategies. Because it had been formed partially to address urban riots and civil rights
protests, it stipulated that monies could be used for the organization of law enforcement units
specifically for the prevention and control of violent civil disorders.123 In addition, the bill
encouraged the training of community service officers to assist law enforcement agencies and
encourage neighborhood participation in crime prevention.124 It also funded the research and
development of new approaches to modernize law enforcement and improve statistical record
keeping to accommodate the Johnson Administration’s goal of helping local police departments
update their data-gathering abilities and, some scholars have argued, enabling them to build
criminal profiles of residents and target street patrols more effectively.125
The LEAA was the grant-making body that would fund such plans. It provided more than
$8 billion in federal grants to police departments for equipment, training, and pilot programs.
The legislation that ultimately emerged had a distinctly Republican shape.126 Signing the act into
law, Johnson declared,
Today, I ask every Governor, every mayor, and every county and city commissioner and
councilman to examine the adequacy of their State and local law enforcement systems to
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move promptly to support the policemen, the law enforcement officers, and the men who
wage the war on crime day after day in all the streets and roads and alleys in America.127
Of particular relevance to later anti-crime legislation was the bill’s reimagining of the
crime victim as a privileged subject for government protection and its restructuring of national
fiscal priorities.128 The LEAA provided a structure for funding to be given directly to state and
local criminal justice bureaus, bypassing more liberal city agencies. Block grants were received
by state planning agencies to be distributed as they saw fit. Mayors were rightfully leery of block
grant distribution, worrying that state governments would bypass cities when divvying federal
funds.129 Increased penalties and other sentencing reforms went hand-in-hand with the
augmentation of state and federal crime-fighting capacity.
Much of the LEAA’s funding ultimately went to rape crisis centers. While increased
financial resources were a boon for centers, the money did not come without exacting its own
particular form of payment. Marie Gottschalk explains that the LEAA’s Crime Victim Initiative
ultimate helped the government co-opt the women’s movement and conscript it in the war on
crime.130 As the LEAA and other arms of the state became more involved in addressing rape,
they successfully “recast the feminist definition of rape as a political issue into the problem of an
individual victim in need of adequate services from the state so as to increase her willingness to
help in the successful prosecution of her case.”131 LEAA money encouraged government
absorption of many formerly independent rape crisis centers and their radical, volunteer,
grassroots orientation into its professional, hierarchical bureaucracy.132
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Feminist activists had at first been quite wary of accepting LEAA funding. In the early
1970s, the NOW Task Force on Rape conducted an investigation into LEAA spending to better
understand its effects.133 The task force found evidence pointing to LEAA’s bias against private
women’s groups, which translated into these groups’ inability to obtain funding as autonomous
entities.134 In order to be considered for LEAA grant money, independent rape crisis centers
needed to partner with another institution, such as the local police department. Once funds were
dispersed, the task force discovered, the majority of money was distributed to the partner
institution. The task force also found that once funding was dispersed, the institutional view of
women’s groups as being “non-professional” often led to the partner institutions maintaining
firm control of joint projects.135 Foreshadowing changes that would haunt the founders of rape
crisis centers for years to come, the act contained a provision that mandated that all grantees had
to receive the approval of the local government or local law enforcement agencies. This rule
gave local law enforcement officials default control over which groups received federal money.
Rape crisis centers ran the risk of not receiving funding if they were perceived as too radical or
out of step with the local law enforcement community, creating financial pressure on them to
conform. In addition, the heavy influx of government funds nurtured dependency on the state,
helping to co-opt the women’s anti-violence movement.136
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Victims’ Rights
While the victims’ rights movement was closely intermingled with and informed by the
tough-on-crime movement, the two have separate trajectories: the first victims’ rights assistance
programs were founded in the 1970s, and the 1982 passage of a federal Victim and Witness
Protection Act spurred the first state constitutional amendments.
The LEAA funneled much of its budget into projects that addressed the criminal justice
system’s treatment—or, some thought, mistreatment— of crime victims. Tougher penalties for
criminals were key to the reimagining of what became called “victims’ rights.”137 The LEAA’s
belief in the efficacy of a victims’ rights-centered policy led to the administration of pioneering
studies and surveys to examine the plight of so-called victims. The LEAA’s early embrace of
victims’ needs and focus on gaining their cooperation put the agency at the center of early efforts
to build the victim’s rights movement with the funding of programs designed specifically to
improve the relationship between victims and law enforcement.138
The victims’ rights movement had grew out of a coalition of a variety of constituencies,
all of whom were dissatisfied with the criminal justice system. Proponents of victims’ rights
believed that the so-called victimization rates were much higher than crime rates, and that this
fact proved that many crimes remained unreported because of victims’ justified distrust of the
criminal justice system. The first form of redress they called for was victim compensation
measures, but victims’ rights advocates saw tougher penalties as central to their long-term
agenda. In addition, convinced that indeterminate sentencing would not deter crimes, victims’
rights proponents advocated mandatory minimum sentences, three strikes laws, and truth-in-
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sentencing laws that tried to ensure prisoners would serve out their full terms. The movement’s
first official body was the National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA), founded in
1975 to give a voice to the members of the nascent movement.
Relatively early in the growth of the movement, some feminists saw the utility of allying
themselves with it. Feminist dissatisfaction with authorities’ handling of rape and domestic
violence fit easily into the a victim-centric world view, and some feminists believed that
focusing on women as victims would help women gain funding and mainstream legitimacy.139 At
the same time, others in the feminist movement worried that the intense focus on victimization
would come at the expense of a deeper and more critical political analysis and more potent forms
of organizing.140 Focusing on women as generic victims detracted from concentrating on the
economic and social specificities of their situation. In addition, such strong emphasis on
victimization was incongruous with the feminist goal of empowering women.
Many feminists worried that the “woman as victim” rhetoric would further complicate the
debate about rape and domestic violence by feeding into the fear born of multiple crime panics
and the racial backlash that ensued. Indeed, there was something of a racial divide in the
approach to victims’ rights, with white feminists supporting the movement’s goals far more than
their black peers.141 Contemporary observers went so far as to accuse white women—whom they
saw as blind to the inherent racism of right-leaning victims’ rights rhetoric—of using a rape
scare to advance their political objectives.
However, there were enough anti-rape feminists who had adopted the victims’ rights
ideology to allow participants at the 1977 NOVA conference to create NCASA, which would
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serve as a new national umbrella organization for rape crisis centers.142 The fact that NCASA
was organized at a NOVA conference was an example of the extent to which the two movements
already had and would become inextricably linked.
Violence Against Women as a Violation of Civil Rights: MacKinnon and the AntiPornography Ordinances
In the late 1970s legal scholar and activist Catharine MacKinnon, already known for
significant contributions to ndy,,,,yy7q6ming and prosecuting workplace sexual harassment,
joined a feminist fight against media depictions of violent acts against women that had ultimately
zeroed in on pornography as the main offender.143 She was part of an internecine struggle
between feminist factions, labeled “anti-pornography” and “sex positive,” that began in the late
1970s and continued through the early 1980s, becoming increasingly acrimonious. The fight
itself was centered on a range of media representations of violent acts against women, all of
which it grouped under the umbrella term “violence against women.”
While many anti-pornography activists professed a link between mass media debasement
of women and increases in the number and severity of violent sexual acts against them,
MacKinnon and Dworkin believed that pornography itself was the root cause of all violence
against women. In Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, MacKinnon wrote, “Pornography, in
the feminist view, is a form of forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, and institution of gender
inequality.”144 In the early 1980s she and fellow activist Andrea Dworkin proposed treating
pornography itself as a violation of women’s civil rights and allowing women harmed by
142
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pornography to seek damages through civil lawsuits.145 According to this strategy, women could
bring lawsuits for damages against producers, sellers, exhibitors or distributors of pornography.
Together MacKinnon and Dworkin introduced anti-pornography ordinances in several
cities throughout the country, and versions of the ordinance were passed in Minneapolis in 1983
and in Indianapolis in 1984, but were blocked by city officials and struck down by courts, on the
grounds that each violated First Amendment freedom of speech protections. While the antipornography ordinances died after a last gasp effort to have them instituted in Massachusetts in
1992.146 Several of their distinctive features—the legal argument that sexual violence violated
women’s civil rights and the merger of several categories of sexual violence into a larger
overarching group—would find new life in VAWA.

Post-ERA Feminism:
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
Ronald Reagan’s election as president in 1980 marked the ascendancy of the New Right,
which was openly antagonistic to the feminist movement.147 In many respects, there was an
outright political backlash against the gains that feminism had made during the previous decade,
which forced many feminist groups to reorient themselves.148 The Republican Party removed the
ERA from its platform for the first time in almost forty years, provoking a deep split between the
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two major political parties on the issue of women’s rights.149 In 1981, Reagan closed the Office
of Domestic Violence.150
Popular culture, too, contributed to an anti-feminist climate. Susan Faludi’s Backlash
documents the extent to which the independence of cultural icons in shows of the 1980s such as
Cagney & Lacey was scaled back to reflect a supposedly more feminine ethos.151 Movies such as
Fatal Attraction offered a cautionary tale about the dangers of feminism’s boundary breaking.152
Mainstream acceptance of many feminist ideas, while a boon for the movement in some
ways, led to a bureaucratization and concurrent political defanging, sapping much of the vital
energy from feminist efforts at change.153 Throughout the 1980s, distinctions between the liberal
and radical wings of the movement continued to blur as liberal groups began to address formerly
taboo topics and radical groups became more institutionalized social service providers.154
NOW faced the difficult task of refocusing its members’ efforts after the defeat of the
ERA and changed tack to focus on electoral politics, using a less strident approach for the group
in particular and the feminist movement in general.155 While from this point on, some of NOW’s
basic agenda items, particularly reproductive rights and gay and lesbian rights, would become
more liberal than those of other groups.
NOW LDEF began to focus more strongly on the educational aspects of its mission. In
1980, NOW LDEF joined with the National Association of Women Judges to establish the
National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts
149
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(NJEP). NJEP pioneered the documentation of gender bias in courts.156 NJEP's judicial education
programs were the catalyst for a series of task forces established by state chief justices and
federal circuit councils to examine gender bias in their own court systems.
In 1984, after a report by a New Jersey task force on gender bias—itself established
through the work and leadership of NJEP—garnered national attention, the NJEP established a
task force of its own to encourage each state to examine gender bias.157 The movement to do so
gained steam when the 1988 joint annual meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices and the
Conference of State Court Administrators got behind NJEP and urged chief justices to create
their own state task forces. The group created educational campaigns aimed at members of the
judiciary around particular issues to promote access to the justice system and equality for women
and men in the courts.158 In 1982, New Jersey’s chief justice created the first state Supreme
Court task force on gender bias in the courts. That year, the Conference of Chief Justices and the
Conference of State Court Administrators adopted resolutions that every state should have a task
force to examine gender bias and minority concerns in its courts. So popular did these
conferences become that, in 1989, the first National Conference on Gender Bias in the Courts at
the National Center for State Courts was held.159
During the 1980s, NOW LDEF focused its legislative efforts on the decade’s long fight
156
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to end employment discrimination Title VII and NOW’s critical issue—reproductive rights—
while continuing to work for the ERA at the state and local level, in spite of the amendment’s
very public federal death. In 1979, NOW LDEF and the Women’s Law Project had established
an ERA Impact Project for just this purpose. In 1982, the project won its first state ERA case,
supporting the right of Pennsylvania women to be volunteer firefighters.160

The Further Mainstreaming of Feminist Ideas About Rape
During the 1980s, ideas about rape that feminists had introduced during the previous
decade began to gain traction with the public to an unprecedented degree. The structural
transformation in sexual crime laws led to a huge increase in the number of rape cases reported
and brought to trial. Take Back the Night marches, begun in the mid 1970s as a more public
outgrowth of consciousness-raising groups, continued steadily and became regular features in
cities and on college campuses. While coverage of rape in the media continued to be problematic
for feminists, the sheer volume of this coverage expanded greatly.161 Images of rape proliferated
in film and on TV as well, and became an object of public fascination.162
Media, scrutiny of rape trials became so intense that, in the spring of 1984, the Senate
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Criminal Law, of which Biden was a member, held a
hearing on the impact of media coverage on rape trials to explore a compromise between the
public’s right to know and the discomfort that new and intense exposure caused rape
survivors.163 At the same time, the number of rape crisis centers, which had peaked in the late
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1970s at over 400, had slowly begun to decline in 1977. In a process described by Gottschalk
and Bumiller, many of these centers had become dependent on government funding and thus lost
the ability to model the transformative social change they had believed possible in their earliest
days.

Feminism and Victims’ Rights
NCASA became fully ensconced in the victims’ rights movement, and began actively
supporting federal victims’ legislation. In 1982 NCASA supported the passage of the Federal
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, designed to sensitize the federal criminal justice
system to victims’ needs and provide legal protection from intimidation of witnesses.164
It also worked in 1984 for passage of VOCA, which created a federal fund to compensate
crime victims via the fines paid by criminals, granting priority to survivors of rape or domestic
violence. Strapped for money, rape and domestic violence groups tapped into VOCA to keep
their doors open. For example, the Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault received its first
allocation of federal VOCA funds and used them to allow rape crisis centers to hire full-time
advocates.165
Historian Nancy Matthews uses California as a case study to explore the extent to which
government funding pushed rape crisis centers to embrace the goals of state agencies, such as
shoring up mental health and assisting law enforcement.166 California is particularly useful as a
case study because there the life of the LEAA was extended through the creation of the Office of
Criminal Justice Programs (OCJP), which continued to fund rape crisis centers even after the
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LEAA’s demise in 1979. The OCJP put pressure on rape crisis centers to forfeit their political
goals and focus instead on providing more tangible social services, going so far as withholding
funds from groups that refused to do so. Affiliation with law enforcement allowed rape crisis
centers to prosper in a way that clinging to the founding principles of the anti-rape movement did
not. Feminist ideology, which related the frequency of rape to women’s oppression, was both
marginalized and at times suppressed. The rape crisis centers that profited the most were those
that more closely affiliated themselves with state-sanctioned goals.167
Domestic violence shelters fared somewhat better during the 1980s than rape crisis
centers.168 In fact, by the end of the 1980s, most funding for shelters came directly from the state.
Both rape crisis centers and domestic violence shelters were forced to apply for and accept
government funding in order to survive. As the two structures became more dependent on
government money, they were forced to be more accountable to outside authorities and
concurrently to focus on temporary rather than long-term solutions to domestic violence.169

The War on Crime Becomes the War on Drugs
Reagan’s presidency heralded a renewed interest in the law and order rubric. Following
the lead of his conservative predecessors, Reagan expended a huge amount of energy on what he
termed “crime in the streets” and argued that policing and social control were essential to the
government’s real “constitutional” obligation.170 In 1982, Reagan focused the crime fight on
drugs, officially declaring a war on drugs. His Comprehensive Crime Control Act, passed in
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1984, was a turning point for federal criminal justice.171 It continued the expansion of the federal
government’s participation in tacking crime issues that had previously been viewed as the
purview of state and local governments. Key among its measures were the Bail Reform Act,
which made possible sometimes-lengthy pre-trial detention of defendants who were deemed
dangerous, and the Sentencing Reform Act, which created the United States Sentencing
Commission, an independent judicial agency tasked with determining sentencing guidelines for
federal courts.172
During Biden’s tenure, Biden, who had first been elected to his Delaware Senate seat in
1972, took the first steps toward becoming the Democratic point person in the fight on crime. In
1984 Biden introduced and, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, helped usher through the
passage of Reagan’s Comprehensive Crime Control Act.173 Then, in 1986, Biden joined in
pushing for the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which had been introduced by Senate Majority Leader
Bob Dole. The bill substantially increased federal penalties for possession and sale of even small
quantities of the crack cocaine ravaging cities.174 It was Biden himself who proposed the 100-to1 sentencing disparity codified between crack and powdered cocaine. 175 Penalties for possession
of powder cocaine, associated with more affluent residents of mostly-white suburbs, were only a
fraction as harsh as those for crack, associated with poorer urban blacks.176 Many scholars argue
that those sentencing differentials have led to significantly higher incarceration rates for
blacks.177 Indeed, looking back on his decision in 2007, Biden remarked on the floor of the
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Senate:
I joined senators (Robert) Byrd and Dole in leading the effort to enact the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, which established the current 100-to-1 disparity….Our intentions
were good but we got it wrong….It is…clear that the harsh crack penalties have had a
disproportionate impact on the African-American.178
Biden's aggressive manner did not win him universal admiration, especially among
liberals, but many appreciated his determination to make crime a winning issue for Democrats—
the party that had been derided as “soft on crime” since the Goldwater days. “Give me the crime
issue,” the senator would plead repeatedly to Democratic Party caucuses, one staff member
recalled, “and you'll never have trouble with it in an election.”179
Perhaps not coincidentally, Biden’s interest in crime prevention spiked in 1987. After
bowing out of his bid for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination that September, he
ensconced himself in the world of law enforcement. His biographer pointedly counters unnamed
critics who claimed that Biden’s frequent excursions to police organization meetings in the late
1980s showed an intensive interest in crime prevention that “may have been seen by skeptics as a
conspicuous effort by Biden to rehabilitate himself in the wake of his…presidential bid.”180
In 1988, Biden and the Republican vice president, George H.W. Bush, began what would
become an ongoing tug-of-war over control of the crime issue when Bush made fighting crime a
key issue of his own presidential election campaign.181
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The 1990s
In many ways the early 1990s were a liminal period in American society’s coming to
terms with the fact of sexual violence against women. The number of groups doing feminist
advocacy had continued to shrink throughout the 1980s. What few rape crisis centers remained
had long lost their revolutionary agenda.
High-profile rape cases continued to receive comprehensive media coverage, as did the
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, which included contentious discussion of sexual
harassment. A media backlash against the idea of date rape also began to gather speed and
ferocity. Legislation addressing violence against women had both gains and losses. While
feminist lawmakers were thwarted in their attempts to have gender included in hate crimes
legislation, anti-stalking laws were put on the books for the first time, opening up the door for
the inclusion of anti-stalking language in VAWA.

Rape in the Public Consciousness
A series of highly publicized rape cases involving public figures escalated newspaper and
TV frenzy around the issue. This began in 1991 with the trial and acquittal of Kennedy scion and
Rhode Island House of Representatives member William Kennedy Smith. The coverage of the
1993 trial and conviction of boxer Mike Tyson for the rape of 18-year-old Miss Black Rhode
Island was detailed and became a national obsession. Media fascination peaked when football
star O.J. Simpson was shown fleeing the police police on national TV after supposedly
murdering his wife and her companion. The subsequently sensationalized trial was termed by
many “the trial of the century” and became even more notorious after Simpson was acquitted.
During a period when rape and violence against women was becoming ever-more present in the
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public's consciousness, the three cases by such high profile public figures kept the issue in the
spotlight.
Sociology professor Neil Gilbert 1991 article “The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assault”
emphasized women’s responsibility for rape and challenged the veracity of the numerous reports
that documented date rape’s prevalence.182 Many of the criticisms were ostensibly aimed at Mary
Koss’s 1985 Ms. magazine-sponsored study of date rape but actually took aim at feminism itself.
There was a class component to much of the criticism. Koss’s study had been of date rape on
college campuses, hardly an environment or populace representative of American women as a
whole. Critics seized on this focus on colleges and college students to support allegations that
feminists did not speak to the needs or desires of the average woman, instead remaining locked
in self-referential ivory-tower conversations with themselves. Katie Roiphe’s widely disputed
1994 book The Morning After: Fear, Sex and Feminism, scoffed at Koss’s assertions and tried to
cast doubt on the idea of date rape’s prevalence.183

Clarence Thomas Hearings
In July 1991, Biden presided over the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas, during which Thomas faced very public allegations of sexual harassment by
Anita Hill, who testified to his harassment some ten years earlier, when she had worked for him
at the EEOC. These hearings are often credited with raising national awareness of sexual
harassment and inspiring the “Year of the Woman,” in which, for the first time, four women
were elected to the Senate in a single year. After the debacle of the Thomas hearings, in fact,
Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) said of VAWA, “There was a strong message sent in the last
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election that women and women’s issues were not being addressed in Congress. That helps
passage of bills like this.”184 One writer from The New Republic quipped, “Most of the bill’s
[VAWA’s] co-sponsors seem to view the legislation as merely the latest stop on the road of
Anita Hill penance.”185
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CHAPTER 2
“SOMETHING ON WOMEN FOR THE CRIME BILL”

The 1968 crime bill provided the legislative template for both the Safe Streets for Women
subtitle of VAWA and several other sections of the crime bill. Including VAWA in a larger anticrime bill made legislative sense because of the convergence of the anti-rape and tough-on-crime
and victims’ rights movements during the 1980s. The designation of VAWA’s rape provision as
“Safe Streets for Women” can likewise be seen as logical. The image of streets, which had first
been used as a metaphor in the 1960s, continued to be resonant in 1990.
Biden introduced VAWA in June 1990 when he was chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, a position he held from 1987 through 1994, the year VAWA passed. As Nourse
explained in an autobiographical piece, VAWA was considered “something on women” to be
added to the crime bill. Although it was not incorporated into the crime bill until 1993, VAWA
was structured to be part of that act and is best understood in the context of the crime bill’s
architecture and goals.
VAWA’s eventual incorporation into a larger piece of legislation focused on reducing
violence and controlling crime signaled the continuation of the ongoing movement of the public
understanding of violence against women away from its feminist origins. While feminists had
stressed empowering women and recognizing systemic, endemic violence against women as
symptomatic of society’s larger structural flaws those supporting VAWA focused on
empowering police to do their jobs and treating violence against women as unexceptional
criminal activity. In the end, VAWA followed broader trends in criminal justice, concentrating
on more and harsher punishments, mandatory minimum sentences, mandatory restitution for
victims, and the involvement of law enforcement in community policing. Rather than providing
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funding directly to rape crisis or domestic violence shelters, the bill adopted the 1968 crime bill’s
block grant formula.
The opposition to both the fact and theory of VAWA’s civil rights remedy was a clear
indication that it was only by packaging the bill as a law-and-order measure that it was made
palatable to those who surely would have rejected it. The civil rights remedy was—in wording at
least—a nugget of more radical feminism in a law-and-order package. VAWA’s more punitive
provisions made the civil rights remedy palatable to non-feminists and in turn the civil rights
remedy made VAWA’s more punitive provisions palatable to feminists.
In order to situate the provisions of VAWA within their historical and political context,
this chapter begins with a discussion of the introduction of the bill that would come to be called
“Biden’s” crime bill.186 Next, the chapter introduces the politicians and policy people who wrote
VAWA, ushered it through Congress and helped amass support for its passage. Finally, it
reviews the major components of VAWA, taking a section-by-section look at the provisions of
the bill in order to prepare for a more in-depth exploration of the particular ideas and ideologies
embedded in each section.

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act Revisited
The bill that would come to be called “Biden’s” crime bill, the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act, emerged within the bitter partisan conflict of the late 1980s. This section
describes the two parties’ initial wrangling over the issue of violent crime—the Republicans led
by President Bush and the Democrats led by Biden—then briefly surveys the provisions of the
186
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crime bill that were at issue. Finally, it touches upon a common theme in both parties’
approaches to the violent crime: a latent racism that critics recognized in the crime bill from the
very beginning.

“Not a Democratic or a Republican issue”
Beginning in February 1989, Bush and Biden introduced competing crime bills.187 When
addressing the nation about his crime policy, Bush picked up an earlier refrain of safe streets and
the emphasis on expanded law enforcement saying,
…we are determined to enforce the law, to make our streets and neighborhoods safe. So,
to start, I'm proposing that we more than double Federal assistance to State and local law
enforcement. Americans have a right to safety in and around their homes.188
Biden, determined to take the issue back from him, argued that recent Democratic anticrime legislative initiatives had neutralized crime to the point that “it was not a Democratic or a
Republican issue.”189 Biden’s bill, introduced in November 1989, proposed $900 million in
funding for law enforcement to Bush’s $450 million; 1,000 police strike forces to Bush’s 89, and
1,000 drug agents to Bush’s 272.190 Although the Senate approved Biden’s crime bill in 1990,
there was too much partisan bickering for it to become law during the Bush administration.
Biden may have outmaneuvered Bush in claiming the crime issue, but Bush was ultimately able
to block the passage of Biden’s bill.191 Both Bush’s and Biden’s bills framed the fight against
crime as a fight against drugs, which Bush called “the gravest domestic threat facing our nation
187
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today” and Biden referred to as “the number one threat to our national security.”192
Bush’s presidency ended before he and Biden could settle their dispute. During his first
presidential campaign, President Clinton had signaled an emphasis on crime and crime control
by putting his campaigning temporarily on hold to travel to his home state of Arkansas to preside
over an execution.193 In the early days of his presidency, however, he shifted his focus from
crime to healthcare reform, ignoring the advice of his transition staff to create a national crime
strategy with VAWA as a key component.194 Clinton picked up the issue again only after the first
100 days of his presidency had passed, as it became clear that his administration would not be
able to realize his health insurance reform agenda.195 Remarks made to The New York Times by
Clinton’s first deputy attorney general about Clinton’s revised strategy were a reminder of the
politicized nature of the war on crime:
Clinton…emphasized a moralistic message almost to the exclusion of practical measures
to reduce crime on the streets. It’s been the most careful political calculation, with
absolutely sublime indifference to the real nature of the problem. School uniforms,
curfews, sexual predators—he’s appealing to social conservatives.196
Biden’s career-long commitment to tough-on-crime legislation dovetailed nicely with
Clinton’s renewed interest in fighting crime. The president’s newfound ownership of the crime
issue increased the likelihood that Biden’s bill would pass.
192
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In August 1993, Clinton held a press conference to announce an agreement with
congressional leadership about the need for and structure of a new crime bill. Clinton did not
make passage of VAWA a priority, and instead focused his attention on what he viewed as the
most important sections of the crime bill: community policing, prison “boot camps,” expansion
of drug courts, safety in schools, and the assault weapons ban.197 Biden reintroduced his crime
bill again the following September, and saw the bill voted out of the Senate that same November.

Provisions of the Crime Bill
When the Biden-sponsored crime bill finally passed both houses of Congress in August
1994, it became the largest crime bill in the history of the nation. It greatly expanded federal
spending on law enforcement and included the largest-ever expansion of the federal death
penalty.198 It also provided $30.2 billion in federal funding for anti-crime measures and markedly
increased federal involvement in municipal and state crime control efforts, including earmarking
$8.8 billion for the hiring of 100,000 new police officers, $7.9 billion for state construction
grants for new prisons, and introducing incentives for states to adopt truth-in-sentencing laws
requiring repeat offenders to serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentences. In addition, the
bill allotted $7 billion to fund grants to cities, schools, and non-profit crime prevention programs
to pay for afterschool recreation, tutoring, job placement assistance, and substance abuse
prevention as well as block grants to local governments for education and research programs to
prevent juvenile violence, gang participation, and drug sales.
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Furthermore, the crime bill stiffened criminal penalties in a number of different ways. It
increased federal minimum penalties for many crimes—including adding new offenses that
could be punished by death, made a number of these infractions federal crimes for the first time;
and imposed what is colloquially known as the “three-strikes law”— a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment without parole for those convicted of a third serious violent felony.199

Race and the Crime Bill
From the start, detractors of the crime bill argued that its measures, especially the three
strikes provision, would inordinately affect blacks and Native Americans. While the bill was still
in Congress, members of the Congressional Black Caucus had tried to temper the negative
effects of the crime bill by endorsing a Racial Justice Act addendum, which contained provisions
reducing racial disparities in death penalty sentences, and bolstering the bill’s crime prevention
components.200 Their efforts, however, were thwarted.201
In their study of the intense sparring around the crime bill’s funding for midnight
basketball games—a small line item in the bill that came to be used as shorthand for crime
prevention measures as a whole—sociologists Darren Wheelock and Douglas Hartmann argue
that Republicans scuttled attempts to create a more balanced crime bill by using coded racial
rhetoric that drew upon deeply entrenched images associating crime with young AfricanAmerican men.202 They used veiled references linking race to criminality to subtly undercut
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arguments for the effectiveness of crime prevention programs.203 Their analysis makes clear the
extent to which discussions of crime were steeped in and inextricable from inherited assumptions
about race as well as the opaqueness that characterized conversations about race.

The Introduction of VAWA: “Something On Women for the Crime Bill”
When VAWA was introduced, it included the civil rights remedy and two additional titles
more closely aligned with the rest of the crime bill—the Safe Streets for Women and Safe
Homes for Women acts. VAWA inherited its parent bill’s focus on fighting crime; of the crime
bill’s $30 billion, $1.6 billion was apportioned to VAWA. Of that, roughly half, or close to $800
million, was allotted to training grants for law enforcement.
Because several conflicting narratives exist describing VAWA’s introduction, there is no
way to know for certain why Biden decided to introduce VAWA when and how he did. It is not
out of the question that Biden was influenced by other interest in rape and domestic violence on
Capitol Hill during the spring and summer of 1990. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA)
introduced a House hearing on rape by remarking that it was the “‘in” thing for Congress to be
talking about rape.”204 Indeed, both rape and domestic violence received a fair amount of
Congressional interest that spring and fall. In April, Senator Daniel Coats (R-IN) presided over
the hearing Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home.205 Then in May, Senator Arlen Specter
(R-PA) introduced a resolution designating October “National Domestic Violence Awareness
Month.” In September, Coats and Biden together introduced the Domestic Violence Prevention
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Act.206
The timing of VAWA’s introduction was certainly influenced by the extent to which the
issue violence against women had lost so many of its feminist overtones in the political arena and
had evolved to fit seamlessly into a larger crime bill focused on punishment and prosecution.
Standing up against violence against women had also become conventional enough that Biden
could sponsor VAWA and appear feminist with only minimal risk to his mainstream liberal
persona.

Crafting VAWA
An examination of the first-person accounts of VAWA’s introduction by Biden,
Goldfarb, Nourse, and MacKinnon reveals as much about competing claims to ownership of the
issues VAWA addressed as it does about the actual history of the bill.22 Biden recounted his
version of VAWA’s introduction in his autobiography, Promises to Keep: On Life and Politics,
framing the discovery of violence against women as his own. He related,
I was constantly watching the crime statistics for anomalies and new problems. …While
looking at Bureau of Justice crime statistics in 1990, I was struck by a particular number.
The violent crimes perpetrated against men had fallen greatly in the previous ten years;
the number of violent crimes against young women trended up.
For this reason, Biden continued, “In 1990, I assigned one of my staff on Judiciary [Nourse] fulltime to the problem of violence against women.”207
Biden not only took credit for conceptualizing the legislation, he also took credit for
noticing the problem of rape in the first place. He did not situate his story in a feminist past, but
rather framed it as a tale about numbers and crime. Furthermore, he implied that he had never
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fully understood the size of the problem of rape before 1990. Neither this account nor any of his
many public statements to Congress made any significant mention of the decades of feminist
activism that raised public awareness of rape and necessarily preceded VAWA’s
introduction. Indeed, VAWA’s murky provenance was relatively divorced from any feminist
context in Biden’s description, which presented VAWA as having arisen as orphan legislation,
unencumbered by any previous legislative efforts, or grassroots political organizing.
This explanation also, misleadingly, set Biden up as the lone man on Capitol Hill fighting for
women’s rights, disingenuously discounting other legislative attempts to address rape and
domestic violence.
The implication behind this telling of this account was that Biden had played a huge role
in the discovery of the issues of rape and domestic violence. There is a certain political utility to
this claim. Biden introduced VAWA in June 1990, following Coats’ domestic violence hearing.
Violence against women had generated a degree of congressional interest, a fact that perhaps did
not escape Biden. VAWA fit like a puzzle piece into the larger crime bill. Biden could add
“something on women” to the crime bill and burnish his both pro-woman and tough-on-crime
credentials simultaneously.
While understanding the importance of Biden’s contribution to anti-violence efforts, and
often praising him for his bravery, the staff at NOW LDEF ultimately saw VAWA not as a the
starting point, but as the culmination of years of work by feminists. In a 1991 action alert NOW
distributed on the act, the organization wrote,
For two decades the women's movement has been supporting battered women's shelters,
staffing rape crisis hot lines and passing laws at the local and state level that attempt to
address the problem of violence against women. We almost enacted national domestic
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violence legislation in 1980, but lost in the tide of the Reagan election. …WE MUST
TRY AGAIN.208
Not surprisingly, NOW LDEF staff conceptualized Biden’s contribution as “an attempt to bring
national attention and federal leadership to our efforts.”209
Unlike Biden, when discussing VAWA’s introduction Goldfarb, Nourse and MacKinnon
focused much more strongly on the civil rights’ remedy’s provision of additional legal redress
for women rather than on the criminality of rape.
Goldfarb recounted that her participation in VAWA began with her meeting
Nourse, to whom she had never before spoken. Goldfarb was thrilled to learn that the federal
government would throw its power and resources behind improvements in law enforcement,
prevention, and victim services, but thought that, “most important of all, this legislation would
declare for the first time that crimes of violence motivated by the victim's gender are a violation
of the victim's civil rights.”210
Goldfarb had studied law under MacKinnon and thus was familiar with her legal theories
about pornography and civil rights. It was these theories that created the scaffolding for the civil
rights remedy seen by NOW LDEF as VAWA's pièce de résistance. Thus Goldfarb’s account of
VAWA’s creation duly stressed the civil rights remedy itself, the portion of the bill to
which NOW LDEF was most dedicated.
Nourse’s account was included as part of an essay on her “accidental” relationship to
feminism.211 As she told it, because she was the only woman in the room of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, she was “faced with the vague injunction from the chairman” of drafting “something
208
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on women for the ‘crime bill.’”212 Nourse did not mention having received any specific guidance
from Biden or anyone else on the Judiciary Committee about the form that VAWA should
take. Thus, she recounted that “…first, I needed some ladies. Having no real ones present, I went
in search of virtual ladies…In the law library of Congress.”213 There she found a trove of work
by feminist legal theorists.214 Nourse’s account does not mention speaking to Goldfarb. It does
make a passing reference to MacKinnon’s work on pornography as a civil rights violation. In her
rendition, Biden thought of the legislation but she came up with the architecture of it from
scratch. This account negates the very real presence of a cadre of feminist lawyers in Washington
at precisely the time she was at the library, giving her all the credit for a piece of legislation that
was undeniably a collaborative effort.
In striking contrast to Nourse, MacKinnon contends that she was, in fact, the author of
VAWA’s civil rights remedy. MacKinnon recounted that she herself:
…conceived the idea for a federal civil sex discrimination law for rape and domestic
violence and proposed it to Sally Goldfarb by phone (I was in a taxi in Washington D.C.
and used the taxi-driver’s phone). It is fundamentally the same theory as the legal claim
for sexual harassment, which I conceived, and the anti-pornography ordinances, which
Andrea Dworkin and I conceived and wrote. Sally conveyed the idea for a federal civil
rights law based on sex to address rape and domestic violence to Victoria Nourse, who
was working for Biden at the time. I was told by Sally that Biden “wanted to do
something for women…”215
Whoever actually wrote VAWA’s civil rights remedy was necessarily indebted to
MacKinnon, whose scholarship had for years focused on violence against women as a violation
of civil liberties. As MacKinnon herself pointed out, this was essentially the same claim used for
the anti-pornography ordinances. Whereas the anti-pornography ordinances had asserted that
because pornography caused violence it was a violation of women’s civil rights, the civil rights
212
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remedy claimed, much more simply, that the violence itself was a violation of women’s civil
rights. In her conception, violence against women is a synecdoche, standing in for all
discrimination against women. Because of gender-based violence, American women and girls
are relegated to a form of second-class citizenship. When explaining why she was not more vocal
at the time about her authorship MacKinnon recalled:
I stayed silent about it because I didn't want the VAWA stigmatized. The stigma of
pornography could have been fatal. …I offered drafting language repeatedly through
Sally in the process...216
Indeed, an association of VAWA with anti-pornography activism would not have worked in
VAWA’s favor. The ideological background for the civil rights remedy was much more radical
than that of the rest of the bill. MacKinnon’s participation in its crafting was perhaps, as she
alludes, kept under wraps because she herself was such a controversial figure. Linking
pornography and violence and civil rights had been hugely contentious, but largely because of
the First Amendment implications. Linking violence against women to civil rights, however, was
not without debate.

The Competition to Shape VAWA
Wherever the first seeds of VAWA were planted, once Biden introduced the bill to
Congress the competition to shape its provisions quickly became fierce. When VAWA was
introduced, it included the civil rights remedy and two additional titles more closely aligned with
the rest of the crime bill—Safe Streets for Women and Safe Homes for Women. In the four years
before VAWA was passed, legislators from both parties tried on several occasions to have the
crime bill absorb large chunks of VAWA. In addition, several Republican rivals of Biden
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introduced their own competing legislation, and were steadfast in their desire to help shape the
issue and even to wrest it from Democrats. Chief among these were Senator Bob Dole (R-KS),
the Senate Republicans’ leader from 1987 to 1995, and Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), who
became the ranking minority member of the Judiciary Committee in 1993.217 They consistently
worked to reshape VAWA to fit their own agendas, which frequently meant suggesting the
addition of more punitive measures, and the removal of the proposed civil rights remedy. Dole
and Hatch both introduced competing violence against women legislation to try to influence the
final shape of VAWA.218
The complicated intersections between the tough-on-crime and women’s rights
discourses evident in VAWA were something that Biden’s Republican rival in the Senate, Bob
Dole, attempted to manipulate when discussing his competing bill. While Biden used VAWA to
prove his status as the Democrat’s go-to man on crime, Dole sought to undercut Biden’s crimefighting credentials. While Biden attempted to manipulate traditionally Republican rhetoric to
forward Democratic aims, Dole tried to wrest ownership of this language back from Biden,
questioning Biden’s commitment to attacking crime. Dole tried to undermine Biden by
emphasizing the complicated worlds Biden was attempting to straddle, and the difficulty likely to
ensue from such a stance, with comments such as these:
These proposals [in Dole’s “Women’s Equal Opportunity Bill”] have created a dilemma
for the Democratic leadership in Congress: Supporting these measures would run counter
to their usual identification with criminal defense interests. However, opposing them
would mean being on the wrong side of anti-rape, pro-women measures.219
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Dole also taunted Biden for softening anti-crime provisions in his omnibus crime legislation,
calling it a “pseudo-crime bill” and arguing:
The Democrats…unilaterally worked out their own “compromise” bill before the
meeting, which consistently incorporated measures…that weakened existing law and
largely discarded important pro-law enforcement measures.220
While Biden wrote comprehensive crime legislation into which he later enveloped
measures addressing violence against women, the Republicans’ crime bill included violence
against women measures from the start. Dole made sure to point this fact out, arguing that Biden
was not truly interested in helping women, and that his own bill was “more pro-women and more
anti-criminal than any bill introduced by the Democratic leadership.”221 Each time VAWA came
to markup, Dole and other senators attempted to attach crime-related amendments to it. Several
of these, such as the death penalty for rape/murders and introduction of a defendant’s prior
record at trial were ultimately inserted elsewhere in the crime bill VAWA was attached to, even
though Biden initially thought they were not appropriate additions to the bill.222
In February 1991, Dole introduced the Women’s Equal Opportunity Act. Like VAWA, it
included stronger penalties for sexual assault, increased restitution for survivors of sexual assault
and provisions for the creation of a national task force on violence against women. Unlike
VAWA, however, in place of a civil rights cause of action for gender-motivated violence, Dole’s
act included an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to allow penalties for workplacerelated sexual harassment. Its final component was a Glass Ceiling Commission to work on
expanding employment opportunities for women. The Department of Justice threw its support
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behind Dole’s bill because of its stronger focus on more effective law enforcement measures.223
Representatives Susan Molinari, a moderate Republican from New York, and Jon Kyl, a victims’
rights-oriented conservative Republican from Arizona introduced Dole’s bill in the House.
By September 1992, when no action had been taken on the Women’s Equal Opportunity
Act, Dole reintroduced it in a slightly different form, at the same time remarking that,
President Bush has always supported and proposed the toughest possible provisions to get
tough with sexual offenders. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee has also proposed
legislation on this topic, although it is much, much, weaker than the legislation I
introduce today, or that which the President has proposed. I ask my friends on the other
side of the aisle to look again at this legislation, to look again at the epidemic of violence
against women, and to join those of us who want to pass the toughest legislation
possible.224
The new legislation’s sexual violence title included increased penalties for rapists and
mandated testing people charged with sexual assault for HIV, something that the VAWA task
force strongly opposed. Nourse worked with Hatch to arrange a hearing about his and Biden’s
bills in Salt Lake City. The grassroots response Hatch saw there was enough to convince Hatch
to support VAWA’s passage. For the first time, the Democrats had a strong Republican voice to
push for the bill’s passage.
At the Judiciary Committee’s business meeting in May 1993, Biden, Hatch, and Dole
wrote alternate phrasing for the civil rights provision which all three could support, making
passage of VAWA much more likely.225 The new wording promised to make the bill more
palatable across the political spectrum. Biden remembered that in November 1993, when VAWA
had finally garnered much more support, “I knew the crime bill we’d voted out of Judiciary had
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strong bipartisan support in the Senate that year … So I added the Violence Against Women Act
to the bill.”226 Working together on the civil rights remedy, Biden and Hatch developed language
that defined discriminatory motivation and limited the use of the civil rights remedy to
felonies.227
Biden attached VAWA to the crime bill while negotiating the terms of the crime bill
itself. In order to ensure acceptance of VAWA’s addition to the crime bill, Biden cut a backroom
deal with Phil Gramm (R-TX), the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.228 With
Hatch’s encouragement, Gramm agreed to back VAWA if funding for the crime bill came from
monies gained through the reduction of the size of the federal work force. Ultimately, the Clinton
administration cut 300,000 people from the government payroll to pay for the crime bill.229
During the summer of 1994, the House and Senate went into conference to discuss the
crime bill to which VAWA had been attached. Both the House and Senate passed the bill, which
President Clinton signed into law on September 13.

VAWA Section by Section
When VAWA finally passed, it included its original three titles—Safe Streets for
Women, Safe Homes for Women, and Civil Rights for Women—plus additional titles on judicial
education and immigrant women’s rights. During the years between its introduction and passage,
VAWA also gained and lost a title on campus safety, which was added in 1990 but spun off into
a separate bill in 1992.
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Subtitle A: Safe Streets for Women230
The Safe Streets for Women subtitle ostensibly addressed sexual assault. In actuality,
only its first chapter, “Federal Penalties for Sex Crimes,” addressed this crime alone. While some
sexual assaults do, indeed, occur on the streets, certainly most do not.231 Mirroring the 1968
crime bill, this part of VAWA classified crime by geography, a tricky proposition, as rape is not
usually characterized by where it takes place. This resonance of the street metaphor can also be
found in other parts of the rest of crime bill, such as the Safer Streets and Neighborhoods title.
When promoting his crime bill on the floor of the Senate in 1990, Biden bragged, “It starts by
attacking the crime and drug problem where it is most acutely felt, in the streets.”232 The
implication of this understanding that rape is something that happens in the “streets” forces
VAWA to fit into a mold that may not accurately address the issues at hand. While it does indeed
focus on the criminality of rape, rape more often than not does not take place in the street, and
there is no reference here to rape as violence particularly geared toward women.
As part of the larger crime bill, this section did very little to address the particularities of
rape, and goes much further toward punishing criminals than empowering women. Its law
enforcement strategies mirrored those first introduced in the 1968 crime bill. Most of the Safe
Streets for Women subtitle was focused on applying a variety of stricter law-and-order
measures—including increased penalties for crimes, mandatory sentencing requirements, and
earmarking of increased amounts of money to fighting crime. Indeed, this chapter of VAWA was
primarily concerned punishment of criminals and, as such, was part of the larger project of the
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crime bill.

Safe Streets, Chapter 1: Federal Penalties for Sex Crimes
Sexual assault was one of several crimes—including manslaughter, arson, and various
forms of drug trafficking—for which the crime bill mandated increased penalties. The first
section of this chapter doubled the possible term of imprisonment for “repeat offenders”; those
with prior convictions for any variety of sexual assault.233 The second directed the United States
Sentencing Commission to consider increasing federal penalties where more than one person was
involved in a sexual assault and where federal penalties were lower than state penalties.
This section included one of only three mentions in VAWA of the disparities in
understanding and reaction to “stranger” as opposed to “date” or “acquaintance” rape when it
directed the United States Sentencing Commission to recommend changes to guidelines to
address disparities between crimes when sex offenders are known to victim and those when he is
not known. It also directed the commission to ensure that guidelines addressed the “general
problem of recidivism in sex offenses.”234 This assumption of a higher rate of recidivism for
offenders was contentious, at best.
This title also sought to standardize the mandatory restitution laws across the states. 235
Restitution to crime victims had become a common demand in the victims’ rights movement, but
since they were first instated in 1984, they had become a jumble of contradictions.
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Before the Judiciary Committee marked up VAWA for the last time in 1993, the Federal
Penalties for Sex Crimes title included increased mandatory minimum sentences for sexual
assault and aggravated sexual assault. The VAWA task force spearheaded an effort to pressure
Biden to reconsider this measure. Rather than increasing sentences outright, the section instead
merely instructed the United States Sentencing Commission to review federal sentences and to
pay special attention to topics identified by the task force as central.236
House versions of the Federal Penalties for Sex Crimes chapter imagined the treatment of
offenders very differently from their Senate counterparts. During the 102nd Congress, the House
replaced the Senate’s penalties for sex offenders with mandated psychological treatment and
rehabilitation. The bill also suggested supplementary chemical treatment, elsewhere known as
“chemical castration.”237 In the 103rd Congress, the House bill removed psychological and
chemical treatment and replaced it with “Offender Training and Information Programs.” Training
was designed to assist probation and parole officers with “case management, supervision, and
relapse prevention,” while Information Programs were designed to ensure that those being
released from prison received information about sex offender treatment programs.238 The debate
about the proper punishment of rapists touched upon numerous other debates related to the
rapists’ identity. Castration had begun to receive attention in the mid-1980s, when it was first
offered as an alternative to incarceration or as a condition for probation or early release.239 In
1992, a Texas judge granted a rapist’s request to be castrated, starting such a firestorm of protest
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that the judge decided to nullify his decision.240 If the rapist rapes because of his inherent nature
as a rapist, can he be made to stop? Chapter 4 will examine the relationship between the identity
of the rapist and the variety of approaches to “punishing,” “treating,” and “curing” him.
As contentious as ideas about what should be done with those convicted of rape in prison
were ideas of how they should be treated upon their release. The removal of penalties made the
House version of this section in some ways less punitive than its Senate counterpart. The
discrepancy between the two versions of this chapter was due to the fact that the part of the
political conversation about being tough on crime involved the exact measurement of punitive
ingredients—retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation—that should be included in
the punishment recipe. The House version of this section included a complicated mix of moreliberal, leaning toward rehabilitation, and more-conservative, tilting toward incapacitation.

Safe Streets, Chapter 2: Law Enforcement and Prosecution Grants to Reduce Violent Crimes
Against Women
The law enforcement and prosecution grants—which received the bulk of VAWA’s
funding— were the aspects of VAWA most obviously indebted to the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act. They shared the 1968 crime bill’s goal of developing and strengthening
effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies and borrowed from the structure of that bill,
creating what came to be known as “STOP” grants (an acronym for service, training, officers,
protection)—block grants that gave funding directly to state and local law enforcement entities.
These grants emphasized coordinated efforts between law enforcement, prosecutors and
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community service groups. 241 While states had to certify that programs they developed would be
coordinated with local, private, nonprofit service agencies such as rape crisis centers and battered
women’s shelters, community groups had no actual authority over the structure of
programming.242 Rape crisis centers and domestic violence shelters were locked out of a wide
swath of funding if they did not want to involve the police in their activities. This lifeline, with
many strings attached, is reminiscent of the LEAA and OCJP funding studied by Nancy
Mathews.
The Safe Streets Act’s focus on training and equipping law enforcement was mirrored by
this chapter’s allocation of $800,000,000 for training and expanding law enforcement,
researching and implementing new police policies and expanding data collection systems.
This chapter’s stated focus on improving law enforcement was in sync with other crime
prevention sections of the crime bill. For instance, the original language of this chapter, when
introduced with the rest of VAWA in 1990, had discussed focusing efforts on the areas with the
highest rates of violent crime against women. That language was moved to a special section on
high-intensity-crime area grants in subsequent bills and then dropped from VAWA and moved to
a generic crime prevention section of the crime bill. The high-intensity crime area grants tried to
create similar kinds of anti-crime programs that involved a broad spectrum of community
resources, including nonprofit community organizations and law enforcement agencies.
The stated purposed of this chapter was “to develop and strengthen effective law
enforcement and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women.” It did not
specifically mention sexual violence, a fact that further elided VAWA with the rest of the crime
241
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bill. Money was earmarked for identifying and responding to violent crimes against women,
including (but not limited to) the crimes of sexual assault and domestic violence. An early draft
of this title gave money only to police and prosecutors. The VAWA task force had to push back
against the assumption that police were in control by lobbying successfully for the addition of
the possibility for rape crisis centers and domestic violence shelters to receive money directly.243

Safe Streets, Chapter 3: Safety for Women in Public Transit and Public Parks
Safety for Women in Public Transit and Public Parks, not a part of VAWA’s first draft,
was added when the bill was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1990. It created
grants for capital improvements to prevent crime in public transportation and parks by increasing
the law enforcement presence there and adding more lights and security cameras at bus stops and
parking lots.
The 1990 Senate report on VAWA described this chapter as taking “simple, but
necessary, measures to ensure that women can travel safely in public parks and on public
transit.”244 While this chapter did allocate a small percentage of its funding toward a study of
ways to increase safety for women in public parks, very little else in this section applies
specifically to rape or domestic violence. In fact, this portion of VAWA has as much in common
with the crime bill’s urban recreation measures as it does with other sections of VAWA itself.245
The crime bill’s subtitle on urban recreation and at-risk youth included a section on “park and
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recreation recovery programs.” This component of the bill aimed both to deter crime by
expanding recreation opportunities for at-risk youth and to increase the security of urban parks
with lighting, cameras and increased collaboration between park personnel and law enforcement.
Both sections fit well into the crime bill’s overall goal of further integrating law enforcement
into community policing efforts.

Safe Streets, Chapter 4: New Evidentiary Rules
VAWA updated the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), the federal code that governs what
is and is not admissible as evidence in civil and criminal trials by expanding it to apply to not
only criminal but also civil cases. 246 Unique to the federal rules, which are normally written by
the Supreme Court, Rule 412 was originally added to the FRE by Congresswoman Elizabeth
Holtzman’s 1978 Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978.247 The changes to the rules
were the subject of ongoing interest to both Congress and the Judicial Conference, the body
charged with overseeing amendments to the FRE.248 Members of the conference, who had begun
watching VAWA warily in 1991, created an Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence to
address the bill. The conference discussed the rule during its annual meeting in 1992 Chief
Justice Rehnquist objected to what he believed was the amendment’s potential to encroach upon
the rights of defendants.249 Because Congress, unlike the Judicial Conference, does not need
Supreme Court approval to amend the rules, it was able to amend Rule 412 without Rehnquist’s
approval.
246

The rule was altered once before its VAWA revision, in 1988, to cover criminal prosecution for any sexual
offense, not just rape. Section 320935 of the crime bill added rules 413-415. Jacqueline H. Sloan, “Extending Rape
Shield Protection to Sexual Harassment Actions: New Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Undermines Meritor Savings
Bank V. Vinson,” Southwestern University Law Review 25 (1995): 365.
247
Ibid., 367.
248
Established in 1922 as the policymaking body of the United States Federal Courts, the Judicial Conference meets
yearly and at special sessions called by the Chief Justice.
249
Sloan, 372.

81

FRE 413 made evidence of prior sexual criminal activity by the defendant admissible in
federal sexual assault and child molestation cases. This was true whether the abuse was proven
or just alleged; under the new rule, if a defendant was accused of having raped someone but
never convicted of the crime, that accusation could be entered as evidence in a trial. Rule 413
had initially been part of the Bush administration’s Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of
1991. It was later picked up by Dole and Molinari in 1991 and introduced as part of their
Women’s Equal Opportunity Act, a more-punitive alternative to VAWA.250 While the act itself
died in committee, many of its provisions were preserved as part of the Sexual Assault
Prevention Act in 1992 and 1993.251 The Senate eventually passed the proposed rules on
November 5, 1993 as part of a crime bill amendment to the Clinton crime bill offered by Dole.
The new rules became a part of the crime bill as a whole, not of VAWA itself.
Rule 413, by allowing the submission of evidence to prove that a defendant had a certain
temperament or was “by nature” likely to have committed a particular crime, made a specific
exception to an earlier rule, which forbade use of evidence pertaining to a person’s character
traits.252 Several in Congress felt strongly enough that the new rule should be included that they
were willing to ignore the wishes of the Judicial Conference.253 The House would not vote to
include these rules because many members felt that the rules should be written by the Judicial.
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The version of the revised evidentiary rules that was ultimately included was a judicial proposal
sent to the Congress and adopted as part of the final bill.254
The underlying premise of Rule 413 was that rapists were criminal by nature, and that
they committed the crime of rape because of their very characters—a sharp departure from
feminist understandings of the crime that saw all men as potential rapists.

Safe Streets, Chapter 5: Assistance to Victims of Sexual Assault
The first section chapter did not provide direct assistance to victims of sexual assault but
instead allocated funding for rape prevention education to states to distribute to rape crisis
centers and other non-profits. It authorized grants for education seminars, hotlines, and educating
professionals and included a provision that twenty-five percent of funding would go to middle
schools, junior high schools, and high schools.
Later portions of this chapter included the House-authored provision of funding for
probation and parole officers to work with sex offenders in case management, supervision, and
what it called “relapse prevention” after those who had been imprisoned for rape were released,
as well as funding to ensure that released sex offenders would be taught about community
treatment programs.
VAWA placed a great deal of emphasis on education, and assumes that education is
prevention. This emphasis speaks volumes about the bill’s implicit understanding of cause and
prevention of rape. VAWA’s section on “relapse prevention” provides essential clues as to the
construction of the rapist as suffering from an “illness.”
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Subtitle B: Safe Homes for Women
The term “homes” delineates as somewhat more clearly defined space than “streets.” The
fact that there was already a federal funding stream for domestic violence, via the Family
Violence Prevention and Services Act, coupled with the extent to which the domestic violence
movement had already organized meant that the task force was able to have a more measurable
influence on this section of the bill.
Safe Homes’ ten chapters focused much more specifically on domestic violence than Safe
Streets’ chapters did on rape. Its most sweeping policy additions were the interstate enforcement
of restraining orders, mandatory arrest policies, and increased rights for battered immigrant
women. VAWA mandated that for the first time orders of protection received in one state must
be recognized by all states.255
Mandatory arrest policies were particularly controversial because of their monolithic
approach to an exceedingly complicated problem and the increased amount of power they put in
the hands of police officers called to the site of a domestic violence incident. Mandatory arrest
policies were a one-size-fits-all solution to an exceedingly complicated problem. Advocates
objected to the presumption included in mandatory arrest policies that the benefit of jailing
abusers was more important than all other victim interests, including autonomy and financial
support from the abuser. 256
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Subtitle C: Civil Rights for Women
The remedy established a federal civil rights cause of action, making it possible for the
first time for those who believed that violence against them had been motivated by their gender
to bring private suit in federal court against their attackers for violating their civil rights. In its
final form, the language of this section required the victim to show that the crime of violence
committed against her was committed because of gender or on the basis of gender and due, at
least in part, to a gender-based animus. Congress claimed the authority to enact this subtitle
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The civil rights remedy—particularly that in VAWA’s first version—was in some ways
anomalous to VAWA’s other titles. It shared their criminal justice focus and was focused again
on what Matthews calls “managing rape.” In its first iteration it also had different fundamental
understanding of the crime of rape, implying that the crime was inseparable from male attitudes
toward women. It used the language of civil rights, not present elsewhere in the bill. Whether or
not the bill actually created additional civil rights for women was contested, but the fact that it
could be framed that way was essential to the passage of VAWA as a whole. Furthermore, the
language of the bill stated that Congress had the right to enact the remedy because of powers
granted to it by the commerce clause. Inherent in this was the idea that the fear of rape is
disabling to women. This tacit acknowledgment that women have an ongoing reason to fear was
a radical understanding of crime. Thus the bill used a radical understanding of rape combined
with conservative way of addressing its existence.
The civil rights remedy was a point of contention for a powerful array of outside
constituencies, including the Department of Justice and the Conference of Chief Justices of State
Supreme Courts. Resistance to its passage was spearheaded by Rehnquist, whose assault was
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part of a larger attack upon the expanding federal powers of Congress.257 The Department of
Justice objected to its supposedly vague language, and the Conference of Chief Justices argued
that it would inundate the courts with cases.
Opposition to the civil rights remedy gathered force after Biden introduced VAWA for
the second time in January 1991. The Conference of Chief Justices was first to act, and adopted a
resolution that supported the rest of VAWA but specifically opposed the civil rights remedy.
After this, Rehnquist spoke out against the bill in his year-end report to Congress.258 Later in the
year, Rehnquist created an Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence to examine VAWA.
Both Rehnquist himself in his year-end report and the Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based
Violence took the stance that the civil rights remedy would result in an avalanche of cases that
would “slow the wheels of justice.” Ultimately, there was a showdown in 1993 at the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association during which the National Association of Women
Judges, which NOW LDEF had been able to rally in support of VAWA, was able to prevent the
American Bar Association from taking an official stand against VAWA’s civil rights remedy.259
The issue of motivation—its definition, degree, and provability—was central to the
debate around this title. When VAWA was reported out of the Senate at the end of 1990, it
included (for one iteration of the bill only) the modifier “overwhelmingly” to describe
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motivation.260 When MacKinnon learned of this new language, she wrote to Goldfarb urging her
to reconsider and warned:
What the perpetrator intends or is motivated by is not only elusive and ambiguous in
many cases; proof of it is almost totally within defendants’ control. Besides,
discrimination is not a thought in the head of the discriminator so much as an injury in
the life of the victim—one done because of who the victim is. The “motive” construction
tends to make discrimination more a sin than an act more mental than material. In short,
this language locates the harm in the wrong place and makes this a law that we will not
be able to use effectively in many if not most gender-based attacks.261
The existing models for determining racial motivation had the potential to limit the civil
rights remedy’s ability to redress gender-subordinating violence the violence that women
experience is frequently not accompanied by overt expressions of hatred or hostility that are the
hallmarks of racial bias.262
Whether or not a crime motivated by a victim’s gender was automatically a bias crime
was another point of contention. The dispute about this issue points to the central question of
whether women should be considered a protected class. When VAWA was introduced, the civil
rights remedy included language referring to equal protection and immunities that suggested as
such.263 To make the bill more palatable this language was dropped, substantially limiting the
reach of the remedy.
As originally drafted, this title had covered only sex-related crimes—including rape,
sexual assault and abusive sexual contact. New language incorporated in 1991 expanded the
definition of crimes covered to include all crimes of violence motivated by gender, not simply
260
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sex-related crimes.264 In 1990, both House and Senate versions of the bill had defined the term
“crime of violence motivated by the victim’s gender” as “any rape, sexual assault, or abusive
sexual contact motivated by gender-based animus.”265 This language was changed, however, so
that “crime of violence motivated by gender” was defined as “any crime of violence, as defined
in this section, including rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact, or any other
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender.”266 Whereas the first
definition had assumed that sexual crimes were always motivated by gender, the second assumed
that some sexual crimes were be motivated by gender while others were not.267
An agreement made between Biden and Hatch in 1993 created the final changes to the
wording of the civil rights remedy. Together, Biden and Hatch chose to limit the title’s coverage
to felonious crimes.268 They also tried to narrow the possibility that there would be an
assumption made in court that women were attacked because they were women by changing the
phrase “crimes committed because of gender” to crimes committed “at least in part due to an
animus based on the victim’s gender.”269 Prior to VAWA’s introduction NOW LDEF and
Nourse had worked together to negotiate use of the word “animus” with several of the federal
judges who had previously been unhappy with the wording of the intent requirement of the civil
rights remedy.270 While meant to clarify the impetus of the violence, this new wording
sometimes caused confusion; Biden originally used the term “animus” in the sense of motivation,
while the colloquial use of the word describes a form of hatred.
There is a continuum between the efforts of Murray’s cohort of feminists to apply the
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Fourteenth amendment to the rights of women and that of VAWA’s crafters to do the same.
When discussing the bill Biden and NOW LDEF staff often made direct analogies. In fact, Biden
said about VAWA that,
This society has long condemned, in the harshest of terms, hate beatings of
blacks, Asians, or Hispanics. When the victim has been singled out because of his
race or religion or the color of his skin, society condemns not only the crime but
also the intentional deprivation of the survivor's civil rights. This bill extends the
same protection to the women of America. Crimes committed because of gender
are not simply random acts of violence. Ninety-seven percent of all sex assaults in
this country are committed against women. We all know this; indeed, we assume
it; but we ignore the implications. Crimes committed because of gender should be
condemned in the same terms as crimes committed because of race or religion—
in terms as strong as this society can possibly muster—as violent deprivations of
civil rights.271
Likewise, when NOW LDEF’s executive director Helen Neuborne testified in favor of
VAWA’s civil rights remedy she stated, “Just as a democratic society cannot tolerate crimes
motivated by the victim’s membership in a minority racial group and must pass special laws to
combat such oppression, so too we must put into place effective laws to prevent and redress
violent crime motivated by the victim’s sex.” 272
Indeed, discussion about the civil rights remedy raised fundamental questions about the
category of gender, such as if and when women are indeed a separate class and if and when it is
empowering to view them as such. Murray had eloquently introduced the parallel between the
rights of women and blacks when the Commission on the Status of Women asked her to
conceptualize a way forward for women’s rights. The civil rights remedy’s exclusion of blacks
was for many a cause for worry. Those at the ACLU and LCCR were convinced that a civil
rights remedy based on gender (but excluding race) would water down other civil rights
efforts.273 Although the race-sex analogy worked well in theory, as courts turned theory into law,
the analogy lost what Serena Mayeri calls the “intersectional nuances” it had originally
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contained. Depending on the context, the race/sex analogy could limit rather than expand
possibilities. Lost from these decisions was any understanding of the complicated historical
relationship between racial and gender inequalities.274
The civil rights remedy left the fate of victims at the intersection of the categories of race
and gender unclear. Although as early as the December 1992 VAWA task force meetings,
members of the task force debated expanding the civil rights remedy to include other categories
such as race and religion.275 In November 1993, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY)
introduced a bill that provided civil rights remedy for victims of violence motivated not just by
gender but also by race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.276

Subtitle D: Equal Justice for Women in the Courts
Equal Justice for Women in the Courts provided funding for the education and training of
federal and state judges on issues relating to violence against women and treatment of women in
the courts.277 While the bill was an important addendum to VAWA, its inclusion was a reminder
of another of the compromises made when feminism stepped into the public agenda. Rather than
seeking to enact any kind of structural change, the Simon bill called for the education of the
judiciary.
NOW LDEF worked closely with NJEP to help prepare this addition, which was
introduced by Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) in October 1990.278 Simon’s interest in the issue of
judicial education was piqued by a report issued in April by the Illinois Task Force on Gender
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Bias in the Courts which found that, despite sweeping changes to the way the legal system
handled violence against women, there remained a persistent institutionalized bias toward female
litigants and attorneys that jeopardized their right to fair treatment in cases involving divorce,
domestic violence, and sexual assault.279 NOW LDEF’s partner, the National Judicial Education
Program (NJEP) had been hugely instrumental in creating the first task forces on court-based
gender bias. The Illinois task force itself was one of seventeen that had been set up by 1990, and
was closely affiliated with NJEP.
In 1994, the year of VAWA’s passage NJEP released a curriculum for judges,
Understanding Sexual Violence: The Judicial Response to Stranger and Non-stranger Rape and
Sexual Assault.280

Subtitle F: National Stalker and Domestic Violence Reduction
This chapter was introduced in the summer of 1994, after the passage of a number of new
state laws in the early 1990s, and aimed to help Congress assist state anti-stalking measures. 281 It
gave courts access to existing national crime databases for use in domestic violence and stalking
cases and money to improve their data collection on domestic violence and stalking cases.
Stalker measures gave much credence to the idea that criminals can be catalogued, as well as the
idea that certain crimes are more likely to be recidivist than others.
Biden’s transformation as a legislator is embodied by his introduction, of this—the first
279
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federal anti-stalking legislation. Stalking first gained widespread attention during the early
1990s. Its emergence as a topic of concern coincided with VAWA’s journey through the House
and Senate. Biden’s vested interest in VAWA made him poised to act on changing public
perceptions of violence; it is hard, but not impossible, to imagine Biden’s pushing anti-stalking
legislation when he first became an advocate for anti-violence legislation. Biden’s public stance
on stalking was also yet another example of his straddling the feminist and tough-on-crime
worlds. The idea that stalking merited federal notice was relatively progressive, while the
measures planned against it were standard anti-criminal fare.

Subtitle G: Safe homes for immigrant women
VAWA made it possible for battered immigrant women to petition without their
husbands’ knowledge or consent for conditional permanent residency for both themselves and
their undocumented children. It also enabled the suspension of deportation proceedings for
battered women. This section first made its way into VAWA through an amendment introduced
in November 1992 by liberal representatives Louise Slaughter (D-NY) and Charles Schumer (DNY), as well as Republican Morella.

What’s Not There: Omissions From VAWA
The Commission that Wasn’t: The National Commission on Violent Crime Against Women
The first version of VAWA called for the creation of a National Commission on Violent
Crime Against Women. The commission was kept in the bill until 1993, when the House
Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice scaled it back to a
task force. The commission and the task force had similar responsibilities. Both were charged
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with evaluating the adequacy of and making recommendations regarding various aspects of local
state and federal responses to violence against women. By the time VAWA passed, the task force
had been removed from VAWA itself and folded into the larger crime bill, which included a
National Commission on Violent Crime. Of the commission’s ten stated goals, only one applied
specifically to violence against women.282

The Title That Wasn’t: Safe Campuses For Women
Safe Campuses for Women called for funding for campus education about rape and
guaranteed survivors the right to know the legal fate of those who had raped them. It was
included when VAWA was reported out of committee in October 1990. The title was introduced
because of feedback from anti-rape activists and because, as the Judiciary Committee reported,
hearings revealed “a special problem of violence, a problem that affects young women on
campus. Those women are at the greatest risk for the most violent of crimes—rape.”283
Representative Barbara Boxer (D-CA) explained that the idea behind education grants was for
the federal government to provide leadership and encourage consistency for the many campuses
introducing education programs about sexual assault.284
In May 1991, at the urging of the VAWA task force, Jim Ramstad introduced the
Campus Sexual Assault Victims’ Bill of Rights, which included the campus-focused sections of
VAWA and passed as part of the Higher Education Amendments of 1992.285 Safe Campuses for
Women incorporated a major VAWA theme by viewing rape through the prism of geographic
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boundaries. The section was true to the rest of bill in terms of its assumptions about the class and
race of victims of sexual violence: later chapters will examine the extent to which VAWA
explicitly and implicitly placed a premium on protecting white, educated, middle-class women.

Responses to VAWA
One rare exception to the relatively uniform media acclaim for VAWA immediately after
the bill’s passage was a piece written when Ms. Magazine asked law professor Mari Matsuda for
a feminist analysis of capital punishment and the crime bill. Matsuda bemoaned the crime bill’s
focus on punishment, explaining,
It is the things we have asked for all along that will stop crime—quality child care and
paid parental leave, guaranteed minimum income, universal literacy, affirmative action,
and free health care, including mental health care.286
While not specifically addressing VAWA’s relationship to the bill as a whole, Matsuda
saw feminists’ lack of vocal opposition to the crime bill’s reliance on increased death penalties
as a huge failure on the part of the movement. Matsuda argued that the feminist fight for
recognition of women as the victims of crime deflected attention from the crimes of the criminal
justice system itself, compromising the integrity of the movement.287
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CHAPTER 3
“PASSING FEMINIST LEGISLATION
WITHOUT APPEARING TOO FEMINIST:”
THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT TASK FORCE

This chapter examines the strategies employed by NOW LDEF and the task force it
assembled to help shape VAWA and to garner support for its passage. Often this was a process
that involved what one member of the task force called “passing feminist legislation without
appearing too feminist.”288
When speaking to members of Congress and congressional staff, task force members
focused on VAWA’s potential as anti-crime, anti-violence legislation and downplayed its
feminist credentials. Such a rubric appealed to the sensibilities of senators primed to pass
Biden’s larger crime bill. Reuss, Goldfarb, and other members of the task force knew from the
beginning of their VAWA advocacy that passing major federal legislation necessitated
modulating the stridency of their feminist demands to a register audible to politicians.
A law-and-order argument also appealed to segments of the population willing and
sometimes eager to accept increasingly punitive law enforcement measures. Support for VAWA
was fueled in part by a public that saw crime as out of control and favored strong, punitive
measures as a response. A synergistic relationship developed between the fact that the task
force’s message helped it solicit support from a much wider range of organizations and the fact
that a wider audience for the bill helped it appear not quite so feminist.
Since VAWA’s parts were different enough to make the legislation, in some ways, two
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bills in one, arguments for its passage were malleable. When targeted at fellow advocates, the
task force message would more often than not be focused on the transformative possibilities of
the civil rights remedy. Packaged with law enforcement measures, the civil rights remedy looked
less activist. Paired together the two parts of the bill each tempered the other. For instance, when
increased enforcement and penalties were bundled with civil rights measures they appeared less
draconian.
Washington-based civil and women’s rights groups were two constituencies that
remained consistently unconvinced by any argument for VAWA. In fact, almost as soon as
VAWA was introduced, the WRP and the NAACP LDF began speaking out privately against it.
While the discord between these groups was based on concern about VAWA, it was also about
contested understandings of feminism. Who is a feminist? And who speaks for the movement?
NOW LDEF had always espoused a very particular strain of historically white, liberal
feminism. It was a category of feminism from which many black women had long felt excluded.
NOW LDEF’s wholehearted embrace of a civil rights remedy that applied to gender and not race
was just the kind of divisive strategy that had caused tension before. In the case of VAWA
traditional tensions were elevated because of the unusual relationship between the civil rights
remedy and its strange bedfellow—law and order legislation fraught with racist undertones. The
situation was not helped by the fact that, to lend VAWA legitimacy as a feminist endeavor Biden
represented NOW LDEF (and NOW LDEF represented itself) as quintessentially feminist and
able to speak for all feminists.
False Starts
Before approaching NOW LDEF for help constructing VAWA, Nourse had initially
contacted a number of so-called inside-the-Beltway women’s groups, all of which refused to
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support VAWA. Nourse has hinted that their resistance to VAWA could have been due to the
fact that these groups saw the issue of violence against women as politically dangerous.289
Neuborne related a similar experience, recalling that after she and Goldfarb agreed to
help with VAWA,
I went out and I talked to the other women leaders of women's groups at the time
to see if they wanted to join with us to really share some of the responsibility and
work and building that would go on around this issue. And surprisingly, they all
said no.290
Biden recollected in his autobiography that women’s groups were not initially interested in
supporting VAWA. “I was a bit surprised at the resistance I met from the inside-the-Beltway
women’s groups.” 291 Biden himself remembered,
I knew these groups didn’t entirely trust me because I wasn’t pure on the issue of
abortion. …But there were other things beyond the groups’ long-held suspicions
of me. I got the sense that the inside-the-Beltway domestic violence advocacy
groups were worried that the VAWA would be a distraction from the main
issues.”292
Reuss attributed feminist groups’ resistance to work on VAWA to the boldness of the
legislation, remembering:
They [inside-the-Beltway women’s groups] were just angry that there was one
more thing that seemed hopeless that some senator wanted to do. They said,
“Good luck, but we don't even have time to look at it or work on it.”293
According to Joan Zorza, a New York-based lawyer specializing in domestic violence, no one in
the activist community conceptualized violence against women as a federal issue, so the
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legislation seemed irrelevant to many at first.294
Some groups that should have had a vested interest in getting the bill passed either could
not or would not work directly with the task force. None of these organizations ever publicly
addressed its initial lack of support for VAWA, so there is no way of knowing for sure what
motivated it. It could perhaps have been a lack of trust in Biden, as he himself intimated. It could
have been because these groups believed that VAWA could not be passed, something else that
Reuss suggested.295
The women’s groups Biden and Neuborne first turned to have not been publicly named
anywhere but most certainly included organizations such as the Women’s Legal Defense Fund
and the NWLC. Their resistance to supporting VAWA was something of a secret hidden in plain
site. Far from being too distracted to work on VAWA or seeing violence against women
legislation as irrelevant or hopelessly impossible to pass, members of these groups were, in
actuality, actively nervous about VAWA’s very real potential to do harm. Cynthia Hogan, who
replaced Ron Klain as chief counsel to the Judiciary Committee in 1992 remembered,
The civil rights community doesn't like it [the civil rights remedy] because they think it
gives a better civil rights cause of action to women than racial minorities have…and the
women's movement is very closely aligned with the civil rights movement, and so when
the bill was first introduced, the women's movement did not embrace it and were very
troubled in particular by Title III.296
Biden’s and the NOW LDEF staff’s professed puzzlement about these groups’ lack of interest in
VAWA was at least to a certain degree feigned. The NWLC and its allies contacted Biden’s
office repeatedly to inform the senator of their concerns.297 Their assumed befuddlement allows
them to acknowledge that there were natural constituents who by all rights should have been
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engaged with VAWA but weren’t without openly acknowledging the very real threat these
groups saw in VAWA.

NOW LDEF Takes the Challenge
Goldfarb stated on several occasions that the passage of the civil rights remedy was her
top priority. For instance, she explained by letter to Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO)
that,
Although NOW LDEF informally chairs this task force made up of over 400
organizational and individual members from all across the United States, our primary
area of interest and expertise is…the civil rights section that is Title III of the Act.298
While a belief in the importance of the civil rights remedy was the driving force behind
NOW LDEF’s dedication to VAWA, additional facets of working on VAWA could also have
appealed to the Goldfarb, Neuborne or Reuss. There was the hope that VAWA would create a
national platform for an issue with tremendous relevance to women. The allocations discussed in
VAWA were an order of magnitude higher than those in the 1984 Family Violence Prevention
and Services Act, the only other federal domestic violence legislation. NOW LDEF may also
have been dedicated to VAWA’s judicial education portions because of the extensive role that
the National Judicial Education Program had played in crafting them.
The relatively recent death of the ERA and even more recent exclusion of gender as a
category from federal hate crimes legislation lent added urgency to the struggle for establishing
gender as a privileged category. The civil rights remedy continued the long-term feminist goal of
extending Fourteenth Amendment protections to women. This was the first time that rape or
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domestic violence had been addressed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.
Working on the bill offered NOW LDEF a chance to sit at the table with Biden, the chair
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. It was an opportunity for NOW LDEF to demonstrate a new
degree of establishment acceptance and respectability, not just for itself as an organization, but
also for the women’s movement as a whole.
Throughout the early 1990s,VAWA both benefitted from and benefitted the slow but
steady growth in public awareness of rape and domestic violence. Family Violence Prevention
Fund president Esta Soler, who had actively lobbied for the 1984 Family Violence Prevention
and Services Act, saw the passage of VAWA as one part of a multi-faceted effort to raise
awareness of violence against women.299 She hired political strategy firm Bass and Howes to
“create a national conversation about domestic violence” which included lobbying for VAWA.300
Other threads in the conversation included a campaign to educate doctors through the American
Medical Association and the PSA campaign “There’s No Excuse,” created by Bass and Howes
in conjunction with the Advertising Council.301

VAWA TASK FORCE BEGINNINGS
After helping to craft VAWA in May 1990, Goldfarb quickly became aware of the need
for a coalition to raise awareness of and support for VAWA, and—not sure that anyone else had
the motivation to do so—in August began to gather one herself.302 After VAWA’s introduction,

299

Esta Soler Ted Talk, “How We Turned the Tide on Domestic Violence,” filmed December 2013, accessed May
10, 2014. https://www.ted.com/talks/esta_soler_how_we_turned_the_tide_on_domestic_violence_hint_the_
polaroid_helped?language=en.
300
Joanne Howes. Telephone interview by author. May 10, 2014.
301
Ibid.
302
Strebeigh, 344.

100

Goldfarb herself sent out a letter to a variety of organizations, inviting them to the first meeting
of what would become the National Task Force on the Violence Against Women Act.303 The
meeting was held in September in NOW LDEF’s New York City offices. The task force would
continue to meet monthly or bi-monthly through VAWA’s passage in 1994.304
In early 1991, Neuborne hired Reuss to help expand the task force and to help navigate
VAWA through Congress. Throughout their years at the helm of the taskforce Goldfarb and
Reuss used political artistry to help ensure its dynamism and longevity. The task force not only
met as a whole but also in smaller subcommittees that addressed particularly disputed issues. At
the first task force meeting, a subcommittee was formed to review federal rape law.305 At
subsequent meetings religious, sentencing, mandatory HIV and treatment subcommittees were
all formed. Reuss, in particular, organized lobbying days, arranged meetings with congressional
staff, and figured out how to get and keep the many different members of the task force invested
in and involved in the legislative process.
Representatives from four main constituencies—national domestic violence coalitions,
women’s rights groups, civil rights policy organizations, and religious organizations—attended
early meetings.306 For the first two years of its existence, the most active constituencies in the
task force remained domestic violence coalitions and religious groups. Without their support,
VAWA would not have begun to build momentum. The task force was able to activate this base
of supporters, encouraging it to be vocal about its support for VAWA.
Domestic violence coalitions also brought small groups of women from throughout the
country to Washington, soliciting feedback from a range of members and giving the domestic
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violence advocacy population a much more active voice than it would otherwise have had.307
Karen Artichoker, a domestic violence activist and member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
remembers being flown to Washington D.C. by the NCADV. At the time, she represented rural
groups in the NCADV, but she ended up pushing for the inclusion of Native Americans in
VAWA.308
Religious organizations, too, were able to make use of already-existing networks to help
increase awareness of and support for VAWA. The Women of Reform Judaism, a member of the
religious subcommittee, passed a resolution against violence against women that closely
mirrored the language of VAWA itself, calling upon Temple sisterhoods to “advocate for the
passage of legislation at the appropriate governmental levels to combat crimes against women,
including provisions for increased protection from violence in the home, on the streets and on
campuses.”309
Task Force Expansion
While the roster for the first task force meeting had been populated with the names of a
cross section of feminist and civil rights organizations, the roster for the last task meeting before
VAWA was passed resembled a who’s who of Washington bureaucracy. More constituent
support was needed, because if women’s groups alone supported VAWA, it would have been
easier for congressmen to write off the bill as not relevant to them.
Despite the continued efforts by task force stalwarts, by early 1992 Reuss had already
begun casting a wider net in search of more varied support for the bill. She was able to mobilize
organizations whose missions were less directly concerned with rape and domestic violence,
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including unions such as the AFL-CIO, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, and United Auto Workers. Her efforts benefited from a public that saw crime as out
of control and favored strong, punitive measures in response.310
Slowly but steadily, support for VAWA moved further into the mainstream, broadening
its appeal. At the same time, the Family Violence Prevention Fund’s domestic violence outreach
to the medical profession began to gain traction, continuing to push the issue further into the
public domain. The May 1992 issues of The Journal of the American Medical Association
included several articles about domestic violence, and the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists renewed campaign against domestic violence was in full swing.311
By the spring of 1993, the task force had both grown and changed considerably. By May
750 organizations were included on the task force mailing list, compared to 150 in 1991.312
AFSCME included an editorial by Biden on VAWA in its spring 1993 news service that was
circulated to 2,500 newspapers nationwide.313 In April, the Family Violence Prevention Fund
released the results of a domestic violence study it had commissioned.314
During the last months of 1993, a much more disparate group of organizations than ever
before participated in task force meetings. In October 1993, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution
called “Women in America” that included support for VAWA.315 Without mentioning VAWA
by name, the resolution articulated support for many of VAWA’s individual provisions. It
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premised its support for these measures on the idea that, “Violence against women is rooted in
attitudes and structures that demean women and confine them to a subordinate position in
society.” 316
When Goldfarb testified at a House Judiciary Committee meeting in November, she was
able to boast of chairing just the kind of far-flung middle-of-the-road task force it had been
aiming to create. Goldfarb identified herself saying, “On behalf of the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, I chair a national task force of hundreds of religious, labor, medical mental
health, aging, civil rights, women’s, children’s, and victims rights organizations, all of which are
concerned about the impact of violence on the lives of women and girls.”317 This was truly a
broad-based feminism.
By March 1994, the Teamsters Union had sent its first task force representative, and that
winter task force meeting attendees included representatives from United Airlines and the
American Psychiatric Association.318 At that point the “There’s No Excuse” PSA campaign by
FVPF had taken flight and the message of the task force and its allies began to spread throughout
the nation.319

STRATEGY OF THE TASK FORCE:
“PASSING FEMINIST LEGISLATION WITHOUT APPEARING TOO FEMINIST”
Talking Points
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Throughout the years that Goldfarb, Reuss, and others helped maneuver VAWA through
Congress, they were aware of the delicacy of their negotiations. Too much feminism could
alienate the politicians whose votes were needed to pass the bill. Too little feminism would make
it possible for the supporters NOW LDEF was enlisting to become disaffected. The task force
mustered considerable support for VAWA precisely because it straddled the line between these
two possibilities, making a case for the bill as anti-crime rather than pro-feminist while
concurrently stressing the debilitating cost of violence against women.
Notes taken during a 1992 task force meeting include the observation that “the problem
in the wake of the [Anita] Hill [and Clarence Thomas] hearings and the Kennedy Smith trial
[was the] perception on the Hill that feminism was put to vote and lost.”320 The lesson was to
make sure to use hearings on VAWA to stress the anti-violence aspect of the bill, and to make
sure the bill was “not a referendum on whether women are oppressed in the United States or a
vote for or against feminism.”321 Despite the advantages that being able to back major legislation
offered them, staff of NOW LDEF were well aware of the compromises inherent in framing antirape legislation as anti-crime legislation.
For instance, task force members who participated in the religious lobbying day realized
that “members of Congress seem to feel the women’s vote is not an important consideration”
given the conclusion of the Clarence Thomas hearings.322 They decided, therefore, to “emphasize
that this is more than a bill for the feminists,” and came up with a series of talking points for
doing so.323 Key among these was the high economic cost society pays for rape and domestic
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violence.324 They also argued that domestic violence is “not solely a women’s issue” but also
affects the family, and that idea went hand-in-hand with the assertion of the importance of
VAWA as a general crime prevention effort, as opposed to a woman-specific one.
Other task force talking points included VAWA’s various money-saving or moneyneutral features, such as the medical costs that can be gained from reducing violence, and the fact
that there was no federal expense associated with the civil rights remedy. Many of VAWA’s
provisions, such as adding additional lighting to parks and public transportation, were dependent
on moving monies from already existing budgets (in this case the Departments of Parks and
Transportation) and not earmarking additional funds. Only when these points were made would
the task force transition to the idea that men should assume responsibility for the problem of rape
and domestic violence, and that violence must be eliminated where people learn it.
To make the most of straddling both sides of the issue, the task force not only chose
talking points that stressed a very particular version of VAWA, they also worked hard in their
lobbying to balance the competing interests of those who were moderately tough on crime and
those who were extremely tough on crime. By using language with various connotations, the task
force was able to have a wider appeal.

Alliance with the Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues
Goldfarb’s December 1992 letter to Schroeder also included a straightforward and
forthright description of their political alliance,
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“So glad you’re going to take a lead next year; we look forward to working with you and
the Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues.” In return for your support and dedication
to ending gender-based violence, we pledge to gather sponsors for the bill, provide
educational materials for both Congress and the public at large, and gather a large and
diverse group of organizations in support of the House legislation that is known as the
Violence Against Women Act.325
Goldfarb and Reuss forged an alliance with the Congressional Women’s Caucus (the
caucus) and were consistently able to relay the task force's recommendations to staff members of
the leading House co-sponsors. Likewise, they were intimately acquainted with the strategies
being employed by the caucus itself and thus could respond quickly with pressure on lawmakers
when needed.
Reuss was intimately acquainted with the complicated political calculus of passing
legislation, and thus was able to provide the task force with a much-needed legislative plan.
According to Bonnie Campbell, then attorney general of Iowa:
The organizational role that NOW LDEF had played in getting the hearings set up
and getting the right people there and that might have been the first time I truly
understood the significant role—leadership role—they played.326
Task force members, worried that Dole would push Biden even further to the right, believed that
they could maximize their impact by,
…supporting the Biden bill while letting Biden know that our support is contingent on
there being no further changes that would either hurt women or create other problems. It
would also be desirable to get Biden publicly committed to the bill in its current form to
forestall future compromises with Dole.327
For this reason, they were eager to work with California Rep. Barbara Boxer, who
introduced the House version of VAWA to draft a bill more liberal than Biden’s. Commenting
on this, Reuss, recommended that the task force,
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…work with Boxer to get a bill even better than Biden’s bill. Since Boxer
identifies herself as a liberal and plans to run for senator in the near future, she is
in the best position to write the most desirable bill. We can then argue that
Biden’s bill is our bottom-line compromise position.328
NOW LDEF was asked by the caucus to put pressure on senators and representatives who
at key points in VAWA’s trajectory. Political scientist Susan Carroll studied the activities of the
caucus to see at which point in VAWA’s trajectory these had their greatest impact. It is clear
from the minutes of the task force that no small portion of the influence of the caucus was due to
the lobbying efforts of the task force.
Together the caucus and task force had their most significant collective impact at two
specific points. First, in November 1993, while VAWA was still in the Judiciary Committee, the
caucus and task force pressured Judiciary Committee chairman Jack Brooks (D-TX) and Rep.
Don Edward (D-CA), Chair of the House Judiciary Civil and Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee, to take action on the bill. Second, while the bill was in final conference, the
caucus and task force lobbied the conference committee to keep both the civil rights provision
and the battered immigrant woman provisions in the bill.329
In addition, task force members tried to influence the shape of the bill with focused
attacks on what they saw as its weaknesses. Leery of the increased sentences included in
VAWA’s Safe Streets for Women subtitle, the task force spearheaded the effort to pressure
Biden to reconsider this measure. Rather than increasing sentences outright, the section instead
instructed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to review federal sentences, paying special attention
to topics identified as central by the task force. An early draft of the Safe Streets’ Law
Enforcement and Prosecution Grants title had given money directly to police and prosecutors.
328
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The task force pushed back against assumptions that police are in control by lobbying
successfully for additional funding to be given directly to domestic violence shelters.
Members of the subcommittee on mandatory HIV testing tried to intercept Dole’s efforts
to insert a measure requiring this. An April 1991 letter the task force drafted for its membership
to send to senators pronounced:
We agree with members of Congress that women who have been raped should not have
to live in fear that they have been exposed to the HIV virus by their attackers; and we
appreciate any efforts to bring to Congress the important issue of rape and AIDS.
However, we strongly oppose mandatory HIV testing of accused sex offenders. Instead,
we believe Congress should directly focus on the needs of the survivor herself.
Immediately after the rape, a survivor should have available to her anonymous HIV
testing. …By contrast, requiring testing of charged rapists is a misdirected approach to
this problem, as it will shift the focus of public concern away from the women who need
these services.330
Goldfarb and Reuss served as matchmakers between domestic violence advocates and
members of the Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues. Their alliance with the caucus
created an entry for a greater domestic violence activist presence in the House and Senate.
Domestic violence groups were able to take advantage of the opportunities granted them because
they were relatively well organized and had a strong Washington presence in the form of
individual lobbyists and a coalition of state activists, the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence (NCADV).331
At least one new domestic violence bill was introduced, modeled on provisions found in
the Senate version of VAWA and created as a result of the task force’s work with the
Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues.332 Furthermore, the idea of including provisions for
330
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immigrant women in VAWA was first discussed by members of the task force in in the spring of
1991 when a subcommittee on battered immigrant women was formed.333 Members of the
subcommittee surmised that Boxer and Slaughter could and would work together on these
provisions and that Boxer would prove especially dedicated, as a representative of an area in
California where immigrant rights carry considerable weight. The task force members and the
Family Violence Prevention Fund lobbyist worked closely with Senate staff to add the category
of immigrant women to the Safe Homes provisions of the House version of VAWA.334
In contrast to this, the domestic violence and rape movements were fractured within
themselves and often unable to work together because of tense competition for money. NOW
LDEF tried, with varying degrees of success, to use the VAWA task force tried as a venue in
which it was possible for them to come together and a platform from which they could speak
with one voice.

Opposition to VAWA
Pinzler (of the WRP) and Smith (of the NWLC) both tried initially to discourage
VAWA’s introduction and, when that failed, to reshape the sections she saw as most harmful
both through engagement with the task force and independent political maneuvering. Pinzler and
others at the WRP objected to VAWA’s provisions across the board. Pinzler herself attended one
of the first VAWA task force meetings and told those present that ACLU policy did not permit
support of increased criminal penalties. She suggested tabling any and all consideration of
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VAWA and instead undertaking a comprehensive examination of women and the criminal justice
system, culminating in drafting original legislation.335
When her suggestion fell on deaf years, Pinzler continued to find ways to object to
VAWA. In 1991 the ACLU released a policy memo that enumerated its misgivings. These
included the fact that VAWA’s civil rights provision provided a remedy for gender-based
violence without providing a similar one for race, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation. The
ACLU expressed concern that this could have the long-term effect of watering down the civil
rights of other groups.336 Finally, the memo took aim at VAWA’s punitive measures, suggesting
that the problem with law enforcement was not inadequate penalties but rather inadequate
enforcement of penalties.337 In 1993 the WRP submitted testimony written by Pinzler that
questioned VAWA’s civil rights title at a House hearing held solely on that topic.338 This time
Pinzler questioned the civil rights remedy’s undue vagueness, and asked how it would be
possible for a plaintiff to prove that a rape was carried out due to the survivor’s gender.
Smith, on the other hand, was most apprehensive about what she saw as the troublesome
conflation of gender and race in the remedy because it ignored fundamental differences between
race-based and gender-based violence. The civil rights remedy’s separation of gender from other
categories oversimplified a multiplicity of crimes. She remembers:
“This was very complicated for me as an African American woman. You will see this in
a lot of the black feminist scholarship, problems with white women, how they defined
what the priorities were and we were just supposed to go along with them…”339
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In addition, while the civil rights remedy’s possible symbolic value appealed a great deal
to those at the helm, to Smith its effective use seemed like a fool’s errand. In order for women to
sue their attackers in court, they would have to have a great deal of money, which meant that at
its best the remedy would be useful to only a certain few.
While opposition to VAWA was fragmented, there was a loose network of people and
organizations opposing it that at times worked together. In 1993 Pinzler’s WRP and Smith’s
NWLC, as well as the United Methodist Church and the NAACP were listed as supporters on a
letter objecting to VAWA sent by the members of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe, whose
interests were represented by the Native American Rights Fund (NARF). The NARF letter was
in direct opposition to the one written by The Women’s Circle. Unlike The Women’s Circle,
Chippewa believed that Indians would bear the weight of increased penalties and that this in
itself was an outcome to be avoided.340 In place of lengthened sentences, the NARF suggested
mandating treatment.
While Pinzler came to very few meetings and did not engage actively with the task force,
in 1993 Smith was part of a task force civil rights subcommittee. Smith recalled that she felt
comfortable talking about her concerns with other members of the subcommittee, but
remembered a slightly hostile environment at full task force meetings.341At one point Smith and
several other lawyers who opposed all or part of the bill, including the United Methodist
Church’s Hilary Shelton sent a letter directly to the Senate Judiciary Committee. What followed
was a tense and awkward lunch with Ron Klain, chief counsel for the Judiciary Committee. As
Smith remembers it, Klain could not see past his assessment that the bill would help women. He
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was confounded by her concern for the people who would be prosecuted under VAWA, and
wondered out loud who could possibly be worrying about those who abuse women.342
The LCCR harbored continued doubts about VAWA’s civil rights remedy and refused to
give the bill its much sought-after approval.343 Because of the stature and size of the
organization, it was not clear that the LCCR would not derail VAWA. As late as March 1994, at
a meeting between Sally Goldfarb as well as a staff person, Amy Allina, from Bass and Howes
and senators Biden and Boxer, the LCCR was still concerned about Title III. According to Amy
Allina, Biden’s staff worried that “the civil rights community’s opposition to the title is stronger
than the women’s community’s support for it.”344 Finally, in April the LCCR wrote a letter of
muted support for Title III.345 The LCCR agreed to support the House version of VAWA (which
did not include the civil rights remedy), to commit to the principle of Title III as passed by the
Senate and to commit to continue working to achieve a consensus on the operative language of
Title III.346 Toward this last goal, the LCCR created a technical drafting committee to discuss
expanding civil rights protections to other affected classes and substituting “intentionally selects”
for “animus.” Throughout the spring of 1994, NOW LDEF continued to reach out to task force
members on behalf of LCCR, encouraging them to work to craft suitable phrasing for Title III.
The issue of increased law enforcement measures was a complicated one precisely
because communities that would be most directly affected by these measures sometimes saw
them in a positive light. A case in point is the letter written by the members of Women’s Circle,
a coalition of mostly Native American domestic violence advocacy groups and shelters. In the
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letter members of the Women’s Circle expressed their support for increased sentences mandated
in VAWA’s Safe Streets Act:
We recognize that the law enforcement and judicial systems are disproportionately harsh
on people of color. We also recognize that the increase in penalties in S.15 will most
effect [sic] Indian people. However, while we as Indian women stand side by side with
our brothers in the fight against racial oppression, violence against Indian women is
causing great and irreparable harm not only to Indian women but to our families and
communities as a whole. Federal sentences need to be increased because compared to the
violence committed, no one is being convicted or sentenced, Indian or non-Indian, on or
off reservations. 347
The members of the Women’s Circle did not come to the decision to support VAWA
easily. A session of hand wringing preceded their fraught choice. Karen Artichoker, the activist
from the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, remembers hours of back and forth conversation, “because the
women were saying they felt like we had to choose between the women that we were serving for
our work and our own personal experiences with the federal criminal justice system that is
racist.”348 But finally one woman whose son was in prison turned the tide when she said “we
can't sacrifice our daughters for our sons…The women in the shelter, they're our daughters.”349

How NOW LDEF Presented its Own Strategy
For NOW LDEF, Biden was publicly proclaimed a savior and privately viewed as a
proxy. The fact that NOW LDEF was in good standing with Biden and others in Congress meant
that the organization could claim ownership of the bill during public events. In order to reify
their argument that the bill was not too feminist, NOW LDEF members presented themselves to
various publics as having warm feelings for Biden, not as his antagonist. All those working for
NOW LDEF expressed the opinion that Biden was a fair player who wanted what was best for
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women. Behind closed doors, however, it was clear—from comments such as Reuss’s remark
about passing a bill better than Biden’s—that their feelings for him and his legislation were
much more complicated.
Current Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, when discussing her own
legislative efforts, said,
Those with whom I associated kept firmly in mind the importance of knowing the
audience and playing to that audience—largely men of a certain age. ….We
sought to spark judges’ and lawmakers’ understanding that their own daughters
and granddaughters could be disadvantaged by the way things were.350
Reuss echoed Ginsburg’s sentiments but took them a step further, calling NOW LDEF’s tactics
“nice girls manipulating.”351 In public, she and others on the task force played up their gratitude
to Biden for things they had done themselves. For instance, at a symposium in honor of the
fifteenth anniversary of VAWA’s passage, then-president of NOW LDEF Irasema Garza praised
Biden for his staunch support of VAWA. Her words of admiration, however, were quite
exaggerated. With a comment that virtually erased over two decades of work by feminist
organizations, Garza said,
Passage of the VAWA in 1994 was a culmination of Senator Biden’s four-year struggle
to put the issue of violence against women in the national spotlight. At the public
hearings he convened in mid-June of 1990, Senator Biden spoke with passion and
conviction asking the nation to break the silence. He said we have ignored the fight of
women to be free from the fear of attacks based on their gender. He went on to say that
for too long we have kept silent about the obvious.352
The public staging of the struggle to pass the civil rights remedy was as notable for what
it didn’t say as for what it did say. In Strebeigh’s Equal, the main danger to VAWA was
presented as its derailment by federal judges, who argued that were the civil rights remedy to
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pass their courts would be flooded with cases. Arguments from civil rights groups were
potentially just as harmful and arguably more trenchant.353 Strebeigh’s rendition pits a band of
fearless female lawyers against a host of male lawyers, stressing NOW LDEF’s success against
great odds and evil interlopers.354 However, he makes little to no mention of the fact that NOW
LDEF was also facing off against traditionally liberal civil rights groups who questioned the
remedy’s usefulness and definition of gender in meaningful ways.
Nourse, too, discussed judges’ opposition to the civil rights remedy in detail but made no
mention of civil rights groups’ opposition. She related, “if Chairman Biden was going to get
VAWA, he would have to take on the judiciary.”355 A chauvinistic and needlessly antagonistic
judiciary making specious claims is a perfect bully to vanquish. A confrontation with the WRP
or NAACP is much harder to paint in flattering terms.
How grassroots was it?
VAWA was often presented as legislation that grew organically out of the grassroots.
When speaking on the floor of the House in 1993, Representative Patricia Schroeder said, “this
bill is the result of grassroots activists on the front lines speaking out; the people in our
communities have been the primary lobbyists on this bill-not Washington lawyers..”356
In fact, VAWA originated in Washington as a senator’s project and much of the activism
that arose to support it was spearheaded by national organizations invested in passing the bill.
NOW LDEF were quite successful in creating a campaign for VAWA. In doing so, NOW LDEF
created the demand for the legislation (and not the other way around), harnessing energies from
the constituencies it recruited to the cause.
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NOW LDEF staff was circumspect when discussing the organization’s relationship to
those it helped mobilize behind VAWA. The task force collected enough nationwide support for
VAWA that NOW LDEF could claim that there was a grassroots movement to pass the bill—and
by 1993 one existed. However, NOW LDEF was not part of that grassroots. Reuss was
essentially an inside-the-Beltway operative posing as a grassroots person. According to Reuss:
…at the moment we never envisioned any—we didn't run shelters, we didn't have
any—law enforcement got a whole lot of, and still does get prosecutors VAWA
money, and cities, and states get VAWA money. And so in a funny way we were
above it.357
NOW LDEF worked on the issues it held near and dear and helped to coordinate
the efforts of the grassroots members of the task force. Again, Reuss recollected:
Early on NOW LDEF said “we’ll do the lion's share of the work if you let us have
the civil rights remedy and the battered immigrant.” And everybody went, oh god
we didn’t know … about any of that. Sure go ahead, you can have that. And then
that was…the brilliance of Sally Goldfarb and me was that everybody had a
say.358
NOW LDEF was also able to call upon NOW, which was membership-based. NOW’s
imprimatur lent VAWA extra credibility and burnished the VAWA task force’s grassroots
credentials. Indeed, NOW LDEF continued working almost as closely with its parent
organization as it did with its child, NJEP, during VAWA’s duration in Congress. Throughout
1990-1994, NOW supported efforts to pass the legislation. In fact, NOW LDEF and NOW joint
sent Sally Goldfarb’s first letter seeking support for VAWA.359 Molly Yard, NOW’s president
from 1987-1991, wrote a letter to the Senate about HIV testing, sent out in support of VAWA
under NOW’s auspices.360
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NOW LDEF did, indeed, generate a great deal of grassroots support for VAWA, but the
original push for the bill was a top-down rather than bottom-up. Other groups perceived NOW
LDEF’s claim to represent a grassroots movement as disingenuous. While the task force was also
often presented in the media as grassroots, and indeed received a lot of support from activists
around the country, VAWA would not have been introduced or passed without the impetus and
staying power of NOW LDEF.361 NOW LDEF’s leadership role elicited mixed feelings in the
activists who worked on the task force. On the one hand, activists were extremely grateful to
have NOW LDEF’s political and organizational firepower behind them, knowing that NOW
LDEF could do what they could not. Many were particularly pleased at the strong statement they
believed federal legislation would make.362
On the other hand, many activists resented the fact that NOW LDEF was laying claim to
an issue that was seen as belonging to the activists themselves and not to NOW LDEF. As one
Washington D.C.-based activist remembered,
There was a group in the domestic violence community who took umbrage at
NOW Legal Defense being involved. From their perspective NOW Legal Defense
was not the expert on these issues and so should not be driving the content of the
bill…They felt like they were not being included as much in the drafting363
While domestic violence groups may have felt animosity toward NOW LDEF and the
task force, for the most part they were quite actively engaged in the process of shaping and
gathering support for VAWA. In fact, the size and scope of anti-domestic violence groups’
participation was in stark contrast to that of rape crisis groups, which were noticeably less
represented. Domestic violence advocates, always slightly better funded than rape activists, had a
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much larger and more complex infrastructure in Washington, but there may have been another
reason for the disparity in the presences of the two groups.
Some members of anti-rape groups disliked the content of VAWA and expressed their
distaste by staying as far away as possible from the legislation. Kata Issari, co-president of
NCASA right before VAWA’s introduction and an active member in NCASA’s Women of
Color Caucus throughout the 1990s, remembered that before she joined the board in 1993 there
had been a well-established relationship between NCASA and the task force, but “we didn't want
to deal with any of the legislators or policy makers or criminal justice people….So our choice
was to step back from it.”364 Her and her like-minded board members’ focus was on serving their
communities, and their apprehension was based in VAWA’s punitive aims. Issari remembers,
I think those of us that were this kind of young strident group on the board didn’t feel that
VAWA was valuable, especially because there was a strong criminal justice element to it.
And then as now, criminal justice was going to disproportionately target men of color,
and disproportionately underrepresent the needs of women of color. So there was a lot of
feeling that VAWA was not going to address the needs or be beneficial, and in fact could
potentially be problematic for our constituents365
Race, Gender and the Civil Rights Remedy
The first words spoken by NOW LDEF staff about VAWA on the official record were
those of NOW LDEF’s executive director Helen Neuborne. At the June 1990 Senate hearing
held in conjunction VAWA’s introduction Neuborne stated, “We are here today to confront the
fact that an epidemic of violence directed against women is depriving half of America's citizens
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of their most basic civil rights.”366 Because she was referring to the threat of violence rather than
the violence itself, this statement was certainly slightly hyperbolic. The threat of violence
inarguably proscribes women’s lives, but it is much less clear exactly which civil rights the
threat of violence removes. Biden himself said about VAWA that,
This society has long condemned, in the harshest of terms, hate beatings of
blacks, Asians, or Hispanics. When the victim has been singled out because of his
religion or the color of his skin, society condemns not only the crime but also the
intentional deprivation of the survivor's civil rights. This bill extends the same
protection to the women of America. Crimes committed because of gender are not
simply random acts of violence. …Crimes committed because of gender should
be condemned in the same terms as crimes committed because of race or
religion—in terms as strong as this society can possibly muster—as violent
deprivations of civil rights.367
It was harder to prove that violence against women is committed because of gender than
because of race. Violent racist acts can be fundamentally different from violent sexist acts. That
women can be of all classes, all races, and all religions further complicates the process of
determining motivation, making it even more difficult to isolate gender as the catalyst for a
violent attack.
VAWA had been crafted to fit into the larger crime bill. Securing additional rights for all
classes of citizen was a much larger—and perhaps unrealistic—legislative goal than securing
them for women. One of civil rights groups’ biggest concerns about the civil rights remedy was
that the qualifications put on violence by the remedy (that it had to be a felony, that the
motivation of the attacker had to be proven) were too strict.368 Civil rights groups feared that
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VAWA’s civil rights remedy would create a standard that eroded civil rights generally.369 It was
bittersweet and perhaps slightly cynical that VAWA used a direct analogy between gender and
race to secure gender-based rights for women that would not be available for victims of racebased crime, especially since the passage of the civil rights remedy was largely symbolic.
Normally, the designation and proof of a civil rights violation leads to a lawsuit filed at the
expense of the federal government. With the civil rights remedy, the survivor—if she could
assemble the financial and legal resources—gained only the right to bring her own suit. If she
won she theoretically would have received monetary damages, but only provided the defendant
had enough money to pay these. Thus the remedy was seen by WRP’s Pinzler as essentially “do
it yourself” justice; the plaintiff would receive no help from the government and have little
chance of prevailing.370
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CHAPTER 4
VAWA’S MALLEABLE UNDERSTANDINGS OF RAPE

Introduction
Chapter 4 provides a close textual reading of both VAWA’s drafts and the bill’s
final version as well as of the bill’s collateral materials—the reports and hearings that
make up its official historical record. It seeks to uncover the assumptions about women’s
vulnerability, the identity of the rapist, and the role of politicians embedded in both the
bill’s language and measures.371
The bill melded rape and domestic violence into a single class “violence against
women” which had not appeared in previous legislation. VAWA’s use of this category
helped semantically merge rape and domestic violence with the other forms of violence
addressed in the crime bill as a whole, and contributed to wresting of the crime of rape
from its feminist roots. This construction led to a deepening of women’s presentation as
generic crime victims.
Once women were portrayed as such, the extra provisions they received in
VAWA gave them special, or über, victim status. Women’s rendering as victims in the
bill paralleled the performative representation of women’s vulnerability and deference in
reports and during hearings.
The content and structure of VAWA’s Safe Streets for Women subtitle, moored to
the framework of the 1968 crime bill, assumed rapists had an essentially criminal nature.
The title’s placement of rape in “the streets”—a category that still held resonances from
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its origins in Johnson’s racially-charged anti-crime legislation—lead to a very particular
representation of the rapist as a black criminal inhabiting the streets.
This interpretation necessarily merged anti-rape efforts with other anti-crime
activities, further enmeshing anti-rape efforts into the structure of anti-criminality.
Furthermore, female victims at the mercy of criminal rapists were to be rescued by
redeemer politicians—like those in the House and Senate who wrote and sponsored
VAWA.

The Category of Violence Against Women
One of the goals of feminism had been to show that rape was a crime of violence,
not a crime of passion.372 Unfortunately, VAWA took this idea to extremes while past
legislation had addressed only rape or domestic violence. Through the category of
violence against women, VAWA blurred the boundaries between the two crimes
themselves and, by emphasizing the violence in each, excised the sexual meaning of both.
Of course there are ways that this combination makes sense conceptually—rape and
domestic violence are by definition “violence against women.” However, using the term
as shorthand for both in the context of addressing other forms of violence changed their
meanings in fundamental ways.
Indeed, as early as 1981, Catharine MacKinnon had suggested that the use of this
category would create a heightened opportunity for co-optation of feminism by the
criminal justice movement. She worried that pressing rape into the category of “violence”
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erased the inherently sexual nature of the crime.373 MacKinnon blamed the melding of
rape, sexual harassment, pornography, and domestic violence into the category of
violence against women on women themselves. She argued that since women were afraid
to appear prudish and “against sex,” they focused on the violence of rape, ignoring its
intricate mix of violence and sexuality. The problem with this construction was, in
MacKinnon’s words, “So long as we say that those things are abuses of violence, not sex,
we fail to criticize what has been made of sex, what has been done to women through
sex...”374 That construction, as MacKinnon also points out, did not allow for the
exploration of the possibility that sexuality, as socially constructed in our society through
gender roles is itself a power structure. It also prevented women from asserting that they
were fighting for the affirmative control of their own sexuality.375 At issue was not only
the nature of the violence against women itself, but its relationship to women’s selfdetermination and their ability to control access to their own bodies.
While use of the phrase “violence against women” grew dramatically in the mid1970s, it had never before been used in a piece of state or federal legislation.376 Ron
Klain, the Judiciary Committee legal counsel, credits himself for adding this construction
to VAWA, but does not say why he decided to use it.377 Presumably it was to allow both
rape and domestic violence to fit more easily into a bill about other violent crimes.
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The Senate Judiciary Committee report, The Response to Rape: Detours on the
Road to Equal Justice, succinctly exemplified the erasure of the particularity of rape and
domestic violence in its introduction: “The purpose of this report is to help us recognize
that ‘violence against women’ is simply ‘violence.’”378 To a certain degree this statement
is shorthand for the idea that it is imperative to take these crimes as seriously as other
forms of violence. It is a tacit acknowledgement that the grievous effects of rape and
domestic violence described by the report were worthy of government intervention. Such
a statement emanating from a Senate committee was important in and of itself. Indeed,
VAWA has been seen by some as a symbolic act, meant primarily for educative
purposes.379 Throughout VAWA’s sojourn in Congress, politicians discussing the bill
minimized the differences between violence against women and violence against other
citizens. For instance, when introducing the June 1991 Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA)
remarked,
Crimes of violence, whether committed against an elderly pensioner or a child
abused by a drug-addicted parent, or against women, the subject of this hearing,
are happening in every corner of the country.380
While this statement makes sense in the context of VAWA’s inclusion in the
crime bill, it is discordant in a feminist context, since the categories of victims of
violence are not analogous. While violence perpetrated against a child by a drug-addicted
parent and violence against women are both violence, they differ from each other in
fundamental ways. Once the particularities of rape and domestic violence were removed
378
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and the meanings of the two had been elided, the next step was folding both into the
larger category of violence and excising the sexual characteristics of both. Former model
Marla Hanson’s testimony, given at the June 1990 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing,
Women and Violence, is an illustration of the idea that under VAWA violence against
women could and did include violence that perhaps had sexual undertones but was
neither rape nor domestic violence per se.381 Hanson had her career destroyed by her
landlord, who hired thugs to slash her face after she refused to date him. Several points of
intersection can be found between the crime against Hanson and actual cases of rape and
domestic violence, so her testimony was not entirely irrelevant. But the fact that Hanson
was chosen to testify indicates the extent to which the boundaries of violence against
women had been stretched to include a great deal more than rape and domestic violence.
In December 1992, VAWA task force members discussed the fact that VAWA’s
visibility had “brought wider attention to issues of violence generally.”382 Several
members worried, however, that the issue of violence against women could get lost, or
that other kinds of violence could be presented in a way that hurt women.383

Language of the Safe Streets for Women and Civil Rights for Women Subtitles
VAWA further fused sexual violence against women to other kinds of violence
against them by not specifically narrowing the focus of the two sections ostensibly
written to address rape and sexual violence respectively: the law enforcement chapter of
the Safe Streets for Women subtitle and the civil rights remedy. For instance, Law
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Enforcement and Prosecution Grants to Reduce Violent Crimes Against Women—the
second chapter of the Safe Streets for Women subtitle—had aimed to strengthen law
enforcement strategies to combat “violent crimes against women.”384 The first version of
VAWA specified that violence against women included sexual assault, while its final
version stipulated that violence against women included both sexual assault and domestic
violence.385
The first version of VAWA had contained this definition of crimes of violence
motivated by the victim’s gender: “any rape, sexual assault, or abusive sexual contact
motivated by gender-based animus.”386 The definition in the final version, introduced in
1994, excluded any mention of rape, sexual assault, or abusive sexual contact and instead
defined a crime of violence motivated by gender as simply “a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an
animus based on the victim’s gender.”387 This change guaranteed that the civil rights
remedy no longer applied to sexual violence alone, but also to any kind of felonious
violence against women. This final characterization, like the category “violence against
women” melded different kinds of sexual violence against women and combined sexual
with asexual violence. According to Nourse, it was this omission made sure that “the
presumption that sexual crimes were gender-motivated was deleted from the bill.”388 This
deletion removed both the specificity of different crimes of violence, as well as the
specificity of crimes aimed at women.
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Women as Victims I: Über-Victim Status
To some extent the success of the victims’ rights movement was responsible for
the elision of meanings in VAWA. While the representation of rapists in VAWA
fluctuated, that of women was fairly consistent. Funding for VAWA’s Law Enforcement
and Prosecution Grants chapter defined the term “victim services” as a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that assists domestic violence or sexual assault victims,
including rape crisis centers, battered women’s shelters, and other sexual assault or
domestic violence programs.389 Throughout VAWA, rape survivors are referred to simply
as victims–not rape victims. Women who have experienced domestic violence are
likewise termed victims.
Because much of the crime bill focused on victims’ rights, Nourse consulted
victims’ rights groups when writing VAWA, and several parts of VAWA were written
with victims in mind. VAWA’s insertion into the crime bill and adoption of the language
of victimization meant that women in VAWA became über-victims. As Hanson, the
model whose face had been slashed, testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee:
I was suffering more from the stigma of victimization than from the actual
violation…It had never occurred to me to be ashamed at being attacked…until the
courts, the press, the society began to…question if I were the architect of my own
suffering.390
Several Senate Judiciary Committee reports exemplified the textual presentation of
women as singularly victimized. To underscore the need for federal intervention, the
Senate Judiciary Committee first published Violence Against Women: The Increase of
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Rape in America in March 1991.391 The report began with the underlined assertion that
“American women are in greater peril now from attack than they have ever been in the
history of our nation.”392
Violence Against Women: A Week in the Life of America followed in 1992 and, by
providing intricate details of a week’s worth of violence against women, attempted to
corroborate assertions of an epidemic.393 Both reports were noteworthy for exaggerated
language and morbidly violent descriptions of violence against women. Both reports
combine a pronounced focus on particularly gruesome crimes and crime statistics
framing the ordinary as extraordinary. For instance, the first section of Violence Against
Women: The Increase of Rape in America presented the inflammatory claim that, “The
picture is bleak: there is an epidemic of rape spreading across the county.”394 It included
the subsection “The Rape Problem is Immense…And Growing.”395 Nowhere did the
report acknowledge the possibility of a relationship between the existence of rape crisis
centers, more discussion of rape, and greater reportage of the crime.
Violence Against Women: A Week in the Life of America included a so-called
“timeline of violence”—twenty pages of barebones sketches of violence against women
culled from information gathered during one week spent surveying hospitals, rape crisis
centers, and domestic violence shelters across the country. The report asserted that the
timeline was the “tip of the iceberg” and, to convey an increased sense of urgency,
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pointed out that only 1/100th of the violent attacks against women reported to the police
every week had been included and that,
If we were to include every reported incident, our timeline would be more than
2,000 pages long—just for a single week. And if we were to add all the
unreported crimes, our timeline would extend to more than 7,000 pages.396
Number of pages is certainly an unusual and perhaps histrionic way to measure
violence against women. The report itself is oddly impersonal, nowhere mentioning the
cost of the violence on the lives of the women themselves. In addition, the report includes
no first-person accounts, which furthers the removal of women’s perceived agency.
The idea of women as victims folded neatly into the larger victim discourse.
Many of those who gave testimony during VAWA hearings had also participated in
victims’ rights groups. Many oblique and explicit references to women as victims in other
hearings and reports were also included. This framed women as the victims not only of
violent crimes men experience but also of the special category of crime termed “violence
against women,” rendering them über-victims. As The Response to Rape, Detours on the
Road to Equal Justice explained, “Women in America suffer all the crimes that plague
the Nation—muggings, car thefts, and burglaries, to name a few. But there are also some
crimes, including rape and family violence, that disproportionately burden women.”397
Philosophy professor Ann Cahill’s observation that, “A significant element of the woman
victim’s experience of rape is directly related to the constitutive element of a power
discourse that produces her body as violable, weak and alien to her subjectivity” is
particularly relevant here. 398 In the case of VAWA, the power discourse was lodged in
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the materials presenting the bill, which depicted not only women’s bodies as violable and
weak, but also women themselves as such.
Often women’s victimization was presented implicitly through their portrayal as
disembodied human beings. For instance, the timeline that makes up the bulk of Violence
Against Women: A Week in the Life of America includes brief three-to-four sentence
vignettes for each reported incident.399 The only information consistently provided in
each sketch is the time and location the attack took place as well as the age of the woman
attacked and, if applicable, what happened to her children while she was being assaulted.
The inundation of story snippets lessens the overall impact of the information
being presented. The graphic nature of the stories, combined with the fact that the women
depicted are anonymous and disembodied contributes to extent to which the stories
themselves take on a tone of pornographic titillation. Like pornography, the timeline
includes extreme depictions of sexualized force against anonymous women. The lack of
any specificity when referring to these women changes them from human beings into
bodies—in this case, bodies that are the target of violence. Physically, Violence Against
Women: a Week in the Life of America decontextualized crime and focused on body
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21-year-old boyfriend. He has a knife and cuts her during the assault.(13)
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parts. There was no attempt made to discern a pattern or make any broader conjectures
about the nature of the violence.
The presentation of women as vulnerable paralleled the performative
representation of women’s defenselessness during several other VAWA hearings. For
instance, the 1990 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, Women and Violence, included
testimony by two women, both of whom had been raped in their teens or early
twenties.400 The first, Christine Shunk, was twenty-five years old at the time of the
hearing and testified about being raped twice. The first rape, she described, was an
acquaintance rape that took place during her freshman year at college; the second
occurred two years later when, having transferred schools, Shunk was raped by a stranger
outside her dormitory. Nicole Snow, the other woman who testified, was twenty-one
years old at the time of the hearing and testified about being raped when she was a
fifteen-year-old high school student. The testimony of the two drew attention to their fear
and emphasized their deference to Biden. During the initial interaction between Biden
and Snow, Biden emphasized the apprehension Snow must be feeling and she, in turn,
reminded those listening that Biden was the one who could allay her fear:
Biden: You are not scared, are you?
Witness [Nicole Snow]: Yes, I am scared too….You have the power to make it
less frightening for survivors and you have the power to make it a lot more
frightening for rapists.401
Shunk, likewise, began her testimony saying, “I am terrified, so please be patient with
me.”402 Snow later summoned the government as protector:
The answers aren't all that difficult, and the solutions are palpable—it has to come
400
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from the top. It has to come from our government’s acknowledgement, protection
through laws and support. And Senator Joseph Biden’s bill is the first step.403
Several Senate reports pointed out women’s sense of what they termed “double
victimization,” referring to the extent to which the disbelief women face at the hands of
the judicial and criminal justice systems is experienced as another victimization.404 It is
true that women have historically faced hostility and disbelief when bringing rape
charges, however feminism has tried to address this issue by empowering women. In
contrast to this, during hearings on VAWA, women’s victimization was presented as
immutable.
Sociologist Jennifer Wood calls the legitimization of government power to punish
through protection symbolic violence, because it gives a voice to those in whose name it
is authorized to speak. She argues that,
A protection racket is at work in the development of these crime policies, in that
they enhance the state’s power to punish, a power that is hidden behind the
idealized images of…particular victims who are represented as powerless. The
victims’ powerlessness becomes the state’s alibi for the violence that the state
commits in the victims’ names.405
Women as Victims II: Rape as Epidemic
Much of VAWA’s legislative history—including numerous hearings and
reports— employed the recurring trope of a rape epidemic. The claim that the frequency
of rape had increased exponentially was repeated not only by many who testified during
VAWA’s evolution, but also by members of congress weighing in on VAWA on the
floor of the House and Senate and referenced in testimony by lobbyists including those
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from NOW LDEF. For instance, the 1991 report Violence Against Women: The Increase
of Rape in America, included this statement by Biden, “Today’s findings…document the
spread of a rape epidemic across the country.”406 Furthermore, the report’s first chapter
was aptly titled “Women in Danger: the National Rape Epidemic.”407
By presenting a picture of burgeoning violence against women across the country,
VAWA’s proponents were better able to make an argument for the necessity of the
federal action called for by VAWA. However, there was no overwhelming evidence to
support the idea that there was more rape, and the fact of rape’s frequency hadn’t been
enough to motivate the introduction of new legislation earlier. To make the case for
VAWA’s importance, it was useful to argue that something unique was happening at this
particular time. The tactic of manipulating public opinion by emphasizing unusually high
or depraved sexual happenings is not unique to VAWA. In fact, several historians have
documented the connection between sex panic and increased punitive measures.408
The subtext of the proposition that VAWA was being introduced to fight an
epidemic was that it was not being introduced because feminism had reached a saturation
point or because rape was horrific and always had been. It was the crime itself that
appeared to have changed, not the public perception of the crime. Rape and domestic
violence were indeed the subjects of a very public hearing, but by focusing on unprovable
claims of an epidemic, politicians and advocates subtly undermined feminist
accomplishments.
This argument was presented as part of a larger claim that there was a crime
406
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epidemic; there was more crime in general, and especially more crime against women.
Again, women were framed as especially victimized. Sometimes the idea that there was
an epidemic of rape was paired with the idea that reporting about rape was unreliable, but
no mention was made of the inherent contradiction between these two ideas. For instance,
Mary Koss, the sociology professor who conducted the 1985 study of date rape with Ms.
magazine, focused the majority of her testimony during a 1990 Senate hearing on an
explication of the problems with the Department of Justice’s National Crime Survey.409
The Justice Department, Koss explained, often gathered data about rape in situations
where those being questioned were not free to answer (for instance, asking children about
sexual abuse by family members with those family members in the room). Despite this,
there was virtually no acknowledgment that the mushrooming amount of information
available about rape—coupled with the nationwide push to open rape crisis centers to
facilitate the reporting and prosecution of rape—may have affected the rate at which rape
was reported. Violence Against Women: The Increase of Rape in America’s lone mention
of data discrepancies was in reference to under-, not over-reporting; when discussing
Montana’s reported decrease in the crime, it asserted, “…we have reason to believe that
Montana’s impressive decrease is due more to reporting problems than a ‘real’ drop in
the number of rapes.”410
There is also the possibility that Biden was goaded by the controversy
surrounding VAWA to embellish statistics. This prospect becomes more likely if one
compares his bold claims of the inflation of rape pre-VAWA with his equally bold claims
of deflation after the bill’s passage. During a 2002 hearing Biden remarked,
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Federal dollars, federal leadership, federal commitment, and, most importantly
federal-state collaboration are making a real difference in the lives of women in
America. ...Since its passage, there has been a 41% decrease in the rate of
intimate partner victimization of women. …Since then, we have also seen a
similar drop in the rates of criminal rape and sexual assault during the same time
frame, almost a 43% decrease.411
Throughout reports and hearings, the increase in the incidence of rape was consistently
presented as nationwide, in order to emphasize the need for federal action. For instance, a
section of Violence Against Women: The Increase of Rape in America was titled, “Rape
is an American Problem,” and included statements like the following: “While we have
surrounded ourselves in gender-specific violence, women in no other nation or culture are
more likely to be raped than those around us.”412 The report claimed that, “All corners of
the country—and everywhere in between—have been plagued by...record-breaking
increases.” It further argued, “...This means that in 1990, American women were more
likely to be raped than ever before...”413
The purported increase in the frequency of rape was also consistently presented as
uniquely American—with the understanding that other countries were not experiencing
skyrocketing rape numbers to the extent that the United States was. Nowhere did the
reports question the political situation in Europe or examine whether any of the factors
that had led to increased reporting in the United States existed elsewhere
The reports were all but mum on why rape was increasing exponentially and why
the numbers were so inflated in the United States.
Feminists themselves, meanwhile, sometimes repeated the epidemic catchphrase
to buoy support for VAWA in the conservative, male-dominated milieu of the House and
411
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Senate. For instance, a NOW LDEF petition sent to Don Edwards (D-CA), for a hearing
on VAWA, referenced an “epidemic of violence.”414 When testifying at a House
Judiciary Committee hearing in 1993, Goldfarb said, “Currently, there is an epidemic of
violent crime against women, and women and girls are targets for many types of violence
because of their sex.”415 Those working behind the scenes for VAWA also used the
specter of an epidemic, even when communicating with other advocates. In a letter to the
NOW’s political liaison, Ginny Montes, Neuborne wrote, “The sooner we can get
heightened national programmatic assistance to women, the sooner we can begin to stem
the epidemic of rape and domestic violence.”416

Women as Victims III: Fighting the Fear
Another belief frequently expressed by VAWA’s lawmakers was that there was
an inherent connection between the increase in the frequency of rape and the imperative
for women to be afraid. The 1990 report Violence Against Women: The Increase of Rape
in America asserted,
It is easy to understand why women in this country do not feel safe. At one point,
their fears were confined to dark, secluded alleys. Now women must worry about
crowded offices, local restaurants, and comfortable homes. For women, there is
no longer any place that they can call “secure.”417
This statement is not entirely logical. Women's fears were never confined to alleyways.
What was new was not the form rape had taken, but an increased willingness to discuss
the crime that had led to a national conversation about what constituted rape.
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A 1993 hearing on violence against women in rural areas, called Violence Against
Women: Fighting the Fear, underscored the need for fear:
Today as never before, women are forced to live in fear. This report shows just
how “real” that fear is. Knowing that 1 in 5 women will be raped at some point in
her life, each woman must ask herself—every day of her life—“will it be me?”
and if so, “will it happen today?”418
Fear is only one of a number of possible responses women can have to the prospect of
rape. It is certainly not the only response, a point made clear by the fury-driven Take
Back the Night marches of the 1970s. By implying otherwise, the Judiciary Committee
reports chose to define women’s experiences for them and usurp a narrative privilege
over women’s lives.419 VAWA dictated not only how the state should respond to rape,
but how women should respond to it as well.

Women as Victims IV: Women as Family Members
Another way that lawmakers reinforced women’s victim status was by referring to
them not as citizens of the world, but as family members—highlighting men’s jobs
outside the home and women’s roles inside it. When introducing Violence Against
Women: The Increase of Rape in America, Biden stated, “Through S.15, the Violence
Against Women Act, I hope to implement the much needed programs that will help
reverse current trends. Otherwise, the raging epidemic will brutally touch the lives of
hundreds of thousands more mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters...and their
families.”420
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Biden was not the only one who employed the construct of women as family
members. Many other politicians used a similar formulation. For instance, when Senator
William Cohen (R-ME) offered his support for VAWA on the floor of the Senate in
1990, he stated:
Women throughout the country, in our Nation's urban areas and rural
communities, are being beaten and brutalized in the streets and in their homes. It
is our mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, friends, neighbors, and coworkers who
are being victimized…421
Echoing this point of view, the 1990 Judiciary Committee report on VAWA
lamented, “…in New York, one program turns away approximately 100 battered women
per week. It is shameful, but this society has invested more in our pets than our
wives…there are three times as many animal shelters as shelters harboring battered
women”422
Speaking at the June 1990 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Strom Thurmond
reflected that:
These disturbing statistics [of violent crimes against women] are not the only
evidence of the seriousness of this problem. The simple fact that our daughters
and wives fear walking down city streets alone or entering their homes at night
reminds us of the reality of violent crime. 423
Descriptions of rapes in Violence Against Women: A Week in the Life of America
included very little information about the women being attacked, but often made note
which women were mothers, with inflammatory statements like this: “Maine woman is
raped by her husband as their children cry outside the bedroom door.”424
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This emphasis on women as mothers and daughters assumed women were being
helped because of their relationship to men, not because of their own status as American
citizens. It also took for granted that women were not in Congress themselves; the “our”
in Thurmond’s statement referred specifically to the men in the room while he was
speaking and, more generally, to the men in power. Men, it was implied, would be the
ones to pass new laws; women would be the ones to be helped. As such, male politicians
were active helpers, while women were the passive recipients of their aid.
Presenting rape and domestic violence as important crimes because they could
happen to people’s families belittles their seriousness. The inference here is that if these
crimes happened to women who were not the family members of politicians, they would
not be so bad. This rendering would prove particularly paradoxical when applied to
domestic violence. For years, many senators and congressional representatives who
supported VAWA argued that domestic violence had been considered a second-class
crime because it happened inside the home.425 Thus, at the same time that those
politicians who supported VAWA argued that it should be passed to protect their
mothers/wives/daughters they argued for an understanding of domestic violence as not
just a “family matter.”
Representative Schumer introduced the hearing Domestic Violence: Not Just a
Family Matter with these words, “Our first goal [at this hearing] is to let you know that
the next woman beaten by her husband could be your daughter, your friend, your
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colleague, or your neighbor.”426 By uttering this statement, Schumer indicated the danger
of his own casual androcentrism and underscored the fact that he himself was guilty of
the very perception he was trying to change. A Senate report on VAWA explained,
Our country has an unfortunate blind spot when it comes to certain crimes against
women. Historically, crimes against women have been perceived as anything but
crime-as a “family” problem, as a “private” matter, as sexual
“miscommunication.” That tradition of ambivalence has led to oxymoronic labels
such as “date rape,” and “domestic violence,” both of which suggest that the
violence described is somehow less violent or less harmful or less serious if it
takes place in a social setting or at home.427
VAWA, while presented as progressive, often solidified ingrained ideas about
women’s roles and their relationship to society.

Women as Victims V: Young and White
The first Senate report on VAWA proclaimed: “While rape rates are increasing, it
is the young who are at the greatest risk: women aged 16 to 19 are the most likely to be
raped. “428 One expert testified: “The women between the ages of 18 and 24 are among
those most likely to be raped. And a large portion of these young women are in
college.”429 Statements such as this, combined with the fact that VAWA originally had a
campus rape component, hint at an assumption that the average rape survivor is young,
educated, and white, a “fact” not necessarily born out by statistics.
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When these women such as Christine Shunk and Nicole Snow testified, their
youth and education was stressed. Both women were young and college-educated, which
made them ideal victims.

Who Was the Rapist?
Conflicting Ideas of the Rapist
VAWA inherited some implicit understandings of the rapist’s identity from the
1968 crime bill’s language. In addition, the bill frequently reflected tension between a
host of pre- and post-feminist portraits of the rapist. While VAWA’s Law Enforcement
and Prosecution Grants title did include a definition of sexual assault, there was no
definition of the rapist, so ideas about his identity must be deduced from VAWA’s
various measures.430 The image of the rapist as an aberrant criminal coexisted with that of
him as mentally ill or spiritually sick as well as with the feminist redefinition of him as an
everyman—and of rape as a reflection of a fundamental power imbalance between men
and women. A woman testifying at a 1992 hearing perfectly captured the friction between
the different “kinds” of rapists when she said,
One group is the kind that Ms. Poland [a witness] and I are dealing with, people
that have a mental illness and some sort of twisted perception, whatever that is.
And then I think there is another group. I don’t think everybody that does this is
430
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crazy. I think there is another group that does this because it has something to do
with men’s privilege and they think it is O.K. to do this to women, and while I
wouldn't call them well-balanced people, I wouldn't call them crazy.431

The Rapist as a Black Street Criminal
VAWA’s geographic partitioning of crimes was an updated version of similar
apportioning found in the 1968 crime bill. VAWA also borrowed several of that bill’s
strategies toward such crimes. This format suffused VAWA with the racial undertones
prevalent in the 1968 crime bill. Classifying crime by geography is a tricky proposition,
as violent crime against women is not otherwise categorized by where it takes place.
Because they based VAWA’s Safe Streets for Women subtitle on the 1968 crime bill, the
authors of VAWA were forced, in effect, to pour sexual assault legislation into the mold
that had been created to address so-called street crime. Because of the historically fraught
idea of danger linked to streets, VAWA’s Safe Streets measures can be viewed as the
confluence between ideas about crime as located in the streets and perpetrated by poor
blacks and the overlapping historical image of the rapist. “Safe streets” would be those
rid of poor blacks. When promoting his crime bill on the floor of the Senate in 1990,
Biden proclaimed, “It starts by attacking the crime and drug problem where it is most
acutely felt, in the streets.”432
Even the Safe Streets for Women subtitle’s provisions for lighting in parks and on
public transportation were slanted toward crime that occurred in cities—the bill aimed to
increase safety specifically in urban parks. The idea that better lighting would prevent
rape was perfectly in sync with the idea of a criminal rapist jumping out of the shadows
431
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to attack, and statements such as these underscore the orientation of the bill not just
toward streets, but particularly toward urban streets.

The Rapist as Sick
VAWA also included traces of the sick rapist whose history was chronicled by
Estelle Freedman. For instance, the Safe Streets for Women subtitle earmarked money to
assist probation and parole officers who worked with released sex offenders with “relapse
prevention.”433 The possibility of relapse implies that the desire to rape is a disease, and
that a cure is possible—in this instance through some form of therapy. It is not clear in
this context whether there is an implication that the rapist can be cured or just prevented
from attacking again. This idea did not sit well with several on the House Judiciary
Committee.434 Schumer, for one, complained that he was opposed to treatment programs
because rapists should be treated as criminals.”435

The Rapist As Everyman
The civil rights remedy included the idea of animus, a word which assumes that
some violence against women (including but not limited to rape) is committed because of
the way certain men feel about women and some is not. As Wells and Motley make clear,
before the animus requirement was added, the remedy made the assumption that violence
against women (rape in particular) was committed because of the way that all men feel
about all women. It did this by applying to crimes committed “because of gender or on
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the basis of gender.” This language was a tacit acknowledgement of systemic misogyny,
placing emphasis on society, not on individual men. The remedy’s language was
changed, however, so that it applied to crimes were not only because of gender but also
committed “at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.”436 Wells and
Motley contend that this change was meant to indicate a requirement that each individual
perpetrating violence against women have gender-bias as his motivation.437 While this
language still included an implicit acknowledgement of gender bias, it was not an
assumption that all such crimes were committed because of gender bias. Ultimately the
civil rights remedy made manifest the idea that only some men—consciously or
unconsciously—harbor gender bias that is expressed when committing rape and domestic
violence438
VAWA’s education provisions suggested that rape was not the act of a hardened
criminal but the mistake of a confused or errant individual. Safe Streets for Women, Safe
Homes for Women, and Equal Justice for Women in the Courts all earmarked monies for
education. Twenty-five percent of the money in the Safe Streets for Women subtitle was
allocated for teaching middle school, junior high school, and high school students. All of
the education dollars at Safe Homes were funneled toward creating model programs for
primary school through college-aged students. VAWA’s education efforts were based on
the implicit assumption that the rapist was not a criminal but instead a misguided or
unlearned person. The inclusion of education measures implied that rape is a learned
behavior, not behavior that happens because of a mental abnormality, or because of an
inherent bias against women.
436
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Whereas more radical feminists had long insisted that men were aware of the
nature of their crimes when they raped, mainstream liberal feminists incorporated the
idea that a lack of understanding undergirded some of men’s violence, a problem
education could correct. In a 1991 VAWA task force meeting, members theorized that
Dole could be sponsoring the Women’s Equal Opportunity Act, a bill to the right of
Biden’s, simply because he needed to be educated about the nature of rape. “It is unclear
what Dole’s rationale is for introducing legislation on violence against women…if
Senator Dole can be educated as to the nature and extent of the problem, he could
potentially be an ally.”439
There is a basic incongruity between the idea that the rapist was an aberrant
criminal and that education could help prevent rape. If the rapist were, indeed, deviant,
than it would be a waste of money to educate him about the crime of rape. The Safe
Streets and Safe Homes subtitles were vague about the content of the educational
programs, mentioning only that the education should help to prevent rape. This was in
contrast to Equal Justice for Women in the Courts, with its very specific course of study
for judges.440
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VAWA’s emphasis on the criminality of rape was of a piece with its focus on
retributive justice as the answer to the crime. VAWA imagined the path toward helping
women as largely dependent on federal policing and prosecution, with punishment as a
recurring motif. In a hearing on the trajectory of rape legislation, Biden said:
The first step in altering our attitudes toward this violence is to understand the
failures of our laws and policies in this regard. Our criminal laws must be judged
by their effectiveness in responding to the injustices done to victims of
violence.441
This focus on punishment was based on an assumption that justice could be served by
responding to violence against women after it had occurred—an abandonment of the
feminist premise that societal power relations must be restructured to prevent rape.
VAWA’s concentration on punishment, therefore, cannot be separated from either its
conceptualization of rapists as criminals, or its presentation of women as helpless victims.
VAWA’s civil rights remedy reinforced the idea of the rapist as angry and violent.
The changes in its language that were made to subdue mounting opposition to the original
wording limited coverage of the remedy to felonious acts.442 This new language butted up
against one of the key goals of state rape law reform, which had been to rid rape law
of the resistance requirement. The concept that extra violence is needed to make a rape a
violation corroded the idea that rape in itself was a violent act.
The idea of the rapist as particularly recidivist, integral to pre-feminist portraits of
him, continued to hold sway in VAWA. The underlying premise of the idea of rapist-asrecidivist was that rapists were criminal by nature, and that they raped because of their
essential characters.443 Feminists countered that because of a gendered power imbalance,
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society construed women as inherently available for men’s enjoyment, giving every man
the potential to rape.444
This earlier conception was implicit in the Safe Streets for Women subtitle’s
Federal Penalties chapter, which specified that the review of the sentencing guidelines it
called for pay particular attention to what was termed “the problem of recidivism in cases
of sex offenses.” It was also implicit in the newly created FRE 413, which made evidence
of prior sexual assaults by a defendant admissible in federal sexual assault cases, whether
the sexual assault used as proof was proven or just alleged. As scholars Wells and Motley
point out, this rule is premised on the idea that past behavior accurately predicts future
conduct—particularly in the case of those accused of rape.445

Politicians as Saviors I: Biden as Protector
It was this focus on women and the ramifications of their behavior that led to their
presumed need for male guardianship. In Sex Panic and the Punitive State, cultural
studies theorist Roger Lancaster writes about the staying power of America’s national
guardian myth, which “casts white men as protectors of white women and children.”446
Biden and other congressmen who worked on VAWA consciously or unconsciously
bought into this myth, expressing their custodial status in a number of ways.
Biden often took credit for an extensive array of achievements surrounding
VAWA, conspicuously downplaying what feminists had accomplished to make the
legislation possible. One of his expressed aims for introducing VAWA was bringing
violence against women the attention of the American public. With statements such as:
444
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“One of the things we have to change is the attitudes about rape. I don't know how to do
it unless we start to discuss it,” he wiped out twenty-plus years of feminist activism that
had already brought rape and domestic violence to the attention of the American people.
Indeed, he exhibited a neglectful ignorance of the fact that feminists had put these crimes
violence into the public eye as well as of the proliferation of rape crisis centers and
domestic violence shelters that grew out of feminist activism. 447 Biden’s contention that
he discovered the issue of violence against women is therefore either negligent or
disingenuous.
Biden’s tactics allowed him to claim expertise on rape and domestic violence. His
assertions about bringing violence against women to the attention of the public were
somewhat self-serving. The general public’s pre-existing awareness of rape was essential
for widespread acceptance of VAWA’s relevance. An already sizeable group of anti-rape
activists provided Biden both with his expert witnesses and with the cognitive map with
which to navigate the landscape of responses toward violence against women.
Incongruously, Biden presented VAWA as in line with feminist demands while
simultaneously minimizing the actual contributions wrought by feminist activism around
those demands. In so doing, he both helped define the contours of the Senate and House
dialogues about rape while reviving rape as an important legislative subject.
When appearing at hearings for VAWA, Biden stressed that, as victims of their
attackers, women should passively wait for Congress to protect them. Biden was not
entirely ignorant of the juxtaposition between protected and protector, and referred to it
when he described telling his wife about VAWA for the first time. Biden recounted in his
autobiography that,
447
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She [Jill] was getting ready…when I turned to her and explained how excited and
proud I was about the act we were writing. I was half-expecting—and surely
hoping—that my wife would give me a big hug and tell me how proud she was of
me. But after a long silence she said, ‘Why are you doing that? We don’t need
protection.’”448

Politicians as Saviors II: The Appropriation of Feminist Arguments
Sometimes, in contrast to their understated subversion of feminism, Biden and
other politicians used extravagant “feminist-style” claims to buttress the case they made
for VAWA. Often their declarations were made with exaggerated anger, to drive home to
the listener the extent of their supposed outrage at women’s treatment.
For instance, during the Senate Judiciary Committee’s August 1990 hearing on
VAWA, Biden questioned Christine Skunk and Nicole Snow, both of whom spoke as
survivors of acquaintance rape. Biden expressed distaste for the fact that both of these
women felt a sense of guilt after their attacks. He proclaimed,
“I think that it is real important for one basic message to go out, and for
everybody to understand it. There is no circumstance ever, ever, ever, ever—no
circumstance ever where a man has a right, for any reason, to use force on a
woman. Never, never. Whether he is a husband, a date, an acquaintance,
no matter what.”449
The outrage Biden expressed allowed him to separate himself from the kind of men who
do use force against women and allowed him to position himself as impervious to the
sexism that befalls so many others. In this instance Biden further positioned himself in
opposition to the rest of the world:
I think the saddest thing and the most important thing that both of you have said
here..is that each of you said something that I hope the whole damn country
listens to…Why in God’s name should you have any sense of guilt?450
448
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When Snow explained that women “don’t ask to be raped,” Biden responded,
Say that again. No matter what, no matter what, no woman asks to be raped.
Never. Right?....Say it again, so everybody hears it, because people do not seem
to get that message.451
Biden separated himself from “people,” implying that the problem is with the general
population, of which he is not a part. He also implied that if the general population heard
his message often enough, people would change their behavior. By default Biden’s
statements implied that the legislation he was there to discuss was itself feminist.
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CONCLUSION
TAKING WOMEN OUT OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
VAWA has been reauthorized three times since its original passage in 1994—in
2000, 2004 and 2013. Just as in the first version of VAWA, the largest budget item in
each of VAWA’s reauthorizations has been that which reauthorized the STOP grants
created in 1994.452
VAWA’s reauthorizations have broken the mold set by VAWA in several ways.
They do not share their parent law’s overt reference to streets as the location for rape. In
addition, because they are no longer tethered to a larger crime bill, they have collected
components that have been able to free themselves slightly from the tough-on-crime
stranglehold that held the first version of VAWA. To some extent, the later bills are able
to place violence against women in a larger context. For instance, by providing economic
support for domestic violence survivors, the most recent VAWA reauthorization takes a
stab at addressing the economic issues surrounding that crime. In addition, each
reauthorization has expanded the groups covered by VAWA. In spite of these changes,
the fact that most funding goes to law enforcement ensures that they all perpetuate its
most damaging characteristics.
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Since its original passage, VAWA’s vocabulary and approach have become
further embedded in the language used by the federal government when addressing rape,
domestic violence, and other violent sexual crimes. Since a divided Supreme Court
declared VAWA’s civil rights remedy unconstitutional in 2000, the remaining portion of
VAWA are those which hew much more closely to the goals of the rest of the crime
bill.453 With the death of the civil rights remedy gone is the public discussion of violence
and its relationship women’s civil rights.
With the addition of new crimes, such as stalking, covered by successive versions
of VAWA, even more violent sexual crimes against women have combined into the
single category of violence against women without reference to the individual
characteristics of each. Women construed as victims are once again necessarily targeted
for protection. And once again the fiscal focus of these bills is not always but most often
on the crimes in question after they have been committed.
The experience of Karen Artichoker, the member of the Rosebud Sioux who
penned the letter sent by the Women’s Circle in 1991 encouraging passage of Safe
Street’s increased federal sentences, serves as a poignant reminder of the extent to which
VAWA has put control of rape crisis and domestic violence centers in the hands of law
enforcement.
Artichoker was flown to Washington, D.C. to consult with other activists from the
NCADV as well as congressional staff. Her participation in crafting and lobbying for
major federal legislation was a first—for Artichoker certainly, as she’d never been to
Washington DC before she arrived to work with fellow activists on VAWA—but perhaps
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for Washington DC as well—rarely if ever before had the country called upon its Native
American feminist activist citizens to pitch in for the good of the polity.
The inclusivity of NCADV made it possible for her to come to the Capitol, and
the connections forged by NOW LDEF made it possible for her opinion to be heard and
recognized. Indeed, when she wrote the letter that was sent on behalf of The Women’s
Circle to the Judiciary Committee in support of VAWA’s law enforcement chapter,
Reuss made a point of taking her up to Biden and introducing her. Artichoker remembers
that Reuss told Biden, “This is Karen and she's the one that wrote that letter that got the
Navajos off your back.”454
But Artichoker’s communion with Reuss and Biden was short-lived. It became
painfully clear to her fairly quickly that her initial hopes for meaningful legislative
change had been misplaced. Worse still, it seemed that a bad deal could truly be worse
than no deal at all.
She remembered the first time the true meaning of the language of VAWA’s
funding provisions was made manifest. She had returned to South Dakota and looked
over the plan for the state’s allocation of its STOP funding. She was speaking to a South
Dakota legislator. 455
But we hated the state’s STOP plan. We had Governor [Bill] Janklow here then.
So we said we wouldn't approve it. And then they said, “Well you don't have to
approve it. According to the legislation we just have to let you see it. But you
don't have to approve it.” Janklow called my counterpart. He really – it was really
cops and prosecutors and buried the whole shelter piece we just hated it.
And then slowly, she realized what had happened to the language of the act as a whole.
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But the co-opting is a pretty hard pill to swallow. I remember saying to the
violence against women office, when I'm reading grants I said, is there any -- I
mean I notice when I’m sitting here visiting with all of you federal officials, that
none of you say the word woman, you always say victim. “This is the Violence
Against Women Act. I said, is it okay to use the word woman?”... And then one
of them finally said, “Well you can, Karen, but we can't.” So they've really kind
of taken the woman out of the Violence Against Women Act.456
Artichoker was not alone in feeling that she’d somehow been tricked by VAWA’s
final shape. VAWA has made it possible for the federal and local governments to insert
themselves into anti-rape efforts at a level not seen before. Grants encouraging arrest
policies encouraged the incarceration of black men and women alike.
VAWA’s measures have contributed to the unyielding focus on incarceration and
increased policing as the main approach toward violent sexual crimes against women.
Part of the country’s drift toward more and longer sentences, VAWA has contributed to
American incarceration rates that are dwarf those of every other industrialized country;
even though the United States has less than five percent of the world’s population it
houses almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners.457 The racial disparities in the makeup
of the prison population are harrowing. Blacks now constitute nearly 1 million of the total
2.3 million people incarcerated; they are incarcerated at nearly six times the rate of
whites with 1 in 100 African-American women in prison.458
In response to this, a group of anti-rape activists “fed up with the existing
organizations that couldn’t (or wouldn’t) address violence faced by women of color”
created INCITE! in 2000 “to develop political projects that address the multiple forms of
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violence women of color experience”.459 The INCITE! statement of purpose identifies
“violence against women of color” as a combination of “violence directed
at communities,” such as police violence and “violence within communities,” such as
sexual and domestic violence.460
With the growth public awareness, in 2003 Ms. magazine published a report
examining the relationship between feminism and incarceration. It was a very public
acknowledgement of the missteps that the anti-rape and domestic violence movements
had made. The report’s authors asked several trenchant questions, including the
following:
Can we prevent violence against women through a broader agenda that invests in
education, employment, housing, and other basic needs? What might it look like
if communities had resources to explore effective interventions and services that
would keep decision-making power within the community…?461
The publication was indicative of the growing mainstream acceptance of a
particular strain of criticism of the anti-violence movement and was part of a growing
chorus calling for reform. In her 2006 book Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a
Break From Feminism Janet Halley devised the term governance feminism to describe
what she sees as “fierce turn in American feminism toward the state” and a powerful
tendency toward “criminalising and illegalising as many of the bad things that men did to
women as feminism could articulate.”462 An unintended result has been that feminism
"has lost a certain power of critical thinking”463 Even more recently, Elizabeth Bernstein
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modified Halley’s phrase slightly to discuss what she terms carceral feminism.464
Such criticisms have fueled a long-overdue public conversation—a conversation
had by people such as Brenda Smith and Isabel Katz Pinzler and the membership of the
LCCR while VAWA was being debated, but then only behind closed doors. Tragically
this discussion is too little too late, as the basic theoretical and funding structures put
solidly into place by VAWA have become standard fare. Indeed the success of VAWA’s
framework—still called feminist but so far removed from many of the original tenets of
the movement—is confirmation of Beth Richie’s observation that anti-rape and domestic
violence activists have “won the mainstream but lost the movement.”465
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